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Chapter 1
Introduction to the Essays
Experiments have a long tradition in the natural sciences, medicine and psychology.
Pioneers such as Isaac Newton believed that experiments could provide important
insights for theories. His view about experiments is best summarized in the following
quote:
The best and safest method of philosophizing seems to be ﬁrst to in-
quire diligently into the properties of things, and establishing those
properties by experiments, and then to proceed more slowly to hy-
potheses for the explanations of them.
 Isaac Newton
As emphasized in this quote, experiments are an appealing scientiﬁc method because
they allow researchers to draw causal inferences. More speciﬁcally, an experiment typ-
ically holds all factors constant and introduces exogenous variation in a single variable,
the treatment. This controlled variation is crucial in order to attribute changes in
the outcome of interest to the treatment (Croson and Gächter, 2010).
Experiments in the ﬁeld of economics are primarily used to test theories. These theories
provide abstract descriptions of social and economic phenomena, involving a set of
individuals, their information and options of choice as well as the possible outcomes
(Croson and Gächter, 2010). Based on behavioral assumptions (such as an assumption
about how the individuals evaluate the outcomes), a theory predicts the choices that
the individuals should make and the outcomes which would result from these choices.
An experiment aimed at testing a theory usually implements its basic features (e.g.
the possible choices and the information structure) and exogenously manipulates the
factors which, based on the theory, should aﬀect individuals' choices. Thereby, the
experiment provides insights as to whether the observed causal eﬀects are consistent
or inconsistent with the eﬀects predicted by a theory.
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Naturally, experiments are not the only method to test theories. In fact, economic
theories have traditionally been tested with data. However, natural treatments which
would allow researchers to analyze causal relationships are rare outside the lab (Davis
and Holt, 1993; Croson and Gächter, 2010). In the absence of naturally occurring
exogenous variation, data can be useful in order to establish empirical associations
between the variables of interest but it might be diﬃcult to disentangle the exact
cause and eﬀect relationship predicted by a theory (Davis and Holt, 1993).
In addition to providing causal tests of theories which might be diﬃcult to obtain with
ﬁeld data, experiments also allow researchers to discriminate between competing the-
ories. Consider the case where two theories predict the very same social phenomenon
(e.g. people contribute to public goods) but attribute such behavior to diﬀerent moti-
vations (e.g. they contribute because they are observed by others and feel obliged to or
they are intrinsically motivated to contribute). Despite the fact that such motivations
cannot be disentangled in the ﬁeld, researchers might be able to identify situations
in which the two theories make diﬀerent behavioral predictions (e.g. manipulate the
observability of one's contributions) and implement this situation a lab experiment.
Thus, in these cases experiments can contribute to our understanding of the motiva-
tions underlying certain economic and social phenomena.
A non-obvious contribution of experiments is that they can provide important insights
for the design of new theories by establishing empirical patterns through replication
(Cassar and Friedman, 2004; Schmidt, 2009). If a replicable pattern is inconsistent with
a single or even a collection of theories, new theories are required in order to explain this
predictable deviation. Although this is certainly not the main purpose why researchers
conduct experiments, several major advancements in Economics can be attributed to
such a process. For example, as discussed by Croson and Gächter (2010), prospect
theory was developed to explain deviations from expected utility theory. Similarly,
theories of social preferences were introduced into economic models as an explanation
for other-regarding behavior observed in a broad class of games (Andreoni, 1990; Fehr
and Schmidt, 1999).
My above arguments show that there might be good reasons to apply experiments in
order to test and distinguish between competing theories, especially in the absence
of natural experiments outside the lab. However, experiments often abstract from
important features of real-world interactions, such as communication or face-to-face
interaction, and study behavior in stylized games. This abstraction implies that the
results of an experiment cannot be extrapolated to the ﬁeld (Levitt and List, 2007),
unless one wants to insist a priori that those aspects of behavior under study are per-
fectly general (Harrison and List, 2004, p.1009). Hence, any lab experiment should be
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carefully motivated by an interest in the internal rather than the external validity of a
theory. In contrast, an interest in the external validity of a theory might justify the use
of experimental methods which impose less rigorous controls, such as ﬁeld experiments
(Harrison and List, 2004). Furthermore, recent developments in econometrics have
provided researchers with a large spectrum of quasi-experimental methods, such as
instrumental variables, regression discontinuity designs as well as the epidemiological
approach. These methods allow researchers to isolate the causal eﬀect of an interven-
tion, even if the population aﬀected by the intervention was not randomly selected
(as in classical lab and ﬁeld experiments). According to Angrist et al. (2013), these
methods allow researchers to come as close as possible to the experiment that could
ideally be used to capture the causal eﬀect (Angrist et al., 2013, p.4), i.e. if a truly
exogenous manipulation of the treatment variable were possible in the ﬁeld. Given the
trade-oﬀ between internal and external validity, these diﬀerent experimental methods
should be rather seen as complements, providing diﬀerent perspectives on the same
economic question, rather than being treated as substitutes.
Experimental methods have become increasingly popular since the 1960s. With the
rise of game theory, social choice and voting theory, economists started to recognize
the potential of experiments to causally test and distinguish between diﬀerent theories
(Cassar and Friedman, 2004). Furthermore, given that a single theory could gener-
ate multiple (in theory equally likely) equilibria, experiments were employed to study
questions of equilibrium selection and coordination. In the late 1960s and early 1970s,
several experiments designed as tests of expected utility theory (Slovic and Lichten-
stein, 1971; Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1971; Lindman, 1971), oligopoly bargaining theory
(Sauermann and Selten, 1960; Siegel and Fouraker, 1960; Friedman, 1963; Malouf and
Roth, 1981) and general equilibrium theory (Smith, 1962, 1964) were published in eco-
nomics and psychology journals. Furthermore, advancements in experimental methods
were published in top journals (Chamberlin, 1948; Smith, 1976; Samuelson, 2005; Levitt
and List, 2007) which made them available to a broad audience. These developments
have facilitated the application of economic experiments to an ever growing range of
topics (see Kagel and Roth (2016) for an overview).
This introduction into experimental economics illustrates that experiments are pow-
erful tools in order to causally test economic theories, distinguish between competing
theories or establish empirical patterns, especially in the absence of natural treatments
and when the research question justiﬁes a high interest in the internal validity of a
theory. The four chapters included in this dissertation all apply experimental methods
to study fundamental questions about economic behavior. Each chapter is motivated
by testing speciﬁc economic theories and the results provide important insights for the
5
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further development of these theories.
While all chapters apply a common method, they contribute to diﬀerent ﬁelds within
economics. Namely, chapters 2 and 3 relate to a recent literature in Behavioral Eco-
nomics, which analyzes the role of heuristics and biases in social choices. Chapters
4 and 5, in contrast, contribute to the literature on Public Choice, by analyzing how
the decision rule aﬀects outcomes and the eﬃciency of agreements in multilateral bar-
gaining. The remainder of this introduction provides a brief overview of the related
literature and outlines the contributions of each chapter. In addition, I provide a brief
summary of each chapter.
Behavioral Economics
The objective of Behavioral Economics is to integrate insights from psychology and
social sciences into economic models. The aspiration is that more realistic assump-
tions about human behavior generate new insights, allow economists to make better
predictions for ﬁeld behavior and design better policies (Camerer et al., 2011). For this
purpose, behavioral economic models relax two assumptions which are at the heart of
almost all neoclassical theories: Rationality and self-interest.
Rationality assumes that decision makers integrate all available information, per-
fectly calculate probabilities and make choices based on a careful assessment of the
beneﬁts and costs. Several well-established ﬁndings in the Behavioral Economics
literature are inconsistent with this notion. Among them are anchoring (Tversky
and Kahneman, 1974; Ariely et al., 2003), loss aversion (Tversky and Kahneman,
1991), reference-dependence (Thaler, 1980; Tversky and Kahneman, 1991) and time-
inconsistency (Thaler, 1981).
In their seminal research, Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman suggest that when
decision makers need to solve complex tasks, such as assessing the future value of a
dollar or the price they should pay for a house, they rely heavily on heuristics or rules
of thumbs (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, 1981, 1991; Kahneman, 2003). The use of
such heuristics leads to predictable biases and choices which are not consistent with
rationality.
A separate strand in the Behavioral Economics literature studies the assumption that
decision makers maximize their own monetary beneﬁts, independent of how their
choices aﬀect the wealth of others. This assumption applies speciﬁcally to non-repeated
contexts in which the decision maker has no incentive to establish a good reputation.
Given that such contexts are rare in the ﬁeld, researchers have studied this prediction
in stylized one-shot games.
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The evidence collected from these games is clearly inconsistent with selﬁsh behavior.
Namely, most people cooperate with strangers, even if cooperation is a dominated
action for a selﬁsh decision maker (Zelmer, 2003). In addition, they pass funds to
strangers in trust games, even at the risk of being exploited (Johnson and Mislin,
2011). Furthermore, evidence from dictator games suggest that most people share a
signiﬁcant fraction of their endowment with an anonymous recipient (Engel, 2011).
Several theories have explained this evidence by introducing the concept of social pref-
erences. These theories assume that a decision maker's utility depends on his own as
well as on the wealth of others. Two decades of research show that the motivations for
social behavior are manifold. Some of the most important concepts in this literature are
the following: People dislike inequality in outcomes (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton
and Ockenfels, 2000) and they make choices which increase the social welfare even at
own costs (Charness and Rabin, 2002). In addition, they reciprocate fair behavior
(Fehr and Gächter, 2000b) and punish selﬁsh behavior of others (Fehr and Gächter,
2000a; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003). Whenever the link between own actions and out-
comes is reduced, they tend to be more selﬁsh (Dana et al., 2007; Fudenberg et al.,
2012). Hence, pro-social choices depend on an evaluation of outcomes, the intentions
of others as well as the observability of pro-social behavior.
While pro-social choices have traditionally been linked to preferences, a recent litera-
ture, inspired by research in psychology, analyzes the role of biases in explaining these
choices. This literature studies the emotional and mental processes involved in pro-
social choices and attempts to identify how cognitive limits aﬀect these choices. Two of
the papers in this dissertation contribute to this recent literature. Chapter 2 (joint with
Johannes Lohse) analyzes the claim that pro-social behavior in one-shot games reﬂects
a cooperation heuristic which is highly adapted for repeated interactions outside the
lab (Rand et al., 2012). Hence, this literature suggests that a decision maker which
decides based on a quick ﬁrst intuition chooses diﬀerently than a decision maker which
carefully analyzes the beneﬁts and costs of pro-social choices. Other researchers argue
that behavior in these game reﬂects a single mental process in which decision makers
resolve the conﬂict between selﬁsh and other-regarding motives (Fehr and Camerer,
2007). To distinguish between the two theories, we use a novel experiment with time
pressure and time delay manipulations. Our experiment provides clear evidence against
the hypothesis that fair behavior in one-shot games can be linked to intuitive biases.
Instead, our results suggest that decisions in these games reﬂect heterogeneous social
preferences. This chapter has been accepted for publication and is forthcoming in
Experimental Economics.
Chapter 3 analyzes whether donors give more to single identiﬁed as compared to groups
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of statistical recipients. This observation is commonly referred to as the identiﬁable
victim eﬀect. Researchers have proposed two explanations for the identiﬁable victim
eﬀect: A bias towards identiﬁed as compared to unidentiﬁed recipients, based on the
assumption that donors experience greater emotional arousal when they can identify
the recipient of their donation, as well as a preference for more concentrated divisions
of the donation, based on a bias favoring interventions with a greater proportional
impact. I design a choice task allowing me to test how both explanations contribute
to the identiﬁable victim eﬀect. In contrast to previous studies, I control for the
information that donors have about recipients in all treatments. The results show
that subjects do not donate more simply because they can identify the recipient of
their donation. Furthermore, I ﬁnd that subjects donate more to groups than to single
recipients, suggesting that there is no general bias favoring single identiﬁed individuals.
In the following, I will provide a more detailed summary of each chapter.
Summary of Chapter 2
The ﬁrst paper Is fairness intuitive? Accounting for subjective utility dif-
ferences under time pressure (joint with Johannes Lohse) provides a new test
for the hypothesis that fairness is intuitive (FII). According to this hypothesis, peo-
ple are intuitively predisposed to make fair choices, such as choosing to contribute in
public good games or sharing their endowment in dictator games. Deliberation can,
however, override the impulse to be fair, thus leading to more selﬁsh choices. A large
number of papers have tested the FII hypothesis using response time data, i.e. the
time it takes before a decision maker enters her choice. Studies which causally test the
FII hypothesis, typically compare the choices of subjects who are placed under time
pressure, thereby forced to make a quick and intuitive choice, with choices of subjects
who are constrained to wait before making a choice. In light of conﬂicting empirical
evidence, we conduct a new test in which we address the concern that response times
may be aﬀected by the subjective choice diﬃculty. We explore how choice diﬃculty
aﬀects decisions under time pressure and time delay and derive conditions under which
an increase in fair choices under time pressure can be unambiguously attributed to the
FII hypothesis.
We use a simple version of the Drift Diﬀusion Model (DDM) to show that time pressure
increases the frequency of mistakes, especially among decision makers who perceive
smaller utility diﬀerences between the options of choice. This implies that time pressure
can increase the fraction of fair choices relative to time delay, if fair decision makers
perceive larger utility diﬀerences than selﬁsh decision makers and are less common in
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the population. In turn, if selﬁsh decision makers perceive larger utility diﬀerences
than fair decision makers and are less common in the population, time pressure should
decrease the fraction of fair choices relative to time delay. The FII hypothesis, on
the other hand, predicts that time pressure should always increase the fraction of fair
choices. Hence, depending on the type of choice situation, the two theories either
predict the same (type I decisions) or opposite eﬀects (type II decisions) which may
even cancel each other out. We show that classifying a choice situation into one of
these two types is essential in order to correctly interpret the evidence, as the FII
hypothesis might be spuriously accepted (if the DDM and the FII hypothesis make
the same prediction) or rejected (if the DDM and the FII hypothesis predict opposite
eﬀects which may even cancel each other out).
In order to test our considerations, we conduct experiments in which subjects take
decisions in two-person binary dictator and prisoner's dilemma games. Across games,
we vary the subjective attractiveness of the fair option by increasing the beneﬁts of
fair behavior. In particular, our experiment includes choice situations in which we
expect that decision makers who prefer the fair option will ﬁnd it subjectively more,
less or as diﬃcult to choose as decision makers who prefer the selﬁsh option such that
the DDM and the FII make either consistent or opposite predictions concerning the
eﬀect of time pressure. To classify choice situations into one of these two types, we
implement an additional treatment in which we observe response time correlations and
choice frequencies. Based on a recent paper by Krajbich et al. (2015a), we should ﬁnd
that fair choices are correlated with shorter response times in decision problems in
which fair choices are subjectively less diﬃcult than selﬁsh choices and vice versa.
Overall, our analysis provides limited support for the FII hypothesis. In binary dic-
tator and prisoner's dilemma games in which both, the DDM and the FII hypothesis
predict that time pressure should increase the fraction of fair choices, we do not observe
that time pressure leads to signiﬁcantly more fair choices as compared to time delay.
Similarly, we do not observe that time pressure increases the fraction of fair choices in
games, where this increase would constitute unambiguous evidence in favor of the FII
hypothesis. In a complementary analysis, we compare the choices of the same decision
maker in a given game under time pressure and time delay. Our analysis shows that the
observed switching patterns strongly reﬂect choice diﬃculty (i.e. indiﬀerence). While
this pattern is predicted by the DDM, it is inconsistent with the FII hypothesis.
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Summary of chapter 3
The third chapter Do people prefer donating to identiﬁed individuals? ana-
lyzes behavioral explanations for the observation that people make larger donations to
single identiﬁed as compared to groups of statistical recipients, commonly referred to
as the identiﬁable victim eﬀect. Researchers have proposed two explanations for this
eﬀect: Identiﬁability and a preference for more concentrated divisions of the donations.
Papers which study the role of identiﬁability on donations typically compare donations
to a single recipient identiﬁed by photo and / or individuating information with dona-
tions to an otherwise anonymous recipient. A common ﬁnding in these papers is that
identiﬁed recipients receive larger donations than anonymous recipients. One explana-
tion for this observation is that donors give more to identiﬁed recipients in response to
the fact that they have better information about them. Another explanation is that
donors give more when they can identify the recipient of their donation, for example
based on feeling more empathy towards an identiﬁed relative to an anonymous recip-
ient. If the latter explanation is true, we would expect that a donor always prefers
to observe the recipient of her donation, even if she has the same kind of objective
information about all potential recipients. To test for such a mere eﬀect of identiﬁ-
ability, I design a new experiment in which I control the amount of information that
donors have and exogenously vary whether subjects can observe the recipient of their
donation.
For this purpose, I run laboratory experiments in which subjects can make donations
to ﬁnance school attendance and lunches for children in Uganda. Each subject is
matched to a group of three children. A picture of each child is displayed prior to the
ﬁrst donation decision such that subjects have the same kind of objective information
about all potential recipients. Subjects take multiple donation decisions. Across these
decisions, I vary whether subjects know which child will receive their donation (such
that the recipient is identiﬁed) or whether they only know that one of the three children
will receive the donation (such that the recipient is unidentiﬁed).
In a separate treatment, I analyze another common explanation for the identiﬁable
victim eﬀect. Namely, several researchers have found evidence consistent with a pref-
erence for more concentrated divisions of the donation. Such a preference could explain
why people prefer to donate to single identiﬁed individuals instead of donating to a
large scale intervention involving multiple recipients. To analyze how the distribution
aﬀects donation decisions, I run a second treatment in which I vary whether a sub-
ject's donation is disbursed to a single identiﬁed child or whether it is equally disbursed
among the three identiﬁed children.
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Hence, my experiment allows me to analyze how both behavioral explanations con-
tribute to the identiﬁable victim eﬀect in a comparable choice task.
I ﬁnd that subjects in the ﬁrst treatment do not give more when they can observe the
recipient as compared to cases in which they cannot observe the recipient of their dona-
tion. Hence, this evidence is inconsistent with the hypothesis that the mere possibility
of being able to identify the recipient increases donations. This result is important
for the interpretation of previous studies. Namely, given that identiﬁcation of the re-
cipient has no eﬀect, the observed diﬀerences in donations to vividly identiﬁed versus
anonymous recipients can be clearly attributed to the fact that donors give more when
they have more information about the recipients.
In contrast to previous studies, I ﬁnd that subjects in the second treatment give less to
a single identiﬁed recipient than to the group with three identiﬁed recipients. Hence,
this evidence is not consistent with a preference for a more concentrated distribution of
the donation. Despite the fact that I used smaller group sizes as compared to previous
studies, I conclude that this result provides evidence that there is no general preference
for concentrated distributions which is independent of the concrete details of the choice
situation (such as the group size and the endowment).
Public Choice
Public Choice uses the tools of economic theory to study political behavior. The
subjects studied include voting behavior, party politics, bureaucracy, constitutions,
inﬂuence groups as well as collective choice. Models within the Public Choice literature
are built on the same behavioral assumptions as neoclassical economic models, i.e.
rational and self-interested agents, whose interactions are studied using game theory
and decision theory.
A central question within the Public Choice literature is which decision rule should
be used in collective bargaining. Early contributions, mostly from the Social Choice
Literature, have studied this question from a normative perspective. Several of these
theories are built on the assumption that individual preferences can be aggregated
to obtain a social will, depicted in the form of a social welfare function (Bergson,
1938; Samuelson, 1948). In reaction to this literature, Arrow (1951) showed that no
voting system can transform the individual preferences of a group into a complete and
transitive social ranking without violating a set of basic normative requirements such as
Pareto eﬃciency and non-dictatorship. His seminal analysis has entered the literature
as the Impossibility Theorem.
From a normative perspective, Arrow's Impossibility Theorem proofs that there is no
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acceptable method to attribute rational preferences to a group of individuals with diﬀer-
ent interests and that any concept of Social Welfare naturally violates some democratic
principles. This has spurred a literature which analyzes the properties of diﬀerent con-
cepts of Social Welfare and discusses which of the normative criteria deﬁned by Arrow
should be fulﬁlled. An overview of this literature is provided by Sen (1977, 2017).
From a positive perspective, the Impossibility Theorem shows that political decisions
may depend strongly on the applied rules. In particular, certain rules may lead to cycles
in the political process such that earlier decisions are overruled. This interpretation
naturally gives rise to the question how the institutional features and rules aﬀect the
outcomes of collective choice (Mueller, 2003). Since the 1970s, several authors have
studied this challenging question.
Although real world decision rules can be quite complex, a number of authors have
focused on analyzing the properties of diﬀerent q Majority rules, with q representing
the number of individuals which need to consent for a decision to be implemented.
Some of the papers in this literature study the eﬀect of decision rules in collective
decisions involving a common interest. An example for this kind of situation is jury
decision making, where all jurors would want to convict a guilty and acquit an inno-
cent defendant. In this literature, diﬀerent opinions are seen to reﬂect the fact that
jurors have diﬀerent information (or at least interpret the objective facts diﬀerently).
Therefore, the question that this literature poses is which decision rule best aggregates
the information of the individual committee members, such that the probability of
selecting the right outcome is maximized.
The literature on common interest bargaining dates back to Condorcet's Jury Theo-
rem. In this theorem, Condorcet (1785) argues that a committee is more likely to make
the right decision under majority rule than each committee member individually. An
important assumption in Condorcet's Theorem is that all members vote sincerely. In
contrast to this assumption, more recent theories assume that committee members vote
strategically, i.e. condition their vote on the event in which they are pivotal (Austen-
Smith and Banks, 1996; Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1996). These theories provide
interesting new insights into individual voting behavior which can, for example, pro-
vide an explanation for abstention in large scale elections (Feddersen and Pesendorfer,
1996; Robinson and Torvik, 2009; Battaglini et al., 2010). Furthermore, these theories
show that majority rule is more eﬃcient in selecting the right outcome than unanimity
rule. This theoretical result is interesting given that real world decisions involving
common interest, such as jury decisions in the U.S. court system, usually involve una-
nimity rule. A recent experiment by Goeree and Yariv (2011), however, shows that as
soon as the members are allowed to communicate, the predicted eﬃciency diﬀerences
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between unanimity and majority rule vanish. Hence, this experimental result shows
that the theoretically sound diﬀerences between diﬀerent rules might disappear once
members can discuss and share their perspective on the interpretation of the facts.
A separate strand, more related to the research presented in this dissertation, studies
the role of decision rules in situations with misaligned preferences. Hence, in this
literature individuals are seen to have diﬀerent preferences over the potential outcomes
or about whether a joint project should be conducted at all. The key question in
this literature is how conﬂicts are handled under diﬀerent decision rules. Other equally
challenging questions are how the diﬀerences in outcomes that individuals could expect
under the diﬀerent rules aﬀect their incentives to engage in joint activities or which
decision rule they would preferably apply in situations with misaligned preferences.
In their book The calculus of consent, Buchanan and Tullock (1962) provide a seminal
analysis of decision rules. They argue that when choosing between diﬀerent q majority
rules, individuals face a tradeoﬀ between external and decision costs: On the one
hand, more inclusive rules which require a larger number of individuals to consent,
decrease the probability of being harmed by a decision. These external costs are
minimized under unanimity rule where each committee member is endowed with veto
power, allowing her to protect her interests. On the contrary, the costs of reaching
an agreement increase as more individuals are required to consent. Buchanan and
Tullock (1962) argue that rational individuals would balance both costs behind the
veil of ignorance and thus favor less-than-unanimity rules.
Several recent experimental studies have analyzed this tradeoﬀ by conducting multilat-
eral bargaining experiments. The evidence reported in these studies is consistent with
Buchanan and Tullock's arguments. Namely, outcomes under unanimity rule tend to be
more inclusive and involve a more equal division of the surplus as compared to majority
rule. Possibly anticipating these eﬀects, people are less likely to make contributions
to projects whose proceeds will be distributed by majority instead of unanimity rule
(Baranski, 2016). While this might make unanimity rule more desirable than majority
rule, groups usually need more time in order to negotiate agreements when unanim-
ity rule is used. This delay results in less eﬃcient agreements. Related research in
behavioral economics shows that when individuals face trade-oﬀs between equal and
eﬃcient outcomes, they tend to choose eﬃcient outcomes (Charness and Rabin, 2002).
If this evaluation extends to collective decisions, unanimity rule might actually be less
desirable than majority rule.
The two last chapters of this dissertation contribute to this challenging topic. Previ-
ous evidence has compared the outcomes of collective bargaining under majority and
unanimity rule in experiments where subjects bargain over an exogenous surplus. A
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key result in these studies is that outcomes under unanimity rule distribute the funds
relatively equal among the committee members, while most collectively agreed out-
comes under majority rule constitute minimum winning coalitions, in which only a
majority of the group members receives a positive share of the funds. Chapter 4 (joint
with Christoph Vanberg) studies whether we continue to observe this diﬀerence in out-
comes if the surplus to be divided result from joint production. In particular, we study
whether subjects indeed form minimum winning coalitions, in which the most pro-
ductive members are excluded. If so, majority rule might discourage individuals from
exerting eﬀort in joint projects whose proceeds will be distributed based on majority
rule. In sharp contrast to previous experiments, we ﬁnd that outcomes under both
decision rules constitute convex combinations of the equal and the proportional split.
Most notably, we see few minimum winning coalitions being proposed. This suggests
that fairness perceptions strongly inﬂuence the outcomes in these situations, even in
the absence of veto power.
While Chapter 4 focuses on the outcomes under unanimity and majority rule, Chapter 5
(joint with Christoph Vanberg) studies how the decision rule aﬀects the decision costs.
A measure of decision costs used in previous multilateral bargaining experiments is
delay, i.e. the number of formal proposals which are made before a group reaches
an agreement. However, delay in real world legislative bargaining is usually caused by
lengthy discussions prior to a formal vote. We therefore study the eﬀect of decision rules
in a novel experiment, in which communication itself is costly. Our results show that
groups communicate signiﬁcantly longer under unanimity as compared to majority
rule. The diﬀerence in communication length is especially large when players are
asymmetric to some degree given that communication is required in order to select one
among multiple possible outcomes.
In the following, I provide a more detailed summary of Chapters 4 and 5.
Summary of Chapter 4
The third chapter Legislative Bargaining with Joint Production: An experi-
mental Study (joint with Christoph Vanberg) examines bargaining games in which
the surplus being divided results from joint production. Such negotiations are likely to
be complicated given that group members might disagree about the degree of propor-
tionality that should prevail. The main question we address in this paper, is how such
disagreements are handled under diﬀerent decision rules. Our analysis focuses on the
comparison between unanimity and simple majority rule as polar cases of a continuum
of q-majority rules being used in practice. The comparison between these two rules
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is interesting given that unanimity rule allows each party to protect her interests by
exerting veto power. Although protection of interests may be deemed as a desirable
feature, endowing each party with veto power creates incentives to withhold agree-
ment. In contrast, majority rule allows for the formation of coalitions in which only a
majority of individuals is included. The threat of being excluded from such coalitions,
therefore, creates incentives to compromise.
Several recent papers have analyzed unanimity bargaining with joint production. In
line with the theoretical arguments discussed above, they show that group members
use their veto power to enforce proportional outcomes and their subjective fairness
perceptions. It is, however, unclear whether the same outcome should prevail under
majority rule where groups can form minimum winning coalitions. Several previous
studies on majority bargaining over an exogenous surplus show that a majority of games
indeed end in such agreements (Diermeier and Morton, 2005; Fréchette et al., 2005a,b;
Agranov and Tergiman, 2017; Miller and Vanberg, 2013, 2015). Hence, an important
question is whether we continue to observe coalitions being proposed if the surplus is
being jointly produced. Especially if members have made diﬀerent contributions, a
crucial question is whether such coalitions include members with higher or those with
lower contributions more often.
We experimentally investigate these questions by conducting 3-person Baron and Fer-
ejohn (1989) bargaining games. In this game, individuals take turns in proposing an
allocation of the surplus which is voted on. In contrast to previous studies, each subject
completes a task prior to bargaining and individually earns points, the sum of which
constitutes the bargaining surplus. Across treatments, we vary whether a proposal
passes by majority (2 members vote yes) or unanimity rule (all three members vote
yes). In addition, we observe several endogenously determined situations in which the
group members either contributed the same or diﬀerent amounts of points to the bar-
gaining surplus. We investigate how the contributions aﬀect proposals, voting behavior
and ﬁnal outcomes under both decision rules.
Our main result is that under both decision rules, outcomes and bargaining behavior
are signiﬁcantly aﬀected by contributions. Most notably, when unanimity rule is used,
all proposals and outcomes constitute convex combinations of the three-way equal split
and the split that is exactly proportional to relative contributions. This result is con-
sistent with previous evidence from bilateral bargaining and multilateral bargaining
with unanimity rule. More surprisingly, we observe a very similar pattern under ma-
jority rule. In particular, a large majority of proposals allocates positive shares of the
surplus to all group members. This results stands in contrast to previous (comparable)
bargaining experiments in which the surplus to be divided is exogenous and where
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most subjects propose minimum winning coalitions. Our ﬁndings further suggest that
players who have made relatively smaller contributions tend to make more equal (i.e.
less proportional) proposals under both decision rules. This pattern is, however, more
pronounced under majority rule. Finally, we observe that majority rule leads to a
higher passage rate than unanimity rule, especially when group members have made
diﬀerent contributions to the surplus.
Summary of Chapter 5
In the fourth paper titled Legislative bargaining with costly communication
(joint with Christoph Vanberg) we ask whether unanimity rule is associated with more
delay than majority rule. This question is important given that decision rules which
result in more delay may be considered less eﬃcient. Several previous papers have
investigated the link between delay and the decision rule in multilateral bargaining
experiments. In these studies, delay is measured as the probability that a proposal
fails given that failure causes the bargaining surplus to be discounted. All studies
ﬁnd that unanimity rule is associated with a higher proposal failure rate (Miller and
Vanberg, 2013; Agranov and Tergiman, 2014; Miller and Vanberg, 2015; Agranov and
Tergiman, 2017). A few recent studies, including the evidence provided in the forth
chapter of this dissertation, suggest that the diﬀerence in proposal failure rates is
especially pronounced if players are heterogeneous to some degree (Miller et al., 2018).
Conﬂicting evidence is provided by Agranov and Tergiman (2014, 2017) who ﬁnd that
allowing for pre-play communication virtually eliminates delay in the form of proposals
failing under both decision rules. While observational data is consistent with their
observation, e.g. few formal proposals are voted down in the legislative process, delay
typically manifests itself in the length of informal bargaining prior to a formal vote.
For this purpose, we re-investigate the link between the length of informal discussions
and the decision rule in a new experiment, where communication itself is costly.
To answer our research question, we use a modiﬁed version of the Baron and Ferejohn
(1989) bargaining game as introduced by Miller et al. (2018). In this game, groups of
three subjects bargain over the division of a ﬁxed surplus. Bargaining proceeds over
discrete rounds and one of the three group members is selected to make a proposal in
each round. Prior to introducing and voting on a formal proposal, players can discuss
via a chat window. The proposer decides when to end informal negotiations and make
a formal proposal. At this point, the game ends with a probability that depends on the
length of informal negotiations. Namely, every two seconds of communication increase
the probability of breakdown by one percent. In the event of breakdown, the surplus is
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lost and each player receives a predetermined disagreement value. Our main treatment
variable is the number of group members which are required for a proposal to pass
(majority or unanimity). Across games, we additionally vary whether players receive
the same or diﬀerent disagreement values, allowing us to study whether the length of
informal negotiations depends on fundamental asymmetries between the players.
Our main ﬁndings are the following. When all players have the same disagreement val-
ues, the decision rule has virtually no impact on the total communication time. Almost
all groups immediately agree on equal splits (two- or three-way) without communicat-
ing. In contrast, when players have asymmetric disagreement values, unanimity rule
is associated with signiﬁcantly longer total communication time than majority rule.
Our analysis shows that outcomes are signiﬁcantly more variable in these situations,
reﬂecting disagreement about which outcome to implement. A more detailed analysis
of the bargaining structure shows that unanimity rule leads to more communication
per round and more proposals failing. Both factors lead to overall longer communica-
tion time and higher breakdown frequencies. Our results conﬁrm that unanimity rule
is associated with longer communication in order to reach agreement, especially in the
absence of focal solutions.
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Chapter 2
Is fairness intuitive? Accounting for
the role of subjective utility
diﬀerences under time pressure1
Abstract
Evidence from response time studies and time pressure experiments has led several
authors to conclude that "fairness is intuitive". In light of conﬂicting ﬁndings we
provide theoretical arguments showing under which conditions an increase in "fairness"
due to time pressure indeed provides unambiguous evidence in favor of the "fairness
is intuitive" hypothesis. Drawing on recent applications of the Drift Diﬀusion Model
(Krajbich et al., 2015a), we demonstrate how the subjective diﬃculty of making a choice
aﬀects decisions under time pressure and time delay, thereby making an unambiguous
interpretation of time pressure eﬀects contingent on the choice situation. To explore
our theoretical considerations and to retest the "fairness is intuitive" hypothesis, we
analyze choices in two-person binary dictator and prisoner's dilemma games under
time pressure or time delay. In addition, we manipulate the subjective diﬃculty of
choosing the fair relative to the selﬁsh option. Our main ﬁnding is that time pressure
does not consistently promote fairness in situations where this would be predicted after
accounting for choice diﬃculty. Hence, our results cast doubt on the hypothesis that
"fairness is intuitive".
Keywords: distributional preferences, cooperation, time pressure, response times,
cognitive processes, drift diﬀusion models
JEL Classiﬁcation: C32, C72, C91, D91, H41
1This chapter corresponds to an article published jointly with Johannes Lohse in Experimental
Economics, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-018-9566-3
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2.1 Introduction
Economists are increasingly interested in understanding the cognitive (Alós-Ferrer and
Strack, 2014) and emotional (Loewenstein, 2000; Hopfensitz and Reuben, 2009; Drou-
velis and Grosskopf, 2016) processes that drive pro-social behavior. One of the cen-
tral questions within this literature is whether "fairness" is intuitive and automatic
or follows from a deliberative weighting of the costs and beneﬁts of making a fair
choice. Several authors have approached this question by analyzing response times as
a proxy for deliberation (Rubinstein, 2007; Spiliopoulos and Ortmann, 2017). A pop-
ular method for understanding the causal impact of deliberation on choices is to place
subjects under time pressure or time delay, given that subjects who are constrained to
make a fast choice might increase their reliance on intuition compared to subjects who
are constrained to wait before making a choice (Wright, 1974; Rand et al., 2012).
Using this method Rand et al. (2012, 2014) ﬁnd that average contributions in a public
good game are higher when subjects are placed under time pressure as compared to
subjects who are forced to delay their contribution decision. These results have inspired
the "fairness is intuitive" (FII) (Cappelen et al., 2016) hypothesis. According to the
FII hypothesis, a decision maker intuitively prefers fairness, i.e. cooperation in a public
good or sharing resources in a dictator game.2 However, this predisposition towards
fairness can be overridden by a more deliberative weighting of the costs and beneﬁts,
such that deliberation can promote selﬁshness (Rand et al., 2012).
The FII hypothesis has not been unequivocally conﬁrmed empirically. In contrast
to the original results of Rand et al. (2012), Tinghög et al. (2013), Verkoeijen and
Bouwmeester (2014), and Bouwmeester et al. (2017) do not ﬁnd that constraining
deliberation by time pressure increases the fraction of cooperative choices in one-shot
public good games. Furthermore, Tinghög et al. (2016) ﬁnd that time pressure does
not aﬀect the fraction of fair choices in (modiﬁed) dictator games. Finally, ﬁndings in
Capraro and Cococcioni (2016) and Lohse (2016) suggest that placing subjects under
stronger time pressure leads to more selﬁsh choices in public good games. Similarly,
Mrkva (2017) ﬁnds that time pressure leads to an increase of selﬁsh choices in modiﬁed
dictator games with high stakes, but not with low stakes.
In light of this mixed evidence, we conduct a new test of the FII hypothesis. In this
test, we address a recent concern that factors other than intuition and deliberation also
aﬀect response times and thereby distort the identiﬁcation of intuitive or deliberative
2 Obviously, the economics literature has come up with various notions of what constitutes a "fair"
choice (Rabin, 1993; Engelmann and Strobel, 2004; Fehr and Schmidt, 2006). In section 2.2, we will
describe in more detail what we refer to as a "fair" choice in the context of our paper.
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choices from fast and slow responses (Recalde et al., 2014; Krajbich et al., 2015a). We
explore how the subjective diﬃculty of choosing between a fair and a selﬁsh option,
as one such factor, aﬀects choices under time pressure and time delay. Our theoretical
predictions highlight that, without controlling for the eﬀect of choice diﬃculty in a
given situation, observing a positive eﬀect of time pressure is not necessarily evidence
in favor of the FII hypothesis; and observing no eﬀect of time pressure is not necessarily
evidence against the FII hypothesis. Thereby, we provide one plausible explanation
why previous tests of the FII hypothesis might have come to diﬀerent conclusions.
Our theoretical considerations are based on insights from a recent paper by Krajbich
et al. (2015a) who use a Drift Diﬀusion Model (DDM) to illustrate how choice diﬃculty
may aﬀect response times. The central prediction of the DDM is that more diﬃcult
choices, i.e. those in which the utility diﬀerence between the fair and the selﬁsh option
are small, are associated with longer response times. We build on this insight and
explore how the subjective diﬃculty of making a choice aﬀects a causal test of the FII
hypothesis. Our analysis is based on the assumption that choices under time pressure
may be aﬀected by both, the amount of deliberation involved in the choice and the
subjective diﬃculty of making a choice (Alós-Ferrer, 2016). Hence, the overall eﬀect
depends on how time pressure aﬀects choices according to the FII hypothesis as well
as the DDM.
We use a simple version of the DDM to show that time pressure causes decision makers
who perceive smaller utility diﬀerences to make more mistakes. Thus, the DDM pre-
dicts that time pressure can either increase the fraction of fair choices, if fair decision
makers perceive larger utility diﬀerences and are less common in the population; or
decrease the fraction of fair choices, if selﬁsh decision makers perceive larger utility
diﬀerences and are less common in the population. The mechanism motivating the
FII hypothesis on the other hand predicts that time pressure should always increase
the fraction of fair choices in one-shot games. Hence, whenever fair decision makers
perceive larger utility diﬀerences than selﬁsh decision makers and are less common
in the population, the DDM and the FII both predict that time pressure should in-
crease the fraction of fair choices. Observing a positive eﬀect of time pressure in these
situations can therefore only provide ambiguous evidence in favor of the FII hypoth-
esis as the same pattern could also be explained by the DDM, while observing no
eﬀect is unambiguous evidence against the claim that "fairness is intuitive". On the
other hand, whenever selﬁsh decision makers perceive larger utility diﬀerences than
fair decision makers and are less common in the population, the FII hypothesis and
the DDM predict opposite eﬀects of time pressure, which may even cancel each other
out. Observing no or even a negative eﬀect of time pressure in these situations is not
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suﬃcient to unambiguously reject the claim that "fairness is intuitive", while observing
a positive eﬀect provides unambiguous evidence in favor of the FII hypothesis. These
arguments illustrate that classifying a choice situation into one of these types is central
for the correct interpretation of time pressure eﬀects. Otherwise the FII hypothesis
could be spuriously accepted or rejected. The fact that previous studies have not ex-
plicitly accounted for subjective utility diﬀerences might explain why they have arrived
at diﬀerent conclusions.
To causally test the FII hypothesis, we conduct an experiment in which subjects take
decisions under time pressure or time delay in multiple two-person binary dictator
and prisoner's dilemma games. Across games, we vary the subjective attractiveness
of the fair option by increasing the social beneﬁts of fair behavior. Speciﬁcally, our
experiment includes choice situations in which we expect that decision makers who
prefer the fair option will ﬁnd it subjectively more, less or as diﬃcult to choose as
decision makers who prefer the selﬁsh option such that the DDM and the FII make
either consistent or opposite predictions concerning the eﬀect of time pressure. To
classify choice situations into one of these two possible types, we use an additional
treatment, in which subjects are unconstrained in their response time and in which we
observe response time correlations and choice frequencies. According to Krajbich et al.
(2015a), we should ﬁnd that fair choices are correlated with shorter response times in
decision problems in which fair choices are subjectively less diﬃcult than selﬁsh choices
and vice versa.
Our experiment comprises two further elements: ﬁrst, it allows for a between- as well
as a within-subject test of the FII hypothesis. Within-subject evidence is obtained by
letting subjects take the same decision twice in each game, once under time pressure
and thereafter under time delay. Second, by comparing evidence from binary dictator
and prisoner's dilemma games, we are able to distinguish between fair choices in non-
strategic and strategic decisions. Thereby, we investigate whether pro-social behavior
follows a common cognitive pattern across diﬀerent contexts. While several previous
tests of the FII hypothesis are based on evidence from strategic decisions in public
good or prisoner's dilemma games, non-strategic decisions in simple binary dictator
games might allow for a more direct test given that they are unconfounded by strategic
uncertainty or misconceptions regarding the game.
Overall, our analysis provides at most limited empirical support for the hypothesis that
"fairness is intuitive". In those binary dictator and prisoner's dilemma games, in which
our classiﬁcation suggests that time pressure should increase fairness according to both
models, we do not observe such increase across all between-subjects tests. In the same
games, there is no consistent within-subjects evidence that subjects who choose the
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fair option under time pressure are more likely to switch to the selﬁsh option under
time delay. In binary dictator games in which an increase of fair behavior under time
pressure would constitute unambiguous evidence in favor of the FII hypothesis we do
not ﬁnd that time pressure signiﬁcantly increases the frequency of fair choices. This
evidence holds between- and within-subjects. A complementary analysis shows that
switching patterns strongly reﬂect choice diﬃculty (subjective indiﬀerence), a pattern
that is supported by the DDM but not by the FII hypothesis.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2.2 contains a detailed
description of the DDM and summarizes our predictions. In section 2.3, we explain
our experimental design. The results are summarized in Section 2.4. In section 2.5, we
conclude with a short discussion of our results.
2.2 Theory and Predictions
The FII hypothesis is based on a dual-process framework in which decisions are jointly
determined by a fast and intuitive system I and a more deliberative and rather slow
system II (Kahneman, 2003; Frederick, 2005). According to the "Social Heuristics
Hypothesis" (Rand et al., 2014), the intuitive system I follows a cooperation heuristic
that individuals have developed in repeated everyday interactions. Upon deliberation,
the same individuals may realize that there are no strategic incentives to cooperate
in atypical one-shot situations implemented in the lab which leads to more defection.
Cooperation is the most prominent application of the "Social Heuristics Hypothesis".
Its underlying mechanism could, however, apply more broadly to non-strategic choices
in the dictator game assuming that sharing resources with other people is also an
advantageous long-term strategy because of reciprocity or reputation concerns. We
summarize the claim that intuition promotes fairness across diﬀerent contexts as the
FII hypothesis.
The FII hypothesis generates empirically testable predictions concerning the eﬀect of
time pressure and time delay on fairness. Since heuristics are seen to operate relatively
independently from the details of a choice situation, the FII hypothesis predicts that
the same decision maker is more likely to choose the fair option when placed under time
pressure than when she makes a deliberative choice. Similarly, when observing choices
of diﬀerent decision makers, subjects who are placed under time pressure should on
average choose the fair option more frequently than subjects constrained to wait before
making a choice.
However, the observation that time pressure leads the same decision maker to choose
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the fair option with higher probability or that time pressure increases the fraction
of fair choices cannot be unambiguously interpreted as evidence in favor of the FII
hypothesis without accounting for choice diﬃculty. To illustrate how the subjective
diﬃculty of the choice situation could aﬀect choices under time pressure and thereby
confound a test of the FII hypothesis, we describe the DDM in more detail.3
2.2.1 Time Pressure in the Drift Diﬀusion Model (DDM)
Assume that a single decision maker faces a binary choice between a "fair" (F ) and a
"selﬁsh" (S) option. According to the DDM, this decision maker is initially unaware
of the utility value she receives from these options. However, she can accumulate
stochastic information regarding her preferences in a series of time periods t. In each
t, the decision maker observes two new stochastic value signals Ft and St which are
normally distributed around her true underlying utility values. The diﬀerence between
the two signals Ft−St, is added to a subjective state variable X it which, thus, encodes
the probability that F yields a higher utility than S (Krajbich et al., 2014; Caplin
and Martin, 2015). The accumulation process continues until the subjective state
variable crosses a pre-deﬁned upper threshold a, inducing the decision maker to choose
F , or the lower threshold b, inducing the decision maker to choose S. The length of
the accumulation process, i.e. the number of time periods before the upper or lower
threshold is reached, corresponds to the decision maker's response time.
The standard DDM makes two predictions regarding the theoretical distribution of
response times and decision errors (e.g., Ratcliﬀ and Rouder, 1998).4 First, the decision
maker's response time depends on the underlying absolute utility diﬀerence, |ui(F )−
ui(S)|. If this diﬀerence is large, the decision maker is expected to decide faster than
if the underlying absolute utility diﬀerence is small because she has to sample fewer
signals to reach one of the thresholds. Second, given that the ﬁnal decision is reached
by observing a series of noisy signals, the decision maker is more likely to make a
mistake (i.e. to choose the option that she does not prefer given her own preferences),
the smaller the underlying utility diﬀerence between the two options. A small utility
diﬀerence between the fair and the selﬁsh option implies that the decision maker is
more likely to receive signals that contradict her "true" preference. This, in turn,
3 We will refer to versions of the DDM that have recently been applied to value-based choices and
social dilemma situations (Polanía et al., 2014; Krajbich et al., 2014, 2015b). For a more extensive re-
view of the behavioral foundations and the application of DDM in psychology refer to the descriptions
in Ratcliﬀ (1988), Ratcliﬀ and Rouder (1998) and a recent summary of this topic aimed at economists
by Clithero (2016).
4 A more detailed description of the DDM as well as proofs and derivations of all predictions are
contained in Appendix A.
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increases the likelihood of making a mistake by choosing the non-preferred option.
Jointly, these two properties of the DDM generate a third prediction concerning the
eﬀect of time pressure and time delay on choices. Time pressure forces decision makers
with otherwise longer response times to make a choice before being suﬃciently sure
about their truly preferred option. Thus, time pressure is equivalent to a reduction
in the decision thresholds. This induces decision makers to choose at lower precision
because noise has a higher likelihood of inﬂuencing their decision. Importantly, the
likelihood of making a mistake is larger for decision makers with smaller absolute
utility diﬀerences because their value signals are less informative.
Aggregating these individual level eﬀects provides predictions for how overall choice
frequencies are aﬀected by time pressure. For illustrative purposes, we will distinguish
between three situations, labeled type 0, type 1 or type 2. Furthermore, we will refer
to a decision maker as "selﬁsh" or "fair" depending on which of the two options yields
a higher utility value according to her subjective preferences. In situations of type 0,
the incentives are such that the underlying absolute utility diﬀerences are the same for
the average selﬁsh and fair decision maker. Thus, fair and selﬁsh decision makers are
equally likely to make a mistake under time pressure and time delay. In situations of
type 1, on the other hand, the absolute utility diﬀerence is larger for the average fair
than for the average selﬁsh decision maker. Hence, in these situations selﬁsh decision
makers are more likely to make a mistake. Finally, in situations of type 2, the utility
diﬀerences are larger for the average selﬁsh than for the average fair decision maker
such that fair decision makers are more likely to make a mistake.
Under the simplifying assumption that time pressure exclusively aﬀects decision makers
with smaller average utility diﬀerences (i.e. weak preferences for one of the options)
and that there are no mistakes under time delay, the DDM generates straightforward
predictions. In situations of type 1, time pressure exclusively causes selﬁsh decision
makers to make a mistake such that time pressure inﬂates the frequency of fair choices
relative to a situation without time pressure. For situations of type 2, the DDM predicts
the reverse eﬀect. Here, fair decision makers should make more mistakes under time
pressure, thus reducing the fraction of fair choices under time pressure.
Without this simplifying assumption (i.e. assuming that the probability of making a
mistake is positive under time pressure and, to a smaller degree, under time delay for
all decision makers), the DDM predictions depend on two factors: ﬁrst, the average
strength of preferences and second, the relative frequency of fair and selﬁsh decision
makers within the population.5 The strength of preferences determines the likelihood
5 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out this crucial distinction and helping us
to reﬁne our model.
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Table 2.1: Testing the FII hypothesis
Predicted eﬀects of Time Pressure
Type 0 Type 1 Type 2
p(f) = 0.5 p(f) < 0.5 p(f) > 0.5
Observed ↑ unambiguous ambiguous unambiguous
eﬀect accept accept accept
(0a) (1a) (2a)
↔ unambiguous unambiguous ambiguous
reject reject accept
↓ (0b) (1b) (2b)
of committing an error under time pressure and time delay for a given type of decision
maker. The population shares, on the other hand, determine the resulting absolute
number of mistakes and the aggregate direction of switches. The most simple test case
for the FII hypothesis is a situation of type 0 in which the relative population shares
of fair and selﬁsh decision makers are roughly similar. In such a perfectly balanced
situation - however rare such situations might be in actual empirical tests - the DDM
predicts that time pressure should have no eﬀect on the frequency of fair choices since
fair and selﬁsh decision makers are equally likely to make a mistake (under time pressure
and time delay) and both groups are of equal size. Consequently, the absolute number
of mistakes is perfectly balanced between both groups and there should be no eﬀect
of time pressure. The DDM also generates unambiguous predictions when the type of
decision maker who has larger utility diﬀerences is less common within the population
(< 50%). In these cases, the DDM predicts that time pressure increases the fraction
of choices which are associated with larger absolute utility diﬀerences. For example, if
the fair option is preferred by less than 50% of subjects in a situation of type 1 (where
fairness is "easy"), time pressure should increase the fraction of fair choices. This
increase is driven by two factors: ﬁrst, selﬁsh decision makers are more likely to make
an error under time pressure and to switch to their preferred choice under time delay as
compared to fair decision makers. Second, given that they constitute the larger group,
there should be more switches from the fair (under time pressure) to the selﬁsh option
(under time delay) than vice versa.
In all other cases, i.e. when the decision makers who have larger utility diﬀerences are
more common in the population, the predictions of the DDM depend on the relative
population shares as well as the unobservable diﬀerence in error rates under time
pressure and time delay for both types of decision makers.6
6 Appendix 2.1 contains a more formal discussion of the possible results.
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2.2.2 Testing the FII hypothesis accounting for DDM predic-
tions
Assuming that choices under time pressure and time delay are aﬀected by the relative
use of intuition over deliberation as well as the subjective diﬃculty of making a choice,
the arguments above imply that the predictions of the DDM and the FII are congruent
in situations of type 1 as long as the fraction of fair decision makers is smaller than
50%. Hence, observing that time pressure increases the fraction of fair choices in these
situations can only provide ambiguous evidence in favor of the FII hypothesis because
the same observation could be fully accounted for by the DDM (see Table 2.1, 1a).
Instead, if we do not ﬁnd these predicted patterns, then this constitutes unambiguous
evidence against the FII hypothesis (1b).7
In contrast, unambiguous evidence in favor of the FII hypothesis can be obtained
from situations of type 2, as long as the fraction of selﬁsh decision makers is smaller
than 50%. Here, the FII hypothesis and the DDM predict opposite time pressure
eﬀects which may even cancel each other out. Thus, observing that time pressure does
increase the fraction of fair choices would be unambiguous evidence in favor of the FII
hypothesis (2a). Not observing any or even a negative eﬀect would not necessarily be
inconsistent with the FII hypothesis because the opposite eﬀects of the FII hypothesis
and the DDM may actually cancel each other out (2b).
Finally, in situations of type 0 in which relative population shares are roughly similar,
the DDM should have little inﬂuence on the direction of time pressure eﬀects as fair
and selﬁsh decision makers are equally likely to make mistakes and are present in equal
proportions within the population. Thus, observing an increase of fair behavior in such
situations would be unambiguous evidence in favor of the FII, while observing no or a
negative eﬀect would provide unambiguous evidence against the FII.
Whenever the DDM predictions regarding the direction of time pressure eﬀects are
not clear because they depend on unobservable diﬀerences in error rates, tests of the
FII hypothesis cannot be interpreted unambiguously. Therefore, classifying the choice
situation as type 0, type 1 or type 2 and approximating the population shares of fair
decision makers is necessary for correctly interpreting the evidence. Previous tests of
the FII hypothesis might, thus, suﬀer from spuriously accepting the FII hypothesis
based on observing an increase of fairness in situations of type 1 or spuriously rejecting
7 Note that observing no eﬀect is not necessarily evidence against the DDM in these situations.
This is because the true model might be that "selﬁshness is intuitive". Hence, a negative eﬀect of
time pressure attributable to the "selﬁshness is intuitive" model might be canceled out by a positive
eﬀect attributable to the DDM. For this reason, we cannot jointly reject the FII hypothesis and the
DDM.
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it based on observing no eﬀect or a decrease of fairness in situations of type 2.
2.3 Experimental Design
In our experiment, we collect decisions from four binary dictator (see Table 2.2) and
four prisoner's dilemma games (see Table 2.3). In each game, subjects are asked to
choose between a "fair" and a "selﬁsh" option (labeled option "A" or "B" on the
decision screen). In line with the FII hypothesis (Rand et al., 2014), we label a choice
as "fair" if it implies sharing resources with another individual at own costs. According
to this deﬁnition the equal allocation is the "fair" choice in the binary dictator (BD)
games and cooperation is the "fair" choice in the prisoner's dilemma (PD) games.
Across the four BD and PD games, we increased the social beneﬁts of choosing the fair
option from VERY LOW to HIGH. For example, in the VERY LOW binary dictator
game, choosing the fair (equal) option increases the recipient's payoﬀ by 10 cents for
every Euro that the dictator gives up relative to the selﬁsh (unequal) option. In HIGH,
the recipient receives 2.25 for every Euro that the dictator gives up.8
If subjective utility diﬀerences reﬂect the costs and beneﬁts of choosing the fair op-
tion (Andreoni and Miller, 2002), we expect that fair decision makers should perceive
smaller utility diﬀerences in the VERY LOW games than selﬁsh decision makers. In
these games, the beneﬁts of choosing the fair option are relatively small since the de-
cision maker needs to sacriﬁce a high amount of her own payoﬀ to increase the payoﬀ
of the other participant by only a small amount. Hence, these games potentially re-
semble a type 2 choice situation that would allow for an unambiguous test of the FII
hypothesis. By the same logic we expect that the HIGH games resemble a type 1 choice
situation in which fair decision makers perceive larger utility diﬀerences than selﬁsh
decision makers. Here, decision makers need to give up only a small amount in order
to increase the payoﬀ of the other participant by a high amount.
Despite these considerations, it is hard to predict a priori if choosing the fair option
will be subjectively more or less diﬃcult than choosing the selﬁsh option in a given
game. Furthermore, a correct interpretation of the evidence also requires a measure of
whether the fair or the selﬁsh option is preferred by a majority of decision makers. To
gain empirical insights into the subjective diﬃculty of choosing the fair and the selﬁsh
option as well as the respective population shares, we conducted additional sessions in
which subjects could decide without being constrained in their response times. Based
8 Labeling the equal outcome as fair in the binary dictator game also aligns our FII predictions
with recent ﬁndings in Capraro et al. (2017) who show that equal outcomes are preferred by intuitive
decision makers whereas deliberation allows for a variety of motives to aﬀect decisions.
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Table 2.2: Binary dictator games used in the experiment
VERY LOW
Unequal 11, 0
Equal 1, 1
LOW
Unequal 9, 0
Equal 3, 3
MEDIUM
Unequal 10, 1
Equal 6, 6
HIGH
Unequal 15, 2
Equal 11, 11
Table 2.3: Prisoner's dilemma games used in the experiment
VERY LOW
C D
C 3.10, 3.10 1, 5.10
D 5.10, 1 2, 2
LOW
C D
C 4, 4 1, 6
D 6, 1 2, 2
MEDIUM
C D
C 6, 6 1, 8
D 8, 1 2, 2
HIGH
C D
C 8, 8 1, 10
D 10, 1 2, 2
on the previous ﬁnding that response times reﬂect the relative diﬃculty of the choice
situation (Krajbich et al., 2015a), we use these additional observations to classify games
as type 0, 1 or 2.
We used the following procedures in our experiment: Part 1 of the experiment consisted
of two successive blocks. In block 1, subjects made decisions in the four prisoner's
dilemma games displayed in Table 2.3 in randomized order. After each prisoner's
dilemma game, subjects made choices in unrelated ﬁller games (see Appendix 2.2).
Once subjects had completed block 1 and a short questionnaire, we elicit choices in
the exact same four prisoner's dilemma and ﬁller games again in block 2. The games
were presented in the same order in block 1 and 2 for each subject.9
Part 2 of the experiment also consisted of two successive blocks. In block 1, subjects
made choices in the four binary dictator games displayed in Table 2.2 in randomized
order. Choices were elicited using the strategy vector method, i.e. both subjects in
a pair made a choice before the computer randomly assigned them to the roles of
dictator or recipient. After each binary dictator game, subjects took choices in three
ﬁller games (see Appendix 2.2). Once subjects had completed block 1 and another
short questionnaire, they made choices in the same four binary dictator and ﬁller
games again in block 2.
For each binary choice, subjects were randomly re-matched in pairs and no feedback on
their partner's choice was given until the very end of the experiment. At the end of the
experiment, one of the games was randomly drawn and subjects were paid according
to their own and their partner's choice.
To analyze the eﬀect of time pressure on the fraction of fair choices, we randomly as-
signed subjects to one of four (between-subjects) conditions, in which we implemented
9 We randomized the order in which the prisoner's dilemma games were displayed across sessions.
The ﬁller games were presented in the same order in all sessions. Subjects were not informed that
they would make the same choices in both blocks.
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Table 2.4: Experimental Design
STRONG
TIME TIME TIME UNCON-
PRESSURE PRESSURE DELAY STRAINED
(TP) (STP) (TD) (U)
P
A
R
T
1 BLOCK 1
4 PDs ≤ 12 ≤ 8 > 12 no
+ 4 Filler Games seconds seconds seconds constraint
BLOCK 2
4 PDs > 12 > 12 > 12 no
+ 4 Filler Games seconds seconds seconds constraint
P
A
R
T
2 BLOCK 1
4 BDs ≤ 6 ≤ 4 > 6 no
+12 Filler Games seconds seconds seconds constraint
BLOCK 2
4 BDs > 6 > 6 > 6 no
+ 12 Filler Games seconds seconds seconds constraint
Notes: This table summarizes the Experimental Design. Each cell displays the
response time limit which subjects faced during their choice. We abbreviate
prisoner's dilemma as "PD", and binary dictator game as "BD".
diﬀerent response time constraints: in the two Time Pressure conditions, TP and STP,
subjects were constrained to choose under time pressure in block 1 and forced to wait
before making a choice in block 2. In the Time Delay (TD) condition, subjects were
forced to delay their decision in both, block 1 and block 2. In the Unconstrained
condition subjects did not face an exogenous time limit in either block.
In the Time Pressure (TP) condition, the time limit was 12 seconds for all prisoner's
dilemma games and 6 seconds for all binary dictator games. These time limits corre-
spond to the ﬁrst quartile of the response time distribution of the ﬁrst choice in the
Unconstrained condition.10 Given that subjects usually get faster over time and that
it is unclear how much time is required to induce intuitive decisions11, we implemented
a stricter time limit of 8 seconds in the PD games which was reduced to 4 seconds in
10 To our knowledge there is no common method according to which time pressure was deﬁned
in previous studies. For instance, subjects in Rand et al. (2012) were constrained to decide within
10 seconds which corresponds to the median response time in their response time correlation study.
Buckert et al. (2017) deﬁne time pressure as 2/3 of the median response time in a Cournot game. Our
analysis of response times in the Unconstrained treatment revealed that the response time distribution
of the 25% fastest decision makers was independent of the order in which the games were presented.
Thus, the time limit in our study avoids heterogeneous eﬀects across diﬀerent order conditions.
11 For instance, Myrseth and Wollbrant (2017) argue that any time limit above 4 seconds could
allow decision makers to engage in some level of deliberation. Spiliopoulos and Ortmann (2017) report
that mean response times fall by up to 30 percent when subjects face the exact same game multiple
times.
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the BD games in the Strong Time Pressure (STP) condition. These time limits corre-
spond to the ﬁrst quartile of the response time distribution for the last decision in the
Unconstrained condition. The time delay limit was 12 seconds for the PD games and
8 seconds for the BD games in both the TP and the STP condition, so that there is a
small gap in the STP condition. The payoﬀs were displayed graphically as stacked and
colored bars in all games (see Appendix 2.2) in order to make them easily accessible
and comparable, even under time pressure.
To ensure compliance with our treatment, we forced subjects to delay their decision
by displaying the choice buttons only after 12 seconds (6 seconds) had passed. Since
compliance with time pressure cannot be enforced in the same way, we instead chose
to incentivize compliance by informing subjects that they would lose their show-up fee
of 3 Euro if they violated the time constraint in the decision chosen for payment.12
A counter, displaying seconds spent, was included on each decision screen in both the
Time Delay and the Time Pressure conditions.
At the end of part 1, we elicited subjects' beliefs regarding the choices of other par-
ticipants which allows us to test whether time pressure and time delay aﬀected beliefs
diﬀerently.13 Subjects were paid an additional Euro for a correct guess. In addition, we
asked subjects to provide a subjective assessment regarding which of the two options
they perceive as the fairer option for the very ﬁrst BD and PD games they encountered
in each block. This assessment can be used to identify if the equal (cooperative) option
is indeed perceived as fair by a majority of our subjects.14
2.4 Results
The experiment was conducted at the University of Heidelberg AWI Lab. In total, 238
undergraduate and graduate students of all disciplines were recruited to participate in
the experiment (62 in Unconstrained, 74 in Time Delay, 72 in Time Pressure and 30 in
Strong Time Pressure) via HROOT (Bock et al., 2014). We restricted our recruitment
12One important limitation of previous studies has been that a large fraction of subjects violate the
time constraints set by the experimenter which potentially reduces their explanatory power (Tinghög
et al., 2013; Bouwmeester et al., 2017). In contrast, we observed few violations of the time limit:
Averaged over all decisions and treatments, the time pressure conditions were violated in 2.5 percent
of the BD and 1.7 percent of the PD games. There is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in violations between
the TP and STP condition.
13 In the Time Pressure treatment, subjects were constrained to indicate their belief within 12
seconds. In the Time Delay treatment, subjects could indicate their belief only after 12 seconds had
passed.
14 Despite being unincentivized and thus noisy, this survey approach can provide some insights into
the modal fairness perceptions of subjects (Faravelli, 2007; Cubitt et al., 2011; Reuben and Riedl,
2013).
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Figure 2.1: Response times in prisoner's dilemma and binary dictator
games (Unconstrained condition)
to subjects who had not participated in more than four experiments (and no experiment
involving social dilemma or distribution tasks). The experiment was programmed in
z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects received all instructions (reproduced in Appendix
2.3) on the screen and questions were answered privately. At the end of the experiment,
subjects were paid in private. The average earnings were 12 Euro, including a 3 Euro
show-up fee. In the following, we will report the results of the Unconstrained condition
before analyzing the results of the Time Pressure and Time Delay conditions.
2.4.1 Unconstrained condition
The purpose of the Unconstrained condition was to identify situations in which the
fair choice is faster or slower than the selﬁsh choice and to approximate the frequency
of fair and selﬁsh choices. This information can be used to classify the diﬀerent games
according to the theoretical considerations outlined in section 2.2.
In Figure 2.1 (top panel) we compare the distribution of response times between choices
of the equal ("fair") and the unequal ("selﬁsh") option in the BD games. The frequency
of "fair" choices rises signiﬁcantly from 9.7% in the VERY LOW game to 43.5% in the
LOW, 51.6% in the MEDIUM, and to 61.3% in the HIGH game (Pairwise Sign Test,
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p < 0.01).15 In line with the results in Krajbich et al. (2015a), we observe that the
correlation between choices of the equal option and response times reverses as the
beneﬁts of the fair option increase: in the VERY LOW game, the median response
time of subjects who chose the equal option is larger than the median response time of
subjects who chose the selﬁsh option (Rank-sum test, p < 0.1). Hence we classify this
game as type 2. In the LOW and HIGH games, the median response times of subjects
who chose the equal option are smaller than the response times of subjects who chose
the selﬁsh option (Rank-sum test, p < 0.1) which is why we classify these games as
type 1. There is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in response times for the MEDIUM game
(Rank-sum test, p = 0.64) which thus constitutes a type 0 game.
We use observed choice frequencies to determine if the DDM makes unambiguous
predictions concerning the eﬀect of time pressure in the diﬀerent games. For the only
type 2 situation (VERY LOW), the share of selﬁsh decision makers is much larger
than 50% such that the DDM makes ambiguous predictions regarding the expected
eﬀect of time pressure. For the two type 1 situations, the DDM makes unambiguous
predictions for the LOW game (< 50% fair choices) but not for the HIGH game in
which a majority of subjects chose the fair option. For the MEDIUM game, the DDM
unambiguously predicts that time pressure should not have any eﬀect on the fraction
of fair choices given that subjects choose the fair and the selﬁsh option at roughly equal
rates (Binomial test, p = 0.9). Thus, solely the LOW and the MEDIUM game allow
for unbiased tests of the FII hypothesis.
The distribution of response times for the three prisoner's dilemma games are displayed
in the bottom panel of Figure 2.1.16 Most importantly, the fraction of cooperators
increases with the beneﬁts: only 34% of subjects chose to cooperate in LOW, while
this frequency rises to 55% in the MEDIUM and to 58% in the HIGH game. Looking
at response times, we ﬁnd that the median response time of subjects who chose to
cooperate is signiﬁcantly smaller than the median response time of those subjects who
chose to defect in each of the three games (Rank-sum test, p < 0.05). Thus, the
Unconstrained condition only includes PDs of type 1. Looking at the fraction of fair
choices, the DDM only makes an unambiguous prediction in the LOW game since the
share of cooperators is smaller than 50% in this game. For the MEDIUM and HIGH
games, on the other hand, the DDM predictions are not unambiguous and hence they
cannot provide unambiguous evidence in favor of or against the FII hypothesis. To
15 In the Unconstrained condition the games were separated by additional distribution tasks, which
were replaced by diﬀerent ﬁller games in the subsequent Time Pressure and Time Delay conditions.
A full analysis of all 12 BD games is available upon request.
16 We later added the VERY LOW game in the subsequent Time Pressure and Time Delay sessions
because each of these games represent a type 1 situation.
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also analyze the eﬀect of time pressure in a game that is more likely to be of type 2,
we added an additional prisoner's dilemma game (VERY LOW) in the Time Pressure
and Time Delay conditions in which we further reduced the beneﬁts of cooperation.17
2.4.2 Constrained response time in the binary dictator games
We begin our discussion of the constrained decision time treatments with a series of
manipulation checks. Most importantly, time pressure signiﬁcantly speeds-up decisions
across all BD games from an average of 13.34 seconds (CI: 11.58, 15.11) in the TD to
3.22 seconds (CI: 3.02, 3.44) in the TP and 2.16 seconds (CI: 1.97, 2.36) in the STP
condition.18 In addition, average decision times are signiﬁcantly smaller in the STP
as compared to the TP condition (Rank-sum test, p ≤ 0.001). Game-wise compar-
isons furthermore indicate that the eﬀect of time pressure is similar across diﬀerent
games and signiﬁcantly reduces response times in all four decisions (Rank-sum test,
p ≤ 0.001).19 Finally, subjects in the TP and STP conditions, who take their ﬁrst
decision under time pressure and their second decision under time delay, are signiﬁ-
cantly faster (Sign-rank test, p ≤ 0.001) when taking their ﬁrst decision as compared to
their second decision (TP: 9.66 seconds [CI: 9.04, 10.30]; STP: 9.51 seconds [CI: 7.90,
11.13]). Overall, these comparisons indicate that time pressure successfully induced
faster decision making among subjects.
In a second manipulation check, we analyze whether subjects indeed perceive the equal
option as the fair outcome in all four binary dictator games. For this purpose we analyze
subjective (unincentivized) fairness statements elicited at the end of the experiment.
We ﬁnd that in all games, a large majority of subjects perceive the equal option as
the fairest outcome (81% in VERY LOW, 97% in LOW, 100% in MEDIUM, 100% in
HIGH). We also ﬁnd that subjective fairness assessments do not diﬀer across the three
conditions. This indicates that labeling the equal option as "fair" is strongly in line
with the fairness perceptions of our subjects, in particular for the LOW and MEDIUM
games that are of most interest for testing the FII hypothesis.
17 Since we do not observe response time correlations or choice frequencies for this game, all time
pressure results can only be interpreted under the assumption that it indeed represents a type 2
situation in which there is a majority of fair decision makers. The second assumption is unlikely to
hold, given that in the LOW game already only 34% of subjects cooperate despite stronger incentives
to cooperate.
18 Note, that the mean decision time in the TD condition is signiﬁcantly higher than 6 seconds and
only a minority of decisions (13.8 percent) is made within the range of 6-7 seconds. This indicates that
there are only few subjects in the TD condition, who have already completed their decision process
when reaching the delay cutoﬀ.
19 More detailed statistics on response time distributions for each game are available in Appendix
2.4
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Table 2.5: Between-subject comparison of the average rate of fair
choices in the binary dictator games
Time Time p-Value Strong Time p-Value
Delay Pressure Fisher's Pressure Fisher's
N mean N mean exact N mean exact
VERY LOW 74 0.11 72 0.11 1 30 0.13 0.74
LOW 74 0.32 72 0.44 0.17 30 0.57 0.03
MEDIUM 74 0.53 72 0.60 0.41 30 0.63 0.39
HIGH 74 0.64 72 0.74 0.22 30 0.63 1
Notes: The mean rate of fair choices displayed is calculated over all orders. We
report the p-Values of a two-sided Fisher's exact test, comparing the fraction of
fair choices in the TD condition with the TP (column 6) and the STP condition
(column 9).
We now turn to analyzing the eﬀect of time pressure on the fraction of fair choices in
the BD games. Averaged over all decisions, we do not ﬁnd evidence that subjects in
the time pressure conditions chose the equal "fair" option signiﬁcantly more often than
subjects who took their decision under time delay (40% in TD vs. 47% in TP vs. 49%
in STP, Rank-sum test, p > 0.1). The main results of our between-subjects test of the
FII hypothesis are summarized in Table 2.5 in which we report the mean fraction of
equal "fair" choices in each of the four games separately.
In the LOW game, the equal "fair" option is not chosen signiﬁcantly more often when
comparing the TD and TP conditions (Two-sided Fisher's exact test, p = 0.17). We
obtain a diﬀerent result, if we restrict our sample to those subjects who took their very
ﬁrst choice in this game (Two-sided Fisher's exact test, p = 0.05). When time pressure
is stronger, we do ﬁnd that the equal allocation is chosen signiﬁcantly more often in
the STP compared to the TD condition (Two-sided Fisher's exact test, p = 0.028),
yet this signiﬁcance vanishes when we restrict our analysis to ﬁrst choices only (Two-
sided Fisher's exact test, p = 0.24). Based on these results we can neither accept nor
reject the hypothesis that "fairness is intuitive". In both treatments we observe that
time pressure increases the fraction of fair choices either in the full sample or when
restricting our analysis to ﬁrst choices. Given that in the LOW game both the FII
hypothesis and the DDM predict that time pressure should increase the fraction of fair
choices, the observed increases in fair choices can, however, at most provide ambiguous
evidence in favor of the FII hypothesis.
According to the DDM, time pressure should have no eﬀect on the fraction of fair
choices in the MEDIUM game. Hence an increase in fairness would be unambiguous
evidence in favor of the FII. The fraction of subjects who select the equal option in
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the TP and STP conditions is indeed slightly higher under time pressure as compared
to the TD condition but this increase is not signiﬁcant (Two-sided Fisher's exact test;
TP: p = 0.41, STP: p = 0.39). Restricting our comparison to ﬁrst choices only does
not alter this result (Two-sided Fisher's exact test; TP: p = 0.76, STP: p = 0.10).
These results constitute unambiguous evidence against the FII hypothesis.
In the VERY LOW and HIGH game we ﬁnd no evidence that time pressure aﬀects
the frequency of fair choices (Two-sided Fisher's exact test, p > 0.1). Since for these
games it is unclear if the DDM predicts eﬀects that are in line or orthogonal to the
FII, we cannot unambiguously reject the FII based on these observations.
Result 1 (Between-Subject evidence in BDs)We ﬁnd evidence that time pressure
increases the fraction of fair choices in games, in which this increase can be accounted
for by both the DDM and the FII hypothesis (LOW game). In contrast, we do not ﬁnd
that time pressure signiﬁcantly increases the fraction of fair choices in games, in which
such increase can only be accounted for by the FII hypothesis (MEDIUM game).
Our design also allows assessing within-subjects evidence by comparing a subject's
initial choice under time pressure and her second choice (in the same game) under time
delay. The two games that can provide unambiguous evidence in favor of or against
the FII hypothesis are the LOW and the MEDIUM game. Given that the likelihood
to switch from one to the other option may also be due to the fact that subjects
gain more experience with the task between their ﬁrst and their second decision, we
compare the switching rates in the Time Pressure conditions to the switching rates in
the Time Delay condition, where subjects take both decisions under time delay. To
analyze switching behavior, we computed a variable that takes a value of 1 if a subject
switched from the fair (ﬁrst choice) to the selﬁsh option (second choice), and a value
of -1 if a subject switched from the selﬁsh to the fair option (see Table 2.6).
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Table 2.6: Within-subject comparison of switching behavior in the binary dictator games
Time Delay Time Pressure Rank- Strong Time Pressure Rank-
N mean Sign- N mean Sign- sum N mean Sign- sum
rank rank p-Value rank p-Value
(within-subjects) (within-subjects) (across) (within-subjects) (across)
VLOW 74 0.04 0.18 72 0.03 0.41 0.78 30 0.1 0.08 0.32
LOW 74 0.07 0.19 72 0.15 0.02 0.27 30 0.27 0.01 0.05
MEDIUM 74 0.03 0.59 72 -0.03 0.64 0.48 30 0 1 0.80
HIGH 74 -0.01 0.74 72 0.11 0.03 0.05 30 -0.03 0.71 0.81
Notes: In this table, we report the direction of switches for each of the four binary
dictator games. The switching variable takes a value of 1 if the subject switched
from choosing the equal option in block 1 to choosing the unequal option in block
2. The decision in block 1 is taken under time pressure in the TP and STP
condition and under time delay in the TD condition. The decision in block 2 is
taken under time delay in all three conditions. Columns 4,7 and 11 report the p-
Value of a Wilcoxon Sign Rank Test, performed on subject's switching behavior
within one condition. In addition, we report the p-Value of a Rank-sum test,
which compares switching behavior across the TD and TP (column 8) or STP
(column 12) conditions.
37
CHAPTER 2. IS FAIRNESS INTUITIVE?
First, looking at the switching rates in the two time pressure conditions, we do ﬁnd that
subjects are more likely to switch from choosing the fair option under time pressure
to choosing the selﬁsh option under time delay than vice versa in the LOW but not
in the MEDIUM game. The former ﬁnding is consistent with the DDM and the FII
hypothesis while the latter ﬁnding is inconsistent with the FII hypothesis. To control
for a potential time trend in the probability to behave fairly which is not caused by
our treatment, we compare the switching rate in the LOW and MEDIUM games in
the two time pressure conditions to the Time Delay condition. The results of the
Rank-sum test are reported in Table 2.6. Our analysis shows that in the LOW game,
subjects in the STP condition were indeed more likely to switch from the equal to
the unequal option compared to subjects in the TD condition. However, given that
the DDM and the FII hypothesis both support this prediction, the evidence can only
provide ambiguous evidence in favor of the FII hypothesis. In contrast, there is no
statistical signiﬁcant diﬀerence in switching patterns for subjects in the TP and TD
conditions. This result constitutes unambiguous evidence against the FII hypothesis.
For the MEDIUM game we ﬁnd no evidence that there is signiﬁcantly more switching
behavior under time pressure than under time delay. This is direct evidence against
the FII hypothesis.20
The interpretation of the previous results rests on the assumption that we indeed
classiﬁed the games correctly. As a robustness check, we employ a complementary
within-subject test that does not depend on the classiﬁcation of the games but instead
exploits the fact that we observe choices in four diﬀerent games per subject. Based on
these four choices we infer in which game a subject should be closest to her individual
indiﬀerence point.21 Let Ci=(x1, x2, x3, x4) describe the set of choices that a subject
makes in the ﬁrst four games such that C0 = (F, F, F, F ) describes a subject who
chooses the fair option in all four games and C2 = (S, S, F, F ) describes a subject who
chooses the selﬁsh option only in the VERY LOW and LOW game. A C0 subject is
closest to her indiﬀerence point in the VERY LOW game since in this game choosing the
fair option is more costly than in any of the other games. A C2 subject is closest to her
indiﬀerence point in the LOW or MEDIUM game since she switches from the selﬁsh
to the fair option between these two games. Overall, there are ﬁve diﬀerent choice
patterns that allow to approximate the location of the indiﬀerence point and 84.66%
20 We do not ﬁnd evidence that there are diﬀerences in switching behavior for the VERY LOW
game, while there is signiﬁcantly more switching for the HIGH game in the TP but not in the STP
condition. Since both of these game can only provide ambiguous evidence in favor or against the FII
hypothesis, we are not discussing these results in more detail.
21 This method rests on the assumption that subjects have transitive preferences over own-other
allocations that are only violated by mistake (Andreoni and Miller, 2002).
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of subjects can be classiﬁed according to these patterns.22 This classiﬁcation can shed
light on the role of subjective choice diﬃculty in the following way: the DDM predicts
that subjects are more likely to make a mistake in games in which they are closer to
indiﬀerence. Thus, when comparing a subject's ﬁrst choices with her second choices
in the same four games, she should be more likely to switch options in games closer
to her indiﬀerence point. The FII, on the other hand, predicts that subjects should
display a similar rate of switching for all games in which they have initially selected
the fair option. Furthermore, there should be few to no switches in games in which
subjects have initially selected the selﬁsh option. These two predictions can be easily
illustrated using an exemplary subject: assume a subject has chosen C1=(S,F,F,F) in
the initial four games and is classiﬁed accordingly. The FII hypothesis predicts that
when comparing the subject's ﬁrst to her second choices in the same games, she should
switch to the selﬁsh option with the same probability in the LOW, MEDIUM and
HIGH games. Conversely, according to the DDM, the highest frequency of switches
should occur in the VERY LOW or LOW game  as the exemplary subject is closest
to her indiﬀerence point in these games  while there should be fewer switches in the
MEDIUM and HIGH games. Figure 2.2 displays the propensity to switch in each game
for each choice pattern.23
For almost all classiﬁcations, switching patterns are more closely in line with predictions
of the DDM than with predictions of the FII hypothesis. With the exception of the
SSFF pattern, we observe that subjects are more likely to switch in games which are
closer to their indiﬀerence point. In contrast, we ﬁnd little evidence that subjects
are switching at similar rates in all games in which they have chosen the fair option
under time pressure. This is most evident for the FFFF pattern, where a majority of
switches occur in the ﬁrst (VERY LOW) game even under time pressure. In contrast
to the predictions of the FII hypothesis, there is also substantive evidence for switching
from the selﬁsh to the fair option (most pronounced for the SSSF and SSSS choice
patterns). Given that most of these switches occur for games that are close to individual
indiﬀerence points, this pattern is closely in line with the predictions of the DDM.
Result 2 (Within-Subject evidence in the BDs) We do ﬁnd evidence that subjects
22 The ﬁve choice patterns are (F,F,F,F), (S,F,F,F), (S,S,F,F), (S,S,S,F) and (S,S,S,S). For any
other pattern (e.g. (S,F,S,F)) there is no clear indication in which decision a subject might have made
an error that violates transitivity and hence where the indiﬀerence point for this subject might be
located. Note that a consistent pattern does not necessarily imply that subjects have not made any
error since a (S,F,F,F) subject could have made an error in either the VERY LOW game implying
that her actual preferences are (F,F,F,F) or in the LOW game implying that her actual preferences
are (S,S,F,F) or could have made more than one error.
23 Due to the smaller group size for some classiﬁcations in the STP condition, we pooled data from
both time pressure conditions for this analysis.
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Figure 2.2: Conditional switching probabilities in the BDs
Notes: This ﬁgure displays the propensity to switch between ﬁrst and second
choice in a given game across ﬁve diﬀerent classiﬁcations of consistent decision
making. The left panel displays switching behavior when ﬁrst choices have been
made under time delay and the right panel displays switching behavior when
ﬁrst choices have been made under time pressure. The percentages indicate how
common a classiﬁcation is within the population.
are more likely to switch from the fair to the selﬁsh option in games, in which this
prediction is supported by the FII and the DDM (LOW); but not in games, in which
this prediction is only supported by the FII hypothesis (MEDIUM). The latter provides
unambiguous evidence against the FII hypothesis.
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Table 2.7: Random effects probit regression for the effect
of time pressure in the binary dictator games
(1) (2) (3)
TIME PRESSURE (TP) 0.350 (0.01) 0.00634 (0.43) 0.249 (1.33)
STRONG TIME PRESSURE (STP) 0.463 (1.30) 0.115 (0.20) 0.261 (0.33)
LOW 1.986**** (7.11) 1.632**** (4.28) 1.707**** (4.20)
MEDIUM 2.574**** (7.18) 2.480**** (6.26) 2.524**** (6.22)
HIGH 2.773**** (9.40) 2.627**** (6.28) 2.698**** (5.93)
SCREEN2 -0.345* (-1.80) -0.382* (-1.95) -0.259 (-0.87)
SCREEN3 0.251 (1.41) 0.259 (1.44) 0.622** (2.02)
SCREEN4 0.176 (0.71) 0.197 (0.77) 0.239 (0.63)
TP * LOW 0.541 (1.12) 0.392 (0.69)
TP * MEDIUM 0.242 (0.49) 0.176 (0.33)
TP * HIGH 0.489 (0.88) 0.436 (0.77)
STP * LOW 1.010* (1.78) 1.273 (1.60)
STP * MEDIUM 0.291 (0.49) 0.567 (0.83)
STP * HIGH -0.0806 (-0.13) -0.0736 (-0.11)
TP * SCREEN2 -0.0606 (-0.14)
TP * SCREEN3 -0.621 (-0.51)
TP * SCREEN4 -0.0298 (-0.05)
STP * SCREEN2 -0.602 (-1.04)
STP * SCREEN3 -0.598 (-1.26)
STP * SCREEN4 0.0114 (0.02)
CONSTANT -2.396**** (-7.25) -2.231**** (-5.85) -2.410**** (-5.57)
Observations 704 704 704
Subjects 176 176 176
Prob > Chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001
Notes: The dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the equal option was chosen and 0 otherwise. The variables Time Pressure and Strong Time Pressure
equal 1 if the subject was assigned to the corresponding condition and 0 otherwise. Low, Medium and High are dummy variables for the games with which
we confronted subjects in block 1 and eﬀects are reported relative to the Very Low game which is the omitted category. The screen variables capture
potential order eﬀects by indicating whether a choice was presented on the second, third or last screen. The eﬀects are reported relative to the decision on
the ﬁrst screen.
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A potential concern, given the observed decline in average fair behavior across decisions,
is that subjects' choices as well as their response time may be inﬂuenced by the order
in which the diﬀerent games were presented. This concern should already be limited
by the fact that we presented the games in a randomized order. In addition, we did
not ﬁnd any evidence in favor of the FII hypothesis using only the ﬁrst decision taken
by each subject. We additionally address this concern using a set of probit regression
models. Each of these models takes individual choices in the four decisions of block
1 as a dependent variable. Importantly, the dependent variable encodes the order in
which the choices were taken. That is, if a subject entered the LOW game on the ﬁrst
screen, it is coded as choice 1. We report the results of three diﬀerent speciﬁcations
in Table 2.7. In speciﬁcation (1), we ﬁnd no evidence that time pressure increases
the frequency of equal choices, when controlling for order eﬀects and the beneﬁts of
choosing the fair option. In speciﬁcation (2) we add interaction terms between the
treatment dummy and the beneﬁts of choosing the fair option. Again, we ﬁnd no
evidence that time pressure signiﬁcantly aﬀects equal choices in any of the four games.
Moreover, all interaction terms for the standard time pressure (TD) treatment are
insigniﬁcant. This is further evidence that even in those games where both the DDM
and the FII would predict an increase of fairness under time pressure there is no such
eﬀect. For stronger time pressure (STP), there is weakly signiﬁcant evidence that
time pressure increases the frequency of fair choices in the LOW game, but not in the
MEDIUM game. The former ﬁnding is, however, predicted by both the DDM and the
FII hypothesis. Finally, in speciﬁcation (3) we add interaction terms between the TP
and the SCREEN variables. These interactions terms would be signiﬁcant if the order
in which the games were presented would moderate the treatment eﬀect - which we
do not observe. As suspected, we do observe that the screen variables are signiﬁcant
in all three speciﬁcations. Thus, if a game was presented on a speciﬁc decision screen,
the likelihood that a subject would choose the equal option was increased or decreased
depending on the speciﬁcation.
2.4.3 Constrained response time in the prisoner's dilemma games
As for the BD games, we ﬁnd that time pressure signiﬁcantly speeds up choices in the
PD games.24 Furthermore subjects' individual fairness assessments, which we elicited
at the end of the experiment, are strongly consistent with our label: a large majority of
the subjects perceives the cooperative option as the fairest outcome in all four prisoner's
dilemma games (VLOW 94%, LOW 96%, MEDIUM 88%, HIGH 97%), independent
24 All response time statistics are available in Appendix 2.4.
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of the treatment condition.
Based on the analysis of response times and choice frequencies in the Unconstrained
condition, the only PD game that can shed light on the FII hypothesis is the LOW
game. The fraction of cooperative fair choices in the LOW game increases from 41%
in the TD condition to 44% in the TP and 50% in the STP condition. This increase is
not statistically signiﬁcant though (Two-sided Fisher's exact test; TD vs. TP: p = 0.74,
TD vs. STP: p = 0.39). When we restrict our analysis to choices on the ﬁrst decision
screen (TD: 69% vs. TP: 60% vs. STP: 50%) we again ﬁnd no evidence that time
pressure increases the fraction of fair behavior but rather observe a slight decrease
(Two-sided Fisher's exact test; TD vs. TP: p = 0.73, TD vs. STP: p = 0.43). Given
that in the LOW game the FII and the DDM both predict that time pressure should
increase the fraction of fair choices, this observation is unambiguous evidence against
the hypothesis that "fairness is intuitive" and the ﬁndings in Rand et al. (2012).
One potential concern is that our time pressure manipulation could have aﬀected be-
liefs. If subjects were more optimistic about average contributions of others in the
Time Delay compared to the Time Pressure or Strong Time Pressure condition, we
might have observed no evidence in favor of the FII hypothesis for this reason. To
address this concern, we compare the stated beliefs. We ﬁnd that in the LOW game,
average beliefs did not diﬀer between the two conditions (Rank-sum test; TD vs. TP:
p = 0.63, TD vs. STP: p = 1).
In a second step, we analyze the within-subject eﬀect of time pressure on choices in the
LOW prisoner's dilemma game. For this purpose, we compute switching probabilities
by comparing a subject's ﬁrst choice with her second choice in the same game. If
fairness was indeed intuitive, we would expect that more subjects initially choose to
cooperate under time pressure and switch to defection under time delay. Note that the
DDM makes the same prediction. Thus, if we do not observe the expected switching
pattern, this would constitute unambiguous evidence against the FII hypothesis.
The ﬁrst thing to note is that subjects in the TP and STP conditions are indeed more
likely to switch from cooperation under time pressure to defection under time delay
(Sign Rank Test; TP p = 0.07, STP p = 0.01). Subjects in the TD condition are also
more likely to switch from cooperation to defection, but this diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant
(Sign Rank Test; p = 0.2). When we compare switching behavior in each of the two
Time Pressure to switching behavior in the Time Delay condition, we do not ﬁnd that
subjects in either of the two time pressure conditions were more likely to switch from
cooperation to defection as compared to subjects in the Time Delay condition (Rank-
sum test; TD vs. TP: p = 0.62, TD vs. STP: p = 0.12). Hence, instead of reﬂecting
a reassessment of an initial intuitive decision, the decline of cooperative choices in the
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Time Pressure conditions might simply reﬂect the well-known fact that subjects tend
to become more selﬁsh in repeated decisions even without receiving feedback (Ledyard,
1994). Therefore, our within-subject evidence in in this game does not support the FII
hypothesis.
Like in the BD games, a complementary analysis of conditional switching patterns at
the individual level shows that most switches occur in games in which subjects are
close to their indiﬀerence point. These observations support the idea that switching
behavior under time pressure reﬂects choice diﬃculty instead of a reassessment of an
intuitive fair choice.25
Result 3 (Between- and within-subject evidence in the PDs) In the Prisoner's
dilemma games, we do not ﬁnd evidence that time pressure increases the fraction of
fair choices even when both the FII as well as the DDM would support this prediction
(LOW game). Within-subjects, we ﬁnd that subjects in both Time Pressure conditions
are as likely to revise an initially fair choice as subjects in the Time Delay condition.
Both results are inconsistent with the FII hypothesis.
2.5 Conclusion and Discussion
In this paper we propose and conduct a new test of the FII hypothesis (Rand et al.,
2012; Cappelen et al., 2016). Our test takes into account that a causal test of this
hypothesis, using time pressure and time delay manipulations, needs to account for
the subjective diﬃculty of making a choice. We use a simple version of the Drift Diﬀu-
sion Model (DDM) to show that time pressure can increase or decrease the frequency
of fair choices, depending on whether decision makers who prefer the fair option per-
ceive smaller or larger utility diﬀerences than decision makers who prefer the selﬁsh
option and depending on the distribution of preference types within the population.
Hence, these predicted eﬀects may either be aligned with those of the FII hypothesis
or aﬀect choices under time pressure in the opposite direction. In our experiment, we
then analyze the eﬀect of time pressure in choice situations in which both the DDM
and the FII hypothesis predict that time pressure should increase the fraction of fair
choices. In neither of the BD or PD games classiﬁed accordingly, we ﬁnd that time
pressure consistently increases the fraction of fair choices. On the other hand, we do
not ﬁnd that time pressure increases the fraction of fair choices in games, in which this
increase is only predicted by the FII hypothesis, thus rendering unambiguous evidence
25 The full analysis of the remaining games and switching patterns can be found in Appendix 2.4.
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against the FII hypothesis. Our empirical test therefore provides little support for the
hypothesis that "fairness is intuitive" in a general way. This result holds between-
and within-subjects. A complementary analysis further demonstrates that switching
patterns strongly reﬂect choice diﬃculty (subjective indiﬀerence), a pattern that is
supported by the DDM but not by the FII hypothesis.
On the one hand our rejection of the FII hypothesis is in line with a number of recent
papers (Fiedler et al., 2013; Tinghög et al., 2013; Martinsson et al., 2014; Duﬀy and
Smith, 2014; Verkoeijen and Bouwmeester, 2014; Achtziger et al., 2015; Kocher et al.,
2016; Lohse, 2016; Capraro and Cococcioni, 2016; Tinghög et al., 2016) and a large
scale replication project (Bouwmeester et al., 2017) which also suggest that in some
instances behaving fairly might not be intuitive and might even require additional de-
liberation or stronger self-control. On the other hand, our results are surprising at least
to the degree that they contradict a signiﬁcant number of previous studies which tend
to ﬁnd that time pressure or other forms of inducing intuitive decision making lead to
more cooperative or fair choices. For instance, a recent meta-study ﬁnds that relying
on intuition relative to deliberation increases the average rate of cooperation by 6.1
percentage points in one-shot games (Rand et al., 2016). Similarly, several current the-
ories on the link between intuition and pro-social behavior are based on the idea that
deliberation can never increase cooperation (Dreber et al., 2014; Rand et al., 2014; Bear
and Rand, 2016)26. The observation that some experiments have found an increase of
fairness under time pressure while other experiments report no eﬀect or even a reduc-
tion of fairness could well be in line with our theoretical considerations because none
of the previous experiments has explicitly accounted for subjective utility diﬀerences.
Hence, it is conceivable that some experiments have looked at choice situations where
the DDM and the FII predict eﬀects of time pressure which go in the same direction
while other experiments have looked at choice situations in which the DDM and the
FII hypothesis make opposite predictions. The most obvious reason for such diﬀerences
is the choice of the experimental task or its parameters. But even in experiments that
analyze the same game (e.g., a public good game with MPCR 0.5) subject pools might
diﬀer (e.g., students vs. non-students) and it is possible that subjects with diﬀerent
individual attributes or cultural backgrounds might attach diﬀerent subjective valua-
tions to options in the same task, thereby leading to unobserved heterogeneity in terms
of the perceived choice diﬃculty as well as the share of fair decision makers. Given
that both of these factors determine if the DDM predicts an increase or decrease of fair
behavior under time pressure, these experiments might come to diﬀerent conclusions
26 For a discussion of the last paper see Myrseth and Wollbrant (2016) and Jagau and van Veelen
(2017).
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concerning the FII hypothesis.
At this point it is also important to stress that our paper does not attempt to directly
replicate previous test of the FII hypothesis or pinpoint any other moderating factor
(e.g. confusion, experience, social value orientation, default options) that might also
aﬀect the direction of a time pressure eﬀect. Rather, we aim at pointing out that
it is unclear whether previous tests provide ambiguous or unambiguous evidence in
favor of or against the FII hypothesis, since they do not account for subjective utility
diﬀerences. Therefore our test diﬀers from these previous tests of the same hypothesis
along several dimensions that are motivated by our theoretical considerations: in our
test subjects were confronted with several one-shot choice situations instead of only
one, the speciﬁcs of each choice situation were only revealed on the decision screen
and not on a preceding instruction screen27, stakes were considerably higher than in
many of the previous internet experiments, we used a graphical interface to visualize
the payoﬀs of the diﬀerent choice options and the compliance with the response time
manipulations was more strongly enforced and consequently substantially higher. We
believe that each of these design changes was well motivated and necessary in order
to provide an unbiased test of the FII hypothesis. Furthermore, none of these changes
should make it less likely to ﬁnd evidence in favor of the FII hypothesis in an obvious
way if it was generally valid as suggested by the mechanism motivating the social
heuristics hypothesis (Rand et al., 2014).
Overall our results suggest that the link between intuition and fairness is more compli-
cated and nuanced than previously thought. A closer inspection of further moderating
factors might provide useful insights into the conditions or individual attributes that
inﬂuence the link between intuition and fairness. Several recent contributions have al-
ready provided ﬁrst insights into the role of confusion (Recalde et al., 2014; Stromland
et al., 2016; Goeschl and Lohse, 2016), gender (Rand et al., 2016; Tinghög et al., 2016),
culture (Nishi et al., 2017), stake size (Mrkva, 2017) and social-value-orientation (Chen
and Fischbacher, 2015; Mischkowski and Glöckner, 2016).
27 This is in line with Fiedler et al. (2013) and Capraro and Cococcioni (2016) but diﬀers from
(Rand et al., 2012). We, however, believe that giving subjects a possibility to fully deliberate on a
task before entering the decision screen will aﬀect the chances of isolating intuitive tendencies via
time pressure.
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Appendix 2.A
2.A.1 Model and Predictions
In this Appendix, we will describe the Drift Diﬀusion Model (DDM), introduced in
section 2.2, in more detail. This description will derive the following three predictions
from the DDM: First, the higher the (absolute) subjective utility diﬀerence between
the options of choice, the lower a decision maker's expected response time. Second, a
decision maker is more likely to make a mistake (i.e. to choose the option that yields
a lower subjective utility) the smaller the utility diﬀerence between the two options of
choice. Third, a decision maker is more likely to make a mistake under time pressure
the smaller the utility diﬀerence between the two options of choice.
The ﬁrst two predictions are common in the DDM literature and have previously been
used to show that the correlation between response times and "fair" behavior can reﬂect
subjective utility diﬀerences (Krajbich et al., 2014, 2015a,b). The third prediction is
novel, at least in the context of the literature on fairness and time pressure, and follows
immediately from the second prediction. A set of plausible parameter assumptions
furthermore allows us to infer how this individual level prediction aﬀects the aggregate
share of fair choices under time pressure and time delay.
For the purpose of illustration, we will refer to a basic version of the DDM. This ba-
sic version can be summarized as follows: A decision maker accumulates stochastic
information about her preferences for a "fair" (henceforth: F ) and a "selﬁsh" (hence-
forth: S) option over a series of time periods t. We denote the decision maker's
true underlying utility value for the fair and the selﬁsh option by ui(F ) = uF and
ui(S) = uS. Thus, the true underlying utility diﬀerence between the fair and the selﬁsh
option is V = uF − uS. In each period t, decision makers observe noisy value signals
Ft ∼ N (uF , σ2F ) and St ∼ N (uS, σ2S) which are centered around the true means of
the underlying value function and which are independently and identically distributed
(i.i.d.).
In line with the existing literature (Krajbich et al., 2015a), we will assume that σ2F = σ
2
S,
i.e. the distribution functions from which the signals are drawn only diﬀer in their re-
spective means. After observing a pair of signals, the decision maker computes the
value diﬀerence between the two signals, i.e. Vt = Ft − St. The stochastic evidence
observed until period t is accumulated in a subjective state variable Xt. The accu-
mulation process stops as soon as the state variable Xt crosses an upper threshold a,
inducing the decision maker to choose F , or a lower threshold b, inducing the decision
maker to choose S. We will follow the convention and assume that the two decision
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thresholds a and b are equidistant from 0 so that b = −a. The evolution of the subjec-
tive state variable Xt before hitting either of the decision thresholds in discrete time
can be written as:
Xt = Xt−1 + (uF − uS) + ϵt = Xt−1 + V + ϵt (2.1)
where ϵt ∼ N (0, σ2) captures the noise in the process with
Xt ∼ N (tV, tσ2) (2.2)
This simple variant of the DDM can also be modeled in continuous time as a Brownian
motion with drift (Ratcliﬀ and Rouder, 1998; Smith, 2000; Bogacz et al., 2006) for
which expressions have been derived for the probability of choosing option F for V > 0
and the mean response time given that V ̸= 0 (Palmer et al., 2005; Clithero, 2016)28.
The probability that a decision maker who prefers the fair option (V > 0) actually
chooses this option can then be written as:
P FF =
1
1 + e
−2V a
σ2
(2.3)
As can be easily veriﬁed by letting V →∞ and V → 0, P FF ∈ [0.5; 1[.
From expression (2.3), the probability of choosing the selﬁsh option given that V > 0
(i.e. the probability that a fair decision maker chooses the selﬁsh option by mistake)
directly follows as
P FS = 1− P FF (2.4)
so that P FS ∈]0; 0.5] .
The expected number of periods (which is commonly referred to as "response time" in
the economics and psychology literature) until one of the thresholds a or b is reached
for V ̸= 0 can furthermore be written as29:
E[t] =
a
V
tanh
(
aV
σ2
)
(2.5)
By symmetry, equations (2.3) and (2.4) can be expressed equivalently for the proba-
bility that a selﬁsh decision maker with V < 0 chooses the fair or the selﬁsh option.
28 An additional assumption is that there is no initial bias in favor of one of the two options s.t.
X0 = 0.
29 This expression makes use of the hyperbolic tangent function tanh(z) = e
z+e−z
ez−e−z
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Prediction I
Prediction I states that the expected response time decreases as the absolute utility
diﬀerence between the fair and the selﬁsh option (i.e. |V |) increases. Since the ﬁrst
derivative of equation (2.5) w.r.t V is strictly negative for V > 0, the above statement
follows immediately. Assuming symmetrical thresholds and no initial bias, the same is
true for V < 0.
Figure 2.3 illustrates the relationship between expected response times and |V | and
its implications for inferring choice diﬃculty from response times. We denote the
utility diﬀerence of fair decision makers as VF > 0, and the utility diﬀerence for selﬁsh
decision makers will be denoted VS < 0. A direct implication of Prediction I is that fair
choices are relatively faster if VF > |VS| (see Figure 2.3a). Similarly, fair choices are
expected to be relatively slower, if VF < |VS| (see Figure 2.3b). A direct corollary of
this relationship is that arbitrary correlations between fair choices and response times
can be created by varying the relative attractiveness of the fair option (Krajbich et al.,
2015a).
Figure 2.3: An illustration of two exemplary processes
(a) Fair choices are faster (b) Selﬁsh choices are faster
Notes: This Figure displays two exemplary Drift Diﬀusion Processes. Xˆ(F )
(Xˆ(S)) represents the expected evolution of the subjective state variable for the
average decision maker with V > 0 (V < 0) option. Expected response times are
labeled as rtF and rtS . The actual evolution of the subjective state variable is
subject to noise, as characterized by the black lines that ﬂuctuate around Xˆ(F )
and Xˆ(S). The expected response time distribution of fair choices are displayed
above a, the corresponding distribution for selﬁsh choices is displayed below −a.
Prediction II
Prediction II states that a decision maker is less likely to make a mistake (i.e. to
choose the option that yields the lower subjective utility value) as |V | increases. We
will demonstrate this by showing that a decision maker is more likely to choose her
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truly preferred option as |V | increases. For V > 0, this follows immediately from
equations (2.3) and (2.4). The ﬁrst derivative of statement (2.3) w.r.t. V is given by:
∂P FF
∂V
=
2ae
−2aV
σ2
σ2(1 + e
−2aV
σ2 )2
> 0 (2.6)
Hence, the probability of choosing the truly preferred fair option increases in V for
V > 0. As a corollary, using statement (2.4), P FS decreases in V . By symmetry, an
equivalent result can be derived for V < 0. The intuition behind this prediction is that
noise in the decision process will have a larger impact on the value of Xt if |V | is small.
Prediction III
Prediction III states that time pressure will reduce the probability of a decision maker
to choose her truly preferred option. We will follow the convention in the psychological
literature and model time pressure as leading to a collapse of the decision thresholds a
and b to a lower absolute level (Bogacz et al., 2006; Milosavljevic et al., 2010; Hawkins
et al., 2015).30 Intuitively, a lower decision threshold implies that decision makers will
choose at lower precision because noise will gain a higher weight in the decision process
resulting in a higher likelihood that the wrong threshold is crossed. In the following,
we will assume that a decision maker's threshold is A if he is constrained to wait (i.e.
t > tL) before making a choice, and a < A if he is constrained to make a fast choice
(i.e. t < tL). Hence, A can be re-written as A = z · a with z > 1.31
Taking the ﬁrst derivative of equation (2.3) w.r.t a shows that the probability of choos-
ing the correct option for a given V > 0 decreases as a decreases. Using equation (2.4),
this implies that higher time pressure causes a decision maker to make more mistakes.
30 This assumption allows to base predictions on equation (2.3). An alternative way to model time
pressure would be to analyze the distribution of Xt at diﬀerent points in time using equation (2.2)
or to analyze the distribution of ﬁrst barrier passage times from which equations (2.3) and (2.5) are
derived. The ﬁrst approach would ignore the presence of decision boundaries. The second approach
would rely on an analytical expression for the ﬁrst passage times with two boundaries P (Ta ≤ tl) = 1−
(e
aV
σ2 K∞T (a)−e
aV
σ2 K∞T (b)) as derived e.g. in Smith (2000) or Hieber and Scherer (2012). However, this
expression contains the inﬁnite sum (KNT (k) :=
σ2π
(a−b)2
∑N
n=1
(n(−1)(n+1))(e(−T (
V 2
2σ2
+ σ
2n2π2
2(a−b)2 ))sin(nπka−b )
V 2
2σ2
+ σ
2n2π2
2(a−b)2
) for
which no closed form solution for the derivative w.r.t V can be found without relying on approximation
(Voss et al., 2004; Bogacz et al., 2006).
31 This approach implicitly assumes that there are suﬃcient incentives so that all subjects will decide
within the time limit, instead of explicitly modeling the choices of subjects who have not crossed the
(now lower) decision threshold at tL. One could e.g. assume that these undecided subjects decide
randomly or simply by the sign of the state variable (Bogacz et al., 2006). Both approaches are not
opposed to, but would rather strengthen Prediction III as the likelihood of being undecided rises as
|V | falls.
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∂(1− P FF )
∂a
= − 2ae
−2aV
σ2
σ2(1 + e
−2aV
σ2 )2
< 0 (2.7)
Hence, a direct corollary of Predictions II and III is that time pressure will lead to
a higher frequency of mistakes among decision makers with smaller |V |. To see this
intuitively, compare two decision makers and assume that VF > |VS|. In this case,
selﬁsh decision makers are more likely to cross the wrong decision threshold compared
to fair decision makers when they have to take a decision under time pressure.
Aggregate choice frequencies
We will use the results of Predictions II and III to show how aggregate choice frequencies
respond to time pressure and time delay. Let α be the fraction of decision makers who
prefer the fair option (V > 0), and 1−α be the fraction of decision makers who prefer
the selﬁsh option (V < 0). Furthermore, let Pmk (V, a) be a function that describes the
probability of a decision maker of type k ∈ {F, S} to choose an option m ∈ {F, S}
using equations (2.3) and (2.4). As described above, we assume that time pressure
leads to a collapse of the decision thresholds, i.e. the decision threshold is A under
time delay and a < A under time pressure such that A = z · a with z > 1. We will
look at a case where VF>|VS|. We write VF>l · |Vs| with l > 1.
We write for the probability of choosing the fair option under time pressure
pF (a) = α · (P FF (VF , a)) + (1− α) · (P SF (VS, a)) (2.8)
Similarly, the probability of observing a fair choice under time delay is
pF (A) = α · (P FF (VF , A)) + (1− α) · (P SF (VS, A)) (2.9)
Using equations (2.8) and (2.9), we can derive the condition under which the fraction
of fair choices is higher when the decision threshold is a as compared to A:
pF (a) ≥ pF (A)
α · (P FF (VF , a)) + (1−α) · (1−P SS (VS, a)) ≥ α · (P FF (VF , A)) + (1−α) · (1−P SS (VS, A))
This equation can be re-written as
51
CHAPTER 2. IS FAIRNESS INTUITIVE?
(1− α) · (P SS (VS, A)− P SS (VS, a)) ≥ α · (P FF (VF , A)− P FF (VF , a)) (2.10)
We want to show that this conditions holds if α < 0.5 (i.e. if the type with the stronger
preference is less common in the population). For α ≤ 0.5 it suﬃces to show that
P SS (VS, A)− P SS (VS, a) > P FF (VF , A)− P FF (VF , a) (2.11)
because (1− α) ≥ α and hence if (2.11) holds, (2.10) holds as well.
We re-write equation (2.11) by plugging in (2.3). To simplify, we will set a = 1 such
that A = z. In addition, we use VF = l · VS with l > 1 and deﬁne the signal-to-noise
ratio as y = V
σ2
> 1. Thereby, we can re-write equation (2.11) as
1
1 + e−2yz
− 1
1 + e−2y
>
1
1 + e−2lyz
− 1
1 + e−2ly
(2.12)
This equation states that time pressure leads to a higher frequency of fair choices, if
the diﬀerence in error rates under time pressure versus time delay is larger for selﬁsh
than for fair decision makers.
To further simplify, we will deﬁne the following function:
g(λ, z) =
1
1 + e−2λz
− 1
1 + e−2λ
(2.13)
Note that the L.H.S of equation (2.12) is g(y, z) and the R.H.S. is g(ly, z). Thus, to
show that equation (2.12) holds, we show that g(λ, z) is a strictly decreasing function
in λ for some reasonable parameter assumptions.
∂g(λ, z)
∂λ
= 2z
1
(1 + e−2λz)2
e−2λz − 2 1
(1 + e−2λ)2
e−2λ < 0 (2.14)
This equation can be re-written as:
z
(1 + e−2λ)2
(1 + e−2λz)2
e−2λ(z−1) < 1 (2.15)
which holds if λ > 1 and z > 1.32
32 More precisely, there exists a λ0 for which this equation always holds if λ > λ0 which is a function
of z. The bigger z (i.e. the stronger the eﬀects of time pressure) the smaller λ0 becomes. If we drop
the assumption that a = 1 this parameter restriction translates to a · λ > 1. In other words, we have
to assume that either the signal to noise ratio y is suﬃciently strong or that the decision threshold
a is suﬃciently large which ensures that decisions are not fully governed by noise. Since we treat
the DDM as a model of decision making, it seems reasonable to assume that the average decision
maker receives value signals which are strong enough. In addition, our empirical design ensures that
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This result leads to four predictions depending on the population share α and l.
1. For α = 0.5 and l = 1 it is easy to verify that the L.H.S. and R.H.S. of equation
(2.10) are exactly equal. This indicates that we would not expect a change in
the frequency of fair choices due to the DDM - a case that we have described as
a type 0 ("perfectly balanced") situation in the main text of the paper.
2. For α ≤ 0.5 and l > 1, we have shown above that equation (2.12) is fulﬁlled as
long as the signal to noise ratio y > 1 or the decision threshold a is suﬃciently
large (or a combination of both). Here, time pressure should increase the fraction
of fair choices relative to time delay. We refer to this as a situation of type 1.
3. For α > 0.5 and 0 < l < 1, we can derive a reverse statement of equation (2.12).
Here, the DDM predicts that time pressure decreases the fraction of fair choices.
We refer to this as a type 2 situation in the paper.
4. For α > 0.5 and l > 1, it does not suﬃce to show that equation (2.12) is fulﬁlled.
As can be seen from equation (2.10), whether the prediction holds depends on the
absolute diﬀerence in error probabilities. Hence, without knowing the mistake
probabilities under a and A, the DDM does not make clear predictions in these
situations. By symmetry, a reverse statement can bee derived for the case where
α < 0.5 and 0 < l < 1.
2.A.2 Experimental Details
Visual Presentation of Games
The payoﬀs associated with each binary choice were displayed graphically as stacked
and colored bars in all games (see Figure 2.4). The subject's own payoﬀ corresponded
to the orange and the other participant's payoﬀ to the blue bar in all binary choice
situations. Subjects received detailed instructions on how to read the bars and we
conﬁrmed their understanding in four control questions before they could start with
the actual decision tasks. Furthermore, the examples used for the control questions
did not relate to prisoner's dilemma games but displayed arbitrary payoﬀs to prevent
potential priming eﬀects. We believe that this way of displaying the payoﬀs has two
advantages. First, it ensures that participants with diﬀerent types of preferences can
identify and implement their preferred choice with equal diﬃculty. Second, it makes the
time pressure is not extreme, allowing individuals to make non-random decisions. When both z and
y become large, note that g(y, z) ∼ g(ly, z) so that the diﬀerence is mainly reﬂecting diﬀerences in
population shares.
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payoﬀs easily accessible and comparable across the choice options, even under response
time constraints.
Figure 2.4: Presentation of games in the experiment
(a) Prisoner's dilemma games
(b) Binary
dictator
games
54
CHAPTER 2. IS FAIRNESS INTUITIVE?
Filler Games
In Figure 2.5, we display the ﬁller games that subjects faced during the experiment.
Figure 2.5: Filler Games
(a) Binary dictator games (Part 2) (b) Prisoner's dilemma games
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2.A.3 Instructions
Instructions were presented on the screens in German language. A translated version
of the original instructions is presented below. The original instructions are available
upon request.
Instructions for part 1 of the experiment 
You will now start with the first part of the experiment. 
This part of the experiment consists of 10 rounds.  
In each round, you will interact with one other randomly chosen participant. No participant is going 
to be informed with whom he or she has interacted during the experiment. 
Procedure within each round 
In each round, both participants simultaneously choose one of two options: You decide between 
option “A“ and “B“, the other participant decides between option “C“ and “D“. Hence, you decide 
between options A and B without knowing which option has been chosen by the other participant.  
Your payoff and the payoff of the other participant depend on the decisions of both participants. At 
the beginning of each round (so before you and the other participant have made a choice), both 
participants will see a table in which the four different payoffs are displayed. 
 
 
Each of the four possible payoffs is depicted as a bar chart. The bars consist of several coloured parts. 
Your own payoff corresponds to the orange part of the bar. The number within the orange part of 
the bar indicates the exact Euro amount that you will going to receive in that case. 
The payoff of the other participant corresponds to the blue part of the bar. The number within the 
blue part of the bar indicates the exact Euro amount that the other participant is going to receive in 
that case.  
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The height of the orange and the blue part corresponds to the sum of payoffs for both participants. 
The grey part of the bar indicates the payoff difference to the maximum achievable sum in this 
round. 
 
Examples:  
Example 1:  
You have chosen option A, the other participant has chosen option C. This results in the following 
payoffs: You receive 1 Euro and the other participant receives 1 Euro. 
Example 2:  
You have chosen option B, the other participant has chosen option D. This results in the following 
payoffs: You receive 4 Euro and the other participant receives 4 Euro.  
 
Please note 
The actual payoff table is going to look different in the experiment. Also, the payoffs will differ in 
each round. 
 
End of a round 
The round is over as soon as both participant have taken a decision. You will not be informed about 
the choices of the other participant.  
 
Your payoff  
At the end of the experiment the computer will randomly choose one round from this or the other 
part of the experiment. You receive the amount which results from your own and the decision of 
the other participant. Hence, each decision in this part of the experiment can influence your final 
payoff at the end of the experiment  
You have received all instructions for the first part of the experiment now. Press “continue“ to learn 
more about how each choice will be displayed on your computer and to test your comprehension on 
an example.  
 
Screen: 
Example 
In this part you can test your comprehension using the payoff table displayed below. Your choices in 
this part will not influence your final payoff.  
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Please look at the payoffs displayed in the table: 
 
Question 1:  
Suppose you choose option A and the other participant chooses option C. 
Your payoff in Euro: ____________________  
Payoff of the other participant in Euro: ___________  
Question 2:  
Suppose, you choose option B and the other participant chooses option C.  
Your payoff in Euro: ____________________ Euro (1) 
Payoff of the other participant in Euro: ___________ Euro (1) 
Press “continue“ to find out whether you answered correctly. 
 
Screen: 
Feedback (correct): 
You have answered both questions correctly. You can start with round 1 now. 
Feedback (wrong): 
Unfortunately, you did not answer all questions correctly. Please take a look at the payoffs displayed 
in the table once more: 
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Question 1 (wrong): 
In question 1 you were asked: What payoff would you and the other participant receive in the case 
that you would chose option A and the other participant would choose option C. The payoffs are as 
follows: 
 
In this case you would receive 4 Euro (orange part of the bar). The other participant would receive 3 
Euro (blue part of the bar).  
Please make sure that you have understood all instructions. If you need further help please contact 
the experimenter.  
Question 2 (wrong): 
In question 2 you were asked: What payoff would you and the other participant receive in the case 
that you would chose option B and the other participant would choose option C. The payoffs are as 
follows: 
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In this case you would receive a payoff of 1 Euro (orange part of the bar). The other participant 
would receive a payoff of 1 Euro (blue part of the bar).  
Please make sure that you have understood all instructions correctly. If you still have problems, 
please contact the experimenter. 
 
Screen: 
 
[Time Pressure] 
In the following 5 rounds you should decide quickly.  
Please select option A or B in less than 12 seconds in every round. 
The remaining decision time is displayed above the payoff table.  
If your decision takes longer than 12 seconds in one round and if this round is chosen for payoff, you 
will not receive your show-up fee of 3 Euro.  
[Time Delay] 
In the following 5 rounds you should wait before making a decision.   
In each round you should wait at least 12 seconds before you decide between options A und B.  
Only after 12 seconds have passed, the grey choice buttons labelled “A“ and “B“ will appear on the 
screen.  
You don’t have to decide precisely after 12 seconds. You can think as long as you want.  
Press “continue“ to start with the first round.  
 
Screen: 
[Time Pressure] 
In the following 5 rounds, there is a time limit for your decision. 
Suppose, one round from this part of the experiment is chosen. You receive your show up fee of 3 
Euro only if you … 
… took a decision in more than 12 seconds 
… took a decision in less than 12 seconds 
… took a decision in exactly 12 seconds 
… took a decision in less than 20, but more than 12 seconds 
… in the randomly chosen round.  
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Please select the correct answer. On the next screen you will be informed whether your answer was 
correct.  
[Time Delay] 
In the following 5 rounds there is a time limit for your decision.  
In each round you should…  
… take a decision in less than 12 seconds.  
… wait at least 12 seconds before to take a decision.  
… take a decision in exactly 12 seconds  
… take a decision in at least 8, but less than <TimePressure|1> seconds to take a decision.  
 
Screen:  
Feedback Correct:  
You answered the question correctly and can now start with round 1. 
Feedback Wrong:  
Unfortunately, you haven’t answered the question correctly. Please take a look at the following 
advice again.  
[Time Pressure] 
In the following 5 rounds you should decide quickly.  
Please select option A or B in less than 12 seconds in every round. 
The remaining decision time is displayed above the payoff table.  
If your decision takes longer than 12 seconds in one round and if this round is chosen for payoff, you 
will not receive your show-up fee of 3 Euro.  
[Time Delay] 
In the following 5 rounds you should wait before making a decision.   
In each round you should wait at least 12 seconds before you decide between options A and B.  
Only after 12 seconds have passed, the grey choice buttons labelled “A“ and “B“ will appear on the 
screen.  
You don’t have to decide precisely after 12 seconds. You can think as long as you want.  
 
 
Press „continue“ in order to start with the first round.  
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2.A.4 Additional Results
Results for Prisoner's Dilemma Games
Table 2.8: Between-subject comparison of the average rate of fair
choices in the prisoner's dilemma games
Time Time p-Value Strong Time p-Value
Delay Pressure Fisher's Pressure Fisher's
N mean N mean exact N mean exact
VERY LOW 74 0.30 72 0.44 0.09 30 0.57 0.01
LOW 74 0.41 72 0.44 0.74 30 0.50 0.39
MEDIUM 74 0.43 72 0.53 0.32 30 0.60 0.14
HIGH 74 0.64 72 0.56 0.40 30 0.47 0.13
Notes: The mean rate of fair choices displayed is calculated over all orders. We
report the result of a two-sided Fisher's exact test comparing the fraction of fair
choices in the BD and the TP and STP conditions.
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Table 2.9: Within-subject comparison of switching behavior in the prisoner's dilemma games
Time Time Rank- St. Time Rank-
Delay Pressure sum Pressure sum
N mean Sign- N mean Sign- p-Value N mean Sign- p-Value
rank rank rank
(within-subjects) (within-subjects) (across) (within-subjects) (across)
VLOW 74 0.11 0.05 72 0.28 0.01 0.04 30 0.33 0.01 0.03
LOW 74 0.08 0.20 72 0.13 0.07 0.62 30 0.27 0.01 0.12
MEDIUM 74 0.04 0.53 72 0.31 0.01 0.01 30 0.27 0.02 0.07
HIGH 74 0.19 0.01 72 0.08 0.32 0.38 30 0.07 0.32 0.23
Notes: In this table we report the direction of switches for each of the four prisoner's dilemma games. The switching variable takes a value
of 1 if the subject switched from cooperation in block 1 to defection in block 2. The decision in block 1 is taken under time pressure in the
TP and STP condition and under time delay in the TD condition. The decision in block 2 is taken under time delay in all three conditions.
Columns 4 and 7 report the p-Value of a Wilcoxon Sign Rank Test, performed on subject's switching behavior within one condition. In
addition, we report the p-Value of a Rank-sum test which compares switching behavior across the TD and TP (column 8) and the STP
condition (column 12).
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Figure 2.6: Conditional switching probabilities in the prisoner's dilemma
games
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Table 2.10: Random effects probit regression for the effect of time pressure in the prisoner's dilemma games
(1) (2) (3)
TIME PRESSURE (TP) 0.180 (0.95) 0.546* (1.87) 0.417 (1.15)
STRONG TIME PRESSURE (STP) 0.316 (1.35) 0.922** (2.47) 0.763 (1.53)
LOW 0.0397 (0.19) 0.394 (1.44) 0.730** (2.23)
MEDIUM 0.350* (1.79) 0.568** (2.16) 0.938*** (3.13)
HIGH 0.576**** (3.45) 1.171**** (4.68) 1.181**** (4.55)
SCREEN2 -0.528*** (-2.64) -0.573*** (-2.79) -1.252**** (-4.56)
SCREEN3 -0.668**** (-3.89) -0.709**** (-4.06) -0.981**** (-3.83)
SCREEN4 -0.777**** (-4.31) -0.728**** (-3.99) -0.786*** (-2.96)
TP * LOW -0.421 (-1.21) -0.778* (-1.74)
TP * MEDIUM -0.219 (-0.66) -0.640 (-1.49)
TP * HIGH -0.780** (-2.22) -0.810** (-2.25)
STP * LOW -0.662 (-1.24) -1.485** (-2.37)
STP * MEDIUM -0.294 (-0.72) -1.577** (-2.52)
STP * HIGH -1.470*** (-2.90) -1.175** (-2.10)
TP * SCREEN2 0.865** (2.05)
TP * SCREEN3 0.295 (0.82)
TP * SCREEN4 0.196 (0.51)
STP * SCREEN2 1.915*** (2.93)
STP * SCREEN3 0.845 (1.48)
STP * SCREEN4 -0.252 (-0.45)
CONSTANT 0.0532 (0.27) -0.239 (-1.03) -0.175 (-0.67)
Observations 704 704 704
Subjects 176 176 176
Prob > Chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001
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Response Time Statistics
Figure 2.7: Response times in the binary dictator games
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Figure 2.8: Response times in the prisoner's dilemma games
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Table 2.11: Average and maximum response times across all Binary dictator Games
Time Delay Time Pressure St.Time Pressure
Mean (Max.) Mean (Max.) Mean (Max.) Mean (Max.) Mean (Max.) Mean (Max.)
Block 1 Block 2 Block 1 Block 2 Block 1 Block 2
VLOW 17.37 (103.54) 9.86 (30.68) 3.48 (5.98) 11.61 (30.62) 2.51 (3.79) 10.84 (31.11)
LOW 14.72 (64.96) 9.13 (25.20) 3.46 (8.00) 10.32 (36.26) 2.11 (4.42) 10.52 (46.87)
MEDIUM 11.48 (98.36) 7.85 (106.89) 3.21 (7.84) 8.54 (17.40) 1.88 (3.82) 8.76 (27.09)
HIGH 9.79 (23.76) 8.54 (38.98) 2.98 (6.07) 8.18 (29.85) 2.14 (0.32) 7.90 (13.74)
Notes: This table shows response time averages for the diﬀerent BD games across blocks I and II and treatment conditions.
68
C
H
A
P
T
E
R
2.
IS
F
A
IR
N
E
S
S
IN
T
U
IT
IV
E
?
Table 2.12: Average and maximum response times across all Prisoner's dilemma Games
Time Delay Time Pressure St.Time Pressure
Mean (Max.) Mean (Max.) Mean (Max.) Mean (Max.) Mean (Max.) Mean (Max.)
Block 1 Block 2 Block 1 Block 2 Block 1 Block 2
VLOW 28.85 (127.85) 23.25 (87.78) 6.25 (12.46) 26.51 (84.89) 5.31 (8.86) 23.27 (78.98)
LOW 27.57 (108.15) 21.95 (98.54) 6.51 (9.92) 21.08 (62.95) 5.06 (7.58) 18.21 (46.98)
MEDIUM 25.03 (99.21) 25.96 (204.10) 6.75 (12.75) 22.05 (50.87) 4.98 (9.93) 20.68 (75.76)
HIGH 26.14 (243.61) 20.61 (152.516) 7.19 (13.18) 23.66 (63.92) 4.73 (7.79) 22.90 (77.47)
Notes: This table shows response time averages for the diﬀerent PD games across blocks I and II and treatment conditions.
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Chapter 3
Do people prefer donating to
identiﬁable victims?
Abstract
Several papers have found that people tend to make larger donations to single identi-
ﬁed individuals than to groups of statistical recipients. This is often referred to as the
identiﬁable victim eﬀect. One explanation which has been proposed for this ﬁnding
is that people give more if they can identify the recipient of their donation. An alter-
native explanation is that people prefer concentrated over equal distributions of their
donation. To distinguish between these alternative hypotheses, I run two experimental
treatments in which each subject is matched to a group of children whose photos are
presented to subjects. In the ﬁrst treatment, subjects can only donate to one of the
children. For some decisions, subjects know which child is chosen (i.e. the recipient
is identiﬁed), in other situations they just know that one of the three children will be
selected such that the recipient is unidentiﬁed. In the second treatment, the donation
is either disbursed to a single child or equally divided among all three children. I ﬁnd
that subjects do not donate more to identiﬁed versus unidentiﬁed recipients in this set-
ting. Furthermore, I ﬁnd that groups of children receive higher donations than single
children.
Keywords: charitable giving, identiﬁability, social preferences
JEL Classiﬁcation: C44, C91, D91
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3.1 Introduction
Numerous psychological and economic experiments have shown that people tend to be
far more generous when they can identify the recipient instead of being presented with
an abstract large scale problem. A popular example is that of Jessica McClure, a little
girl who fell into a well in Texas in 1987. Her ordeal was closely followed by the media
until her rescue 2 days after she had fallen into the well. Americans responded with
enormous sympathy and the McClure family received more than $700,000 donations
(Jenni and Loewenstein, 1997). Despite the impressive amount of sympathy and help-
ing behavior, Cryder et al. (2013) note that this outburst of generosity occurred at a
time where UNICEF estimated that millions of unidentiﬁed children would die from
causes for which relatively cheap treatments are available.
The greater emotional response towards identiﬁed as compared to statistical recipients
has entered the literature as the identiﬁable victim eﬀect (Schelling, 1968). According
to a recent article in The New Yorker (2013)1, academic research on the identiﬁable
victim eﬀect has inspired the design of fund-raising campaigns. For example, the
charity Benevolent allows donors to sponsor speciﬁc individuals in reaching a prede-
termined goal, such as buying a piece of land in Uganda or renewing a professional
license. Other charities, such as World Vision, allow donors to support a single identi-
ﬁed child with regular donations. Does the possibility to observe the recipient increase
donations? This is what I study in this paper.
Several papers have studied the role of identiﬁability on donations by conducting ex-
periments. These studies typically compare donations to recipients identiﬁed by photo,
name and age and otherwise anonymous recipients, for which no individuating infor-
mation is provided (Jenni and Loewenstein, 1997; Small and Loewenstein, 2003; Kogut
and Ritov, 2005a,b; Genevsky et al., 2013; Small et al., 2007). All of these studies ﬁnd
that donors give more to identiﬁed as compared to anonymous recipients.
An interesting open question arising from this literature is whether donors increase
their donation in response to the available information (Cryder et al., 2013), or whether
they value identiﬁability per se. Some scholars explicitly support the latter view. For
example, Kogut and Ritov (2005a,b) argue that identiﬁability increases the likelihood
that donors adopt the perspective of the recipient. Related studies ﬁnd that adopting
the perspective of another person in need increases empathy and altruistic motivations
to help (Batson, 1987; Batson et al., 2016). Hence, according to this view, there could
1New help for the poor: Cash grants though a website (2013),
https://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/new-help-for-the-poor-cash-grants-through-a-web-
site
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be a diﬀerence between individuating information (such as a recipient's name, age and
photo) and the mere fact of knowing who receives one's donation. As a result, we would
expect that a donor who observes a group of individuals, all of which are presented by
the same kind of individuating information (such as photos), would still donate more if
she knows which of the presented individuals receives her donation instead of knowing
that one of the individuals will receive the donation.
In addition to identiﬁability, some scholars argue that the identiﬁable victim eﬀect
could result from a preference for concentrated over dispersed donations. Papers which
study this second hypothesis typically compare donations to single identiﬁed recipients
and groups of fully identiﬁed recipients. An important feature of these experiments is
that donations to the group are either equally disbursed among the recipients or framed
as contributions to a public good. A common ﬁnding is that single identiﬁed recipients
receive larger donations than groups of fully identiﬁed recipients (Kogut and Ritov,
2005a,b). These results suggest that even in the absence of informational diﬀerences
between single recipients and groups, donors prefer concentrated distributions to a
single recipient over equal distributions to a group of recipients. Scholars have pointed
out that this preference could results from the fact that concentrated distributions
generate a higher perceived impact (Baron, 1997; Jenni and Loewenstein, 1997).
The purpose of this paper is to provide controlled laboratory evidence on how both
explanations, identiﬁability as well as the distribution of the donation, contribute to
the identiﬁable victim eﬀect. I will analyze the two explanations in a comparable
choice task in which I control the amount of information. Therefore, diﬀerences in
donations cannot reﬂect the fact that donors give more as a result of having better
information about recipients.
For this purpose, I run experiments in which student subjects can make donations to
ﬁnance school attendance and lunches for children in Uganda. Each subject is matched
to a group of three children. Photos of all three children are presented to the subject
prior to her ﬁrst donation decision such that she has the same kind of individuating
information about all three children.
In the Identiﬁed versus Unidentiﬁed (IvU) Recipient Treatment, subjects take two types
of donation decisions (one of which is randomly selected for payment): In the ﬁrst
type, subjects can donate to one of the children which has been randomly selected
as the recipient before the donation decision. Hence, in this type of choice situation,
the recipient is identiﬁed. In the second type of decision, one of the three children
is randomly selected as the recipient only after subjects have entered their donation.
Subjects are not informed which child has been chosen. Hence, I will say that the
recipient is unidentiﬁed in this situation, given that subjects do not know which of the
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three children has been selected as the recipient. By comparing donations across these
two kinds of decisions, I can isolate the mere eﬀect of identiﬁability on donations.
If subjects indeed donate more to identiﬁed as compared to unidentiﬁed recipients in
this treatment, this is clear evidence in favor of the hypothesis that identiﬁability has
an added value independent of individuating information. In contrast, not observing
this eﬀect implies that identiﬁability per se does not have an eﬀect on donations. If
so, the diﬀerences in donations to identiﬁed and anonymous recipients, observed in
previous studies, could be better explained by the donor's response to information.
I run a second treatment, in which I vary whether the donation is disbursed to a single
child or equally shared among the three children. In this Single Identiﬁed Recipient
versus Multiple Identiﬁed Recipients (SvM) Treatment, I again confront subjects with
two kinds of decisions: The ﬁrst kind of decision involves a single identiﬁed recipient, i.e.
subjects can donate to a child selected as the recipient prior to their donation decision.
Hence, this decision is exactly the same as in the IvU treatment. In the second kind
of situation, every amount donated will be equally divided among the three children.
Hence, in this decision subjects can make a donation to multiple identiﬁed recipients.
If subjects indeed donate more to a single identiﬁed recipient as compared to a group
of identiﬁed recipients, this constitutes evidence in favor of the claim that donors prefer
concentrated over dispersed distributions of their donation, observed in previous studies
by Kogut and Ritov (2005a,b). Not observing this pattern, in contrast, is inconsistent
with a preference for more concentrated distributions.
Finally, by comparing the results across the IvU and the SvM treatment, I can explore
the joint role of identiﬁability as well as the distribution of the donation in explaining a
bias towards identiﬁed single recipients. In particular, I can assess whether both factors
contribute to the identiﬁable victim eﬀect (if subjects donate more to identiﬁed versus
unidentiﬁed and to single recipients versus groups) or whether a single factor explains
this phenomenon as soon as we control for the information available to the donor.
An important question is whether donors choose to observe the recipient of their do-
nation or actively avoid exposure to single identiﬁed recipients. Several studies have
found that people tend to avoid situations in which they feel especially compelled to
give (DellaVigna et al., 2012; Andreoni et al., 2017). These papers, however, only vary
the solicitation method while the characteristics of the charity program are naturally
held constant. In contrast to this explanation, donors might actively seek charities
which reveal the identity of the donor if identiﬁability increases the perceived impact
or warm glow of giving.
I explore this question by matching subjects in both treatments with a new group of
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three children from Uganda after they have completed the treatments described above.
Before subjects can enter a donation, they are asked to choose between two modes of
donating. In the IvU treatment, subjects can decide whether they want to donate to an
identiﬁed recipient, randomly chosen prior to their donation decision, or whether one of
the children should be selected without them being informed of the recipient's identity.
Respectively, subjects in the SvM treatment can choose whether their donation should
be disbursed to a single child (randomly selected before their donation decision) or
whether their donation should be equally shared among the three children.
The results are as follows: In the IvU treatment, I do not ﬁnd that subjects make
higher donations to identiﬁed as compared to unidentiﬁed recipients. This result holds
within-subjects (when comparing the choices of the same subjects in the two kinds
of donation decisions) as well as between-subjects (when comparing the ﬁrst choices
in the two kinds of decisions across sessions). Therefore, my ﬁndings suggest that
identiﬁability per se has no eﬀect on donations. Hence, the diﬀerences in donations
to identiﬁed and anonymous recipients, observed in previous studies, can be solely
attributed to the fact that donors give more, the more vivid details they have about
the recipient.
In the SvM treatment, I ﬁnd that subjects donate more when their donation is equally
shared among the three identiﬁed recipients, instead of being allocated to a single iden-
tiﬁed recipient. As for the other treatment, I can conﬁrm this result within- as well
as between-subjects. These results are inconsistent with previous studies. A potential
explanation (discussed in more detail in the conclusion) is that single identiﬁed recip-
ients only receive higher donations if the group is large enough and / or if subjects
have a relatively small endowment. I conclude that the results of this paper might be
taken to suggest that there is no general bias towards identiﬁed single recipients which
is independent of the choice details.
Finally, my results suggest that a majority of subjects choose the mode in which they
previously donated more in both treatments. Hence, I do not observe that subjects
avoid the ask. Nevertheless, I observe that subjects are less likely to choose donating
to single identiﬁed recipients in both treatments, even if they previously donated the
same amount to an identiﬁed single recipient and an unidentiﬁed recipient (in the IvU
treatment) or to a group involving three identiﬁed recipients (in the SvM treatment).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 provides an overview of
the related literature. The experimental design and the hypothesis are summarized
in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 presents the results. I conclude and discuss the results in
section 3.5.
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3.2 Related Literature
The present paper contributes to the literature analyzing how being able to identify the
recipient of one's donation aﬀects charitable giving. Several studies in this literature
compare donations to single identiﬁed and otherwise anonymous recipients. In these
studies, recipients are either identiﬁed by vivid and individuating information (Jenni
and Loewenstein, 1997) or by a photo that is displayed to the donor (Kogut and Ritov,
2005a,b; Genevsky et al., 2013).2 A common ﬁnding in this literature is that identiﬁed
recipients receive larger donations than anonymous recipients.
Several authors have linked the identiﬁable victim eﬀect to the fact that subjects
experience greater emotional arousal and empathy for identiﬁed as compared to anony-
mous recipients (Jenni and Loewenstein, 1997; Kogut and Ritov, 2005a; Slovic, 2010).
This greater emotional arousal may reﬂect that donors experience more sympathy and
distress the more vivid information they have about the recipient (Genevsky et al.,
2013). Consistent with this view, Jenni and Loewenstein (1997) and Kogut and Ri-
tov (2005a) ﬁnd that donations increase in the amount of details provided about the
recipient. Furthermore, Cryder et al. (2013) report evidence that donors give more
to interventions (not involving an identiﬁed victim) the more vivid the information
about the intervention. Hence, these studies provide evidence that information tends
to increase generosity.
Some scholars, however, argue that at least a part of the greater emotional arousal can
be attributed to identiﬁability (Kogut and Ritov, 2005a,b). According to this view,
a subject is more likely to adopt the view of a recipient if the recipient is identiﬁed.
Related studies ﬁnd that subjects which project themselves into another person in
need, i.e. by trying to imagine how that person feels, experience greater empathy
and, consequently, are more willing to help that person (Batson, 1987; Batson et al.,
2016). This link between empathy and altruism is referred to as the empathy-altruism
theory (Batson, 1987). Similarly, a study by Redelmeier and Tversky (1990) ﬁnds that
doctors recommend more treatments when primed to think about a patient as a single
individual instead of being part of a group of patients with similar symptoms. A
recent study by Dickert et al. (2009) suggest a diﬀerent channel, namely that single
individuals attract more attention and evoke greater sympathy, both of which might
2 Small and Loewenstein (2003) ﬁnd that subjects share greater amounts of their endowment in a
dictator game if the recipient is already determined when the dictator chooses an allocation instead
of being randomly selected from a pool of recipients after the dictator has made a choice. Thus,
their paper explores determinedness as a source of vivid information. In a later paper, Cryder and
Loewenstein (2012) attribute their ﬁndings to increased feelings of responsibility in cases where the
dictator's decision determines the recipient's payoﬀ.
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increase the donor's generosity.
These results suggest that identiﬁability has an eﬀect which can be separated from
the eﬀect of vivid and individuating information. For example, imagine that a donor
observes a group of recipients, all of which are presented to the donor by a photo.
Naturally, a donor might be willing to donate more to a randomly drawn member in
this group (in which each member is presented by a photo) as compared to a randomly
drawn member from a second group for which she has no individuating information.
This increase in donations is attributable to the eﬀect of information. Nevertheless,
she might give even more if she can observe which individual receives her donation as
compared to knowing that one of the presented individuals will receive the donation.
This increase reﬂects the mere value of identiﬁability, i.e. being able to observe the
recipient. A possible explanation for this eﬀect, as formulated by the empathy-altruism
hypotheses, is that a donor might feel more empathy for an identiﬁed recipient, given
that it is easier to adopt the view of a concrete individual as opposed to adopting the
view of a potential recipient.
A few recent studies suggest an alternative explanation for the identiﬁable victim ef-
fect, namely that donors prefer a more concentrated distribution of their donation. For
example, Kogut and Ritov (2005a,b) run experiments in which subjects are matched
to a single child, identiﬁed by a photo, or a group of eight children, all of which are
identiﬁed by a photo. Both studies ﬁnd that a single identiﬁed recipient receives more
donations than a group of fully identiﬁed children. An important feature of these ex-
periments is that every dollar donated to the group is used to ﬁnance a public good
which will be provided to all children in the group. Hence, these studies suggest a sep-
arate channel for the identiﬁable victim eﬀect, namely that donors prefer to donate
to a single recipient instead of disbursing their donation among multiple recipients.
Related research suggests that donors judge concentrated interventions (with a smaller
number of recipients) as generating a higher impact (Baron, 1997; Jenni and Loewen-
stein, 1997). Thus, the larger amount donated to single identiﬁed individuals could
be explained by the fact that people perceive a dollar in the pocket of one individual
as generating a higher impact compared to disbursing the dollar to a potentially large
group.
This paper also contributes to the avoiding the ask literature. Several papers show
that people tend to avoid situations in which they feel especially compelled to give
(Dana et al., 2006; Broberg et al., 2007; Dana et al., 2007; Andreoni and Rao, 2011;
DellaVigna et al., 2012; Andreoni et al., 2017). Hence, donors might avoid being
exposed to identiﬁed recipients and instead choose programs which do not reveal the
recipient's identity. On the other hand, identiﬁability could increase the perceived
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impact or warm glow of donating, such that people might actively choose programs in
which they can identify the recipient.
Furthermore, this paper contributes to a broader literature, examining the role of
identiﬁability in strategic and non-strategic interactions. Most of these papers highlight
the role of identiﬁability in providing information. Mobius and Rosenblat (2006) show
that subjects rated as more attractive receive higher wages in an experimental labor
market. Brosig et al. (2003) ﬁnd that identiﬁcation of one's partner does not increase
cooperation relative to a standard four person public good game. However, groups
reach almost full cooperation when they are allowed to communicate via a video chat
function. Although all of these papers attribute the observed eﬀects to the information
contained in a photo, being able to observe one's partner could have an eﬀect that goes
beyond the informational value that the decision maker extracts from the photo.
3.3 Experimental Design and Hypotheses
The experiment started with a questionnaire and subjects were promised a ﬁxed pay-
ment of 15 EUR for answering the questions.3 After completing the questionnaire,
subjects were informed that they could donate a share or their entire payment to
Abaana e.V., a German charity supporting school children in Uganda.4 Subjects were
informed that all donations collected in the experiment would be used to ﬁnance school
attendance as well as school lunches for individual children. Each subject took ﬁve do-
nation decisions, one of which was implemented for each subject individually. Subjects
were paid 15 EUR minus their donation in the randomly chosen situation (if any).
For the ﬁrst four donation decisions, I matched each subject to a group of three children.
The photos of all three children were displayed on the subject's computer screen prior
to the ﬁrst donation decision. Subjects were informed that they could make a donation
to one or several of the displayed children.
To investigate the impact of identiﬁability as well as the distribution of beneﬁts on
donations, I assigned subjects to one of two treatment conditions:
In the Identiﬁed versus Unidentiﬁed Recipient (IvU) treatment, I present each subject
with two kinds of decision situations. In the ﬁrst situation, one of the three children
was selected as the recipient before subjects made their choice. A photo of the child was
displayed on the decision screen where subjects could enter their donation. Subjects
3 The questionnaire contained questions from the German Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP) as well as
the Big Five Personality questionnaire. On average, it took subjects 8 minutes to answer all questions.
4 Subjects received information about the charity's purpose on their decision screen and could
browse through a brochure issued by Abaana e.V.
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were informed that the child displayed on the screen would receive the entire amount
donated. Thus, I will say that the recipient is identiﬁed in this choice situation. In
the second situation, one of the three children was selected as the recipient only after
subjects entered their donation. On the decision screen, where subjects could enter
their donation, they could see the pictures of all three children. Subjects were informed
that one of the displayed children would receive the entire donation but that they would
not be informed which child had been selected. Hence, I will say that the recipient is
unidentiﬁed in this situation given that the donor does not know which of the three
displayed children will receive her donation.
In order to assess whether subjects would donate the same amounts to all three children
in their group, each child was presented as identiﬁed recipient once (in randomized or-
der). Across sessions, I varied whether the situation involving an unidentiﬁed recipient
was presented as the ﬁrst or the second decision. Therefore, I can compare the eﬀect
of identiﬁability within-subjects (by comparing a subject's choice across the two kinds
of situations) and between-subjects (by comparing the choices of subjects whose ﬁrst
choice involved an identiﬁed versus an unidentiﬁed recipient).
According to the existing evidence, discussed in the previous section, we would expect
that subjects experience more empathy towards an identiﬁed recipient as compared to
an unidentiﬁed recipient, given that it is easier to adopt the position of a concrete as
opposed to a potential recipient. If we indeed observe this pattern, this is unambiguous
evidence in favor of the hypothesis that the mere possibility of being able to identify
the recipient increases donations. Instead, not observing this pattern, implies that
identiﬁability does not have an eﬀect on donations as soon as diﬀerences in information
about identiﬁed and unidentiﬁed recipients are eliminated.
Hypothesis 1. In the IvU treatment, subjects donate more to an identiﬁed than to an
unidentiﬁed recipient.
To explore the role of the distribution of donations, I conduct a second treatment. In
this Single Identiﬁed Recipient versus Multiple Identiﬁed Recipients (SvM) treatment,
subjects were confronted with two kinds of choice situations: The ﬁrst situation was the
same as in the IvU treatment. Namely, subjects could donate to a child selected as the
recipient before their donation decision. Hence, there is a single identiﬁed recipient
in this situation. In the second situation, the photos of all children were displayed
on the decision screen. Subjects were informed that their donation would be equally
divided among all three children. Hence, this situation involved a donation to a group
of multiple identiﬁed recipients.
To assess whether subjects want to donate the same amount to all three children,
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each child was presented single identiﬁed recipient once (in randomized order). Across
sessions, I varied whether the ﬁrst choice involved a single recipient or a group of three
recipients. Therefore, I am able to analyze the eﬀect of the distribution on donations
within-subjects (by comparing a subject's donations across the two choice situations)
and between-subjects (by comparing donations of subjects whose ﬁrst choice involved
a single recipient versus a group of recipients).
Based on the existing evidence discussed above, we would expect subjects to believe
that their donation will generate a higher impact if it is disbursed to a single recipient
instead of being equally shared among a group of three recipients. Hence, we would
expect that subjects donate more to a single identiﬁed recipient than to a group of
three identiﬁed recipients. If we ﬁnd this eﬀect, then this is evidence in favor of the
hypothesis that donors prefer more concentrated divisions of their donations. Instead,
not observing this eﬀect would be inconsistent with such a preference.
Hypothesis 2. In the SvM treatment, subjects donate more to a single identiﬁed re-
cipient than to a group with multiple identiﬁed recipients.
Finally, to analyze whether subjects avoid situations in which they feel compelled to
give more, I implement a ﬁfth choice. Prior to their decision, subjects were matched
to a new group of three children.5 The pictures of all three children were displayed on
the computer screens. In the IvU treatment, subjects could then choose whether they
wanted to donate to an identiﬁed or an unidentiﬁed recipient. In the SvM treatment,
subjects could choose whether they wanted to donate to a single child or to the group
of three children. If a subject selected the ﬁrst option, a photo of the child selected
as the recipient was displayed on the decision screen where subjects could enter their
donation.6 Subjects who chose the second option saw the pictures of all three children
on the decision screen.
In line with the literature on avoiding the ask, we would expect that subjects in the
IvU treatment are less likely to select an identiﬁed recipient instead of an unidentifed
recipient. Similarly, subjects in the SvM treatment should be less likely to select a
single identiﬁed recipient instead of selecting a group with three identiﬁed recipients.
Hypothesis 3. In the IvU treatment, subjects less often choose to make a donation
to identiﬁed as compared to unidentiﬁed recipients, thereby avoiding to make higher
donations.
5 This group had not been matched to any other participant in the previous donation decisions.
6 It was emphasized to the participants that they would not be able to choose the recipient of their
donation.
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Hypothesis 4. In the SvM treatment, subjects less often choose to make a donation to
single as compared to groups of recipients, thereby avoiding to make higher donations.
To ensure that choices and payments are anonymous, each subject secretly drew a
card with a four-digit participant code at the beginning of the experiment. Subjects
had to enter the code in order to start the experiment and were instructed to keep
the card until the end of the experiment. All choices and the ﬁnal payment were
recorded under this participant code. The experimenter could not attribute choices
and payments to a speciﬁc person. At the end of the experiment, the experimenter
placed the ﬁnal payments (15 EUR - donation in the randomly chosen situation) in
envelopes numbered with the corresponding participant code and left the room. At
this point, one randomly selected subject was instructed to call the other participants
to the front desk and supervise that the code on the card drawn at the beginning of the
experiment matched the envelope collected by the participant. The payment procedure
was explained in detail before subjects made the donation decisions.
An important concern is that subjects might prefer some of the children they are
matched to. Thus, they might donate more if their preferred child is presented as
the single identiﬁed recipient in both treatments. We might falsely attribute this
behavior to signal a preference for identiﬁed as compared to unidentiﬁed (in the IvU
treatment) or as a preference for a single as compared to multiple recipients (in the
SvM treatment). I tried to limit this concern by forming the groups such that the
three children had the same gender and approximately the same age. In addition, I
matched the children in terms of their overall appearance, such as their clothes and
the background against which the photo was taken. Furthermore, to ensure that the
ﬁfth decision is comparable to a subject's previous donation decisions, subjects were
assigned two very similar groups (see Figure 3.1 as an example). Finally, to ensure
that choices are comparable across treatments, I used the same groups of children in
every session.
Another concern is that subjects might want to behave consistent across the diﬀerent
choice situations. Suppose that a subject would want to donate more to an identiﬁed
as compared to an unidentiﬁed child. However, this type of behavior might appear
inconsistent if subjects face both decisions sequentially. Hence, a preference to make
consistent choices could eliminate a possible within-subject treatment eﬀect. To limit
the extent of such a consistency bias, I did not inform subjects how many donation
decisions they would take. In addition, I can conduct between-subject tests by com-
paring the ﬁrst choices of subjects across sessions. Given that subjects did not know
which choices they would take, the between-subject evidence should not be aﬀected by
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Figure 3.1: Example of groups assigned to one subject
(a) First group
(b) Second group
a preference to make consistent choices.
Finally, subjects might want to avoid being exposed to photos of needy children, thus
rapidly entering a donation in order to leave the decision screen. To prevent subjects
from avoiding the photo, subjects could enter and conﬁrm their choice only after 15
seconds had passed.7
3.4 Results
The experiments were conducted in June 2018 at the University of Heidelberg Lab.
In total, I recruited 125 students from all disciplines via Hroot (Bock et al., 2014).
The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and subjects received
all instructions (reproduced in Appendix 3.2) on their decision screen. I conducted 4
sessions for each treatment, involving a total of 62 subjects in the IvU and 63 in the
SvM treatment.8
7 Total decision times were also recorded but not used in the empirical analysis.
8 Each session was planned for 16 subjects. Due to no-shows, one of the sessions in the IvU
treatment involved only 14 subjects, and one session in the SvM treatment involved only 15 subjects.
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3.4.1 Identiﬁed versus unidentiﬁed recipient
I will start with a discussion of the within-subject eﬀect of identiﬁcation, observed in
the IvU treatment. In this treatment, subjects took 4 choices, 3 of which involved
an identiﬁed recipient and one choice involving an unidentiﬁed recipient. To analyze
the eﬀect of identiﬁability on donations, I compare a subject's average donation to
the three identiﬁed children and the same subject's donation to an unidentiﬁed child.
On average, the mean donation to the three identiﬁed children was 3.83 EUR and the
unidentiﬁed child received an average donation of 3.84 EUR. Using a sign test, I ﬁnd
that there is no statistical diﬀerence between a subject's average donation to the three
identiﬁed recipients and her donation to an unidentiﬁed recipient (N = 62, p = 0.32).
This ﬁnding is inconsistent with Hypothesis 1.
Given that donating to an unidentiﬁed recipient is essentially a lottery in which the
computer chooses the recipient, participants may want to give less if the donation
is randomly allocated than if they know that it will be allocated to their favorite
child. Moreover, if they are risk-averse, donations to an unidentiﬁed child should be
less than their average donation to the three identiﬁed children. In order to look more
closely at within-sample diﬀerences, I will distinguish between subjects who donated
the same and those who donated diﬀerent amounts to the three identiﬁed recipients in
the following.
Overall, 63% of subjects donated the same amount to all three identiﬁed children.
Panel (a) in Figure 3.2 depicts the diﬀerence in donations to the three identiﬁed and
the unidentiﬁed recipient for these subjects. If the mere possibility of being able to
identify the recipient increases donations, this diﬀerence should be positive on aver-
age, reﬂecting a tendency to give more when the recipient is identiﬁed. Clearly, this
is not the case given that almost all subjects donated the same amount to identiﬁed
and unidentiﬁed recipients (Sign Test, N = 39, p = 1). Only 5% of subjects ex-
hibit behavior which is consistent with the identiﬁed victim eﬀect and donate more to
each identiﬁed recipient than to the unidentiﬁed recipient. As above, this evidence is
inconsistent with Hypothesis 1.
In total, 37% of subjects did not donate the same amount to all three children. I
run random eﬀects Tobit regressions conﬁrming that diﬀerences in donations to the
three children are not explained by order eﬀects9 nor is it the case that some children
9 To check for order eﬀects, I run random eﬀects Tobit regressions with sum donated as the
dependent and dummies controlling for whether an identiﬁed recipient was presented ﬁrst or second.
The regression results show that donations to children presented as identiﬁed recipients last do not
diﬀer from donations to children presented as identiﬁable recipients ﬁrst (Marginal eﬀect β1 = −0.11,
σ1 = 0.27, p = 0.67) or second (Marginal eﬀect β2 = 0.22, σ2 = 0.27, p = 0.41).
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Figure 3.2: Difference in Donations to identified versus unidentified re-
cipients (Within-subjects)
(a) Same donations (N = 39) (b) Diﬀerent donations - Max (N = 23)
(c) Diﬀerent donations - Min (N = 23) (d) Diﬀerent donations - Mean (N = 23)
Note: This ﬁgure displays the diﬀerence in a subject's donation to an identiﬁed
versus an unidentiﬁed recipient. Panel (a) displays this diﬀerence for all subjects
which chose to make the same donations to the three identiﬁed recipients. Panels
(b)-(d) display information for subjects which did not make the same donation
to the three identiﬁed recipients. Therefore, these panels display the diﬀerence
between a subject's maximum (b), minimum (c) and average donation (d) to an
identiﬁed minus her donation to an unidentiﬁed recipient.
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receive higher donations by all subjects they are matched to.10 These results suggests
that diﬀerences in donations to the three children are explained by some unobserved
preference which varies at the individual level.
The evidence for these subjects is depicted in panels (b) to (d) where I plot the dif-
ference between a subject's maximum, minimum and average donation to the three
identiﬁed recipients and her donation to the unidentiﬁed recipient. As can be inferred
from panel (b), the maximum donation to an identiﬁed recipient is either the same or
higher than the amount donated to an unidentiﬁed recipient for all subjects. Using a
Sign test, I conﬁrm that this pattern is statistically signiﬁcant (N = 23, p < 0.001).
Although this might be interpreted as evidence in favor of Hypothesis 1, the same
observation is consistent with a preference to donate to one's favorite child. Hence,
the observed diﬀerence cannot be unambiguously attributed to identiﬁability. Fur-
thermore, the eﬀect is, reversed in panel (c) where I plot the diﬀerence in a subject's
minimum donation to an identiﬁed recipient and her donation to an unidentiﬁed re-
cipient. Here, almost all subjects donate either the same or less to an identiﬁed versus
an unidentiﬁed recipient, the pattern again being statistically signiﬁcant (Sign Test,
N = 23, p = 0.01). Given that this pattern is consistent with the assumption that
subjects want to donate more to the lottery than to their least favorite child, we
cannot reject Hypothesis 1 based on this evidence. In particular, a positive eﬀect of
identiﬁability may be overridden by a preference to give less to one's least favorite
child in these cases. What can, however, be said is that only few subjects exhibit be-
havior which could lead us to conclude that the latter (negative) eﬀect is smaller than
a positive eﬀect attributable to identiﬁability. Namely, only 5% of subjects donated
a higher minimum amount to an identiﬁed as compared to an unidentiﬁed recipient.
Finally, panel (d) plots the diﬀerence between average donations to the three iden-
tiﬁed versus the (one) donation to an unidentiﬁed recipient. Clearly, this diﬀerence
is distributed almost symmetrically around zero and I do not ﬁnd any statistically
signiﬁcant diﬀerence (Sign test, N = 23, p = 0.56).
To summarize, the evidence reported in panels (b) to (d) is consistent with the as-
sumption that subjects donate more to their preferred identiﬁed recipient than to an
unidentiﬁed recipient (see panel (b)), and that they donate less to their least preferred
recipient than to an unidentiﬁed recipient (see panel (c)).
In conclusion, the within-subject results cast clear doubt on the hypothesis that people
give more to identiﬁed than to unidentiﬁed recipients.
10 I run a separate set of random eﬀects Tobit regressions the sum donated as the dependent and
dummies for each child as independent variables. None of the child dummies is signiﬁcant at the 5%
level.
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Figure 3.3: Donations to identified versus unidentified children
(Between-subjects)
Note: This ﬁgure displays the distribution of donations
among subjects whose ﬁrst choice in the experiment involved
an identiﬁed recipient (black bars) versus the distribution
of donations among subjects whose ﬁrst choice involved an
unidentiﬁed recipient (gray bars).
Result 1a. When comparing the donation decisions of each subject, I do not ﬁnd that
subjects donate more to an identiﬁed than to an unidentiﬁed recipient (inconsistent
with Hypothesis 1).
In what follows, I provide evidence on the between-subject eﬀect of identiﬁability on
donations. Thereby, I can address whether the lack of observing evidence in favor of
Hypothesis 1 is explained by a preference to make consistent choices. Assume that
subjects did want to donate higher amounts to the three identiﬁed recipients than
to the one unidentiﬁed recipient. This behavior might, however, appear inconsistent
when subjects face both decisions sequentially. Hence, a preference to make consistent
choices in this setting could eliminate a possible within-subject treatment eﬀect.
To address this concern, Figure 3.3 plots the distribution of donations among subjects
whose ﬁrst choice involved an identiﬁed versus subjects whose ﬁrst choice involved an
unidentiﬁed recipient. As can be seen, there are some noticeable diﬀerences in the two
distributions. Namely, identiﬁed recipients are more likely to receive a donation of 8
EUR than unidentiﬁed ones. In turn, more subjects chose to donate 2 EUR to an
unidentiﬁed as compared to an identiﬁed recipient. However, using a Ranksum test, I
do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the donations to identiﬁed versus unidentiﬁed
recipients (N = 62, p = 0.61). Thus, in line with the within-subject evidence reported
above, the between-subject results cast doubt on the notion that people donate more
if they can identify the recipient of their donation.
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Result 1b. When comparing the ﬁrst donation choices of subjects across sessions, sub-
jects whose ﬁrst choice involved an identiﬁed recipient do not donate more than subjects
whose ﬁrst choice involved an unidentiﬁed recipient (inconsistent with Hypothesis 1).
3.4.2 Single versus multiple recipients
In what follows, I will describe the results of the SvM treatment, starting with the
within-subject evidence. Subjects took 4 donation decisions, 3 of which involved a
single and identiﬁed recipient and 1 choice in which the donation was equally divided
among all three identiﬁed children. I start by comparing a subject's average donations
to the three single children and the donation to the group. Averaged over all subjects,
the mean donation to the three single recipients was 3.30 EUR and 4.30 EUR to the
group of recipients. Using a Sign test, I ﬁnd that the average donation to the three
single recipients was indeed signiﬁcantly smaller than the donation to the group of three
recipients (N = 63, p = 0.001). Averaged over all subjects, I ﬁnd that the donation to
the group exceeds the average donation to the three identiﬁed recipients by 60%. This
evidence is inconsistent with Hypothesis 2.
As for the IvU treatment, the interpretation of results crucially depends on whether
subjects are indiﬀerent between the three children they are matched to. Namely, a
subject might donate more if she knows that her donation will be disbursed to her
favorite child instead of being equally divided among the three children (with her
favorite child receiving only a third of the total amount donated). Hence, I will
distinguish between subjects who donated the same and those who donated diﬀerent
amounts to the single recipients in the subsequent analysis.
Overall, 81% of subjects chose to make the same donation to all three single and
identiﬁed recipients.11 Panel (a) in Figure 3.4 displays the diﬀerence in donations to
each single recipient and the donation to the group of three children (each of which
will receive a third of the total amount donated). Contrary to Hypothesis 2, almost
half of the subjects donate the same (total) amount to a single child and the group of
three children and 42% of the subjects donate higher amounts to the group. Using a
Sign Test, I can reject the hypothesis that subjects donate the same amount to a single
recipient and a group with three recipients (Sign Test, N = 51, p < 0.001). Hence,
the evidence in panel (a) is inconsistent with the hypothesis that donors give more to
11 This percentage is signiﬁcantly higher than in the IvU treatment (Ranksum, N = 125, p = 0.02).
A possible explanation for this diﬀerence is that enforcing an equal division of the funds decreases the
likelihood of donating diﬀerent amounts to subsequent identiﬁed recipients. Given that the option
to donate to the group was presented either as the ﬁrst or the second decision, I cannot test this
explanation.
87
CHAPTER 3. DONATING TO IDENTIFIED INDIVIDUALS
Figure 3.4: Difference in donations to Single Identified versus Multiple
Identified recipients (Within-subjects)
(a) Same donations (N = 51) (b) Diﬀerent donations - Max (N = 12)
(c) Diﬀerent donations - Min (N = 12) (d) Diﬀerent donations - Mean (N = 12)
Note: This ﬁgure displays the diﬀerence in a subject's donation to a single (iden-
tiﬁed) recipient versus a group of three (identiﬁed) recipients. Panel (a) displays
this diﬀerence for all subjects which chose to make the same donations to all three
single recipients. Panels (b)-(d) display information for subjects which did not
make the same donation to all three single recipients. Therefore, these panels
display the diﬀerence between a subject's maximum (b), minimum (c) and aver-
age donation (d) to a single recipient minus her donation to the group of three
recipients.
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a single identiﬁed recipient as compared to a group with three identiﬁed recipients.
Indeed, the opposite seems to be true.
The remaining 19% of subjects chose to donate diﬀerent amounts to the three single
recipients. As in the IvU treatment, I run random eﬀects Tobit regressions allowing
me to asses whether these diﬀerences are explained by order eﬀects (i.e. identiﬁed
recipients presented ﬁrst receive higher donations than identiﬁed recipients presented
last) or by the fact that certain children received higher donations than others. The
regressions results conﬁrm that diﬀerences in donations cannot be attributed to the
latter explanation. However, I ﬁnd that children presented as single recipients ﬁrst re-
ceive signiﬁcantly larger donations than those presented last.12 A subsequent analysis,
however, revealed that excluding a subject's ﬁrst choice does not change the size or
signiﬁcance of any treatment eﬀect (see Appendix 3.1).
Panels (b) to (d) summarize the evidence by plotting the diﬀerence in a subject's maxi-
mum, minimum and average donation to the three single recipients minus her donation
to the group of recipients. Panel (b) depicts the diﬀerence in a subject's maximum
donation to a single recipient and her donation to the group of three recipients (among
which the donation will be equally shared). As can be seen there, 42% of subjects
donate the same amount to a single recipient and a group of three recipients. Another
42% of subjects donate strictly more to a single child. Based on this evidence, I cannot
reject the hypothesis that subjects donate the same amount to single recipients and
the group (Sign Test, N = 12, p = 0.45). This result is surprising given that we would
expect that subjects prefer donating to a single child, even more so to their favorite
child. Hence, this result cannot be consistent with Hypothesis 2. The data pattern is
much clearer in panel (c), where a majority of subjects donated less to at least one sin-
gle recipient than to the group. This diﬀerence is strongly statistically signiﬁcant (Sign
Test, N = 12, p = 0.01). However, given that this pattern could also be explained
by the fact that subjects may want to donate more to the group than to their least
favorite child, we cannot reject Hypothesis 2 based on this evidence. As depicted in
panel (d), there are no diﬀerences in average donations to single recipients and groups
(Sign Test, N = 12, p = 0.77).
In conclusion, the results do not conﬁrm the hypothesis that single recipients receive
larger donations than groups of recipients.
Result 2a. When comparing the donation decisions of each subject, I do not ﬁnd that
12 To check for order eﬀects, I use the donation amount as dependent variable and include dummies
controlling for whether a single recipient was presented ﬁrst or second. The results show that children
presented as single recipient ﬁrst receive signiﬁcantly larger donations (Marginal eﬀect, β1 = 1.25,
σ1 = 0.32, p = 0.01) but children presented second do not receive more (β2 = 0.78, σ2 = 0.32,
p = 0.25) as compared to the child presented last.
89
CHAPTER 3. DONATING TO IDENTIFIED INDIVIDUALS
Figure 3.5: Donations to single versus multiple recipients (Between-
subjects)
Note: This ﬁgure displays the distribution of donations
among subjects whose ﬁrst choice in the experiment involved
a single (identiﬁed) recipient (black bars) versus subjects
whose ﬁrst choice involved a donation to the group of three
(identiﬁed) children (gray bars).
subjects donate more to a single identiﬁed recipient than to a group of three identiﬁed
recipients (inconsistent with Hypothesis 2). Instead, I ﬁnd that groups receive signiﬁ-
cantly higher donations than single recipients.
Finally, Figure 3.5 summarizes the between-subject evidence by plotting the distribu-
tion of donations among subjects whose ﬁrst choice involved a single recipient versus
subjects whose ﬁrst choice involved a group of three recipients. In this ﬁgure, the distri-
bution of donations to groups appears to be shifted to the right. Most notably, groups
are less likely to receive no donations than single recipients while at the same time being
more likely to receive the highest possible donation of 15 EUR. Using a Ranksum test,
I ﬁnd that there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in donations received by a single recipient
and those received by the group of three recipients (N = 63, p = 0.05). Hence, the
between-subject evidence does not conﬁrm the hypothesis that single recipients receive
higher donations than groups of recipients either.
Result 2b. When comparing the subjects' ﬁrst donation decision across sessions, I do
not ﬁnd that subjects donate more to a single identiﬁed recipient than to a group with
three identiﬁed recipients (inconsistent with Hypothesis 2).
3.4.3 Preferred mode of donating
In this section, I will report the results from the ﬁfth donation decision. For this
decision, subjects were matched to a new group of three children and asked to choose
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Table 3.1: Donation Mode chosen in decision 5 (IvU Treatment)
Decisions 1-4 Number of Decision 5
Donations observations Chosen mode
Identiﬁed Unidentiﬁed
Identiﬁed (avg) > 16 3 13
Unidentiﬁed (23%) (19%) (81%)
Identiﬁed (avg) = 36 11 25
Unidentiﬁed (58%) (31%) (69%)
Identiﬁed (avg) < 10 1 9
Unidentiﬁed (16%) (10%) (90%)
62 15 47
the mode in which they would like to donate. This allows me to assess whether subjects
avoid modes of donating in which they might feel compelled to give more.
First and most notably, a majority of subjects in the IvU treatment (47 out of 62
subjects) chose to donate to an unidentiﬁed recipient. Using a proportions test, I
can reject the hypothesis that both modes were chosen with the same probability
(Proportions Test, 76 versus 24%, N = 62, p = 0.15). This pattern is inconsistent with
the ﬁrst part of Hypothesis 3. What is surprising about this result is that although
most subjects donated the same amount to identiﬁed and unidentiﬁed recipients (and
might, thus, be indiﬀerent) in the previous part of the experiment, there seems to be
a preference for unidentiﬁed recipients.
To analyze individual choices in more detail, Table 3.1 depicts the chosen mode of
donating in decision 5 (columns) by the diﬀerence in average donations to the three
identiﬁed recipients and the unidentiﬁed recipient observed in decisions 1-4 (rows).
Hence, if subjects avoid the ask we should see that they are more likely to select the
mode in which they previously donated less.13
Three patterns are immediately visible: First, a majority of subjects which previously
donated the same average amount to the three identiﬁed recipients and the one iden-
tiﬁed recipient, chose to donate to an unidentiﬁed recipient in decision 5. If these
subjects were indiﬀerent, we would instead expect that each option is chosen with 50%
probability. Using a Proportions Test, I can reject the hypothesis that both options
are chosen with the same probability (31 versus 50%, N = 36, p = 0.02). Hence, there
13 It should be pointed out that a subject's actual donation in decision 5 (after she has selected a
mode) is strongly correlated with her previous donation in the respective mode: A Tobit regression
with the donation amount in decision 5 as the dependent and the previous donation in the same mode
as dependent variable ﬁnds that the previous donation is strongly predictive of a subject's donation
in decision 5 (β = 0.93, p < 0.0001). In a separate regression, I also include the selected mode as
a separate independent variable. I do not ﬁnd that this changes the explanatory power of previous
donations on donations in decision 5 (β = 0.93, p < 0.0001).
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Table 3.2: Donation Mode chosen in decision 5 (SvM treatment)
Decisions 1-4 Number of Decision 5
Donations observations Chosen mode
Single Recipient Group of Recipients
Single (avg) > 9 3 6
Group (14%) (33%) (66%)
Single (avg) = 24 0 24
Group (38%) (0%) (100%)
Single (avg) < 30 4 26
Group (48%) (13%) (87%)
63 7 56
appears to be a preference for unidentiﬁed recipients even among subjects which pre-
viously made the same donations. Second, among subjects which previously donated
higher average amounts to the three identiﬁed recipients than to the unidentiﬁed recip-
ient, only 19% of subjects chose an identiﬁed recipient. This implies that a majority of
these subjects avoid the ask. However, this might simply reﬂect a general preference
for an unidentiﬁed recipient, as displayed in row 2 of the table.14 In contrast, subjects
which previously donated more to an unidentiﬁed recipient do not avoid the ask.
As displayed in the table, 90% of these subjects choose to donate to an unidentiﬁed
recipient in decision 5.
In conclusion, the data pattern observed is not consistent with the hypothesis that
subjects avoid the ask. However, the results reveal a strong preference for uniden-
tiﬁed recipients, even among subjects which previously donated the same amounts to
unidentiﬁed and identiﬁed recipients.
Result 3. I do ﬁnd that subjects are less likely to choose to donate to an identiﬁed as
compared to an unidentiﬁed recipient. However, most subjects which choose to donate
to an identiﬁed recipient previously donated the same or an even higher amount to an
unidentiﬁed as compared to an identiﬁed recipient. Hence, there is no evidence that
subjects avoid the ask (inconsistent with Hypothesis 3).
The corresponding evidence for the SvM treatment is summarized in Table 3.2. First
and most notably, I observe that a large majority of subjects (56 out of 63) chose
to donate to the group instead of making a donation to a single recipient. Using a
proportions test, I can reject the hypothesis that both modes were chosen with the
same probability (89 versus 11%, N = 63, p < 0.0001). Given the above ﬁnding that
14 Using a proportions Test, I cannot reject that the fraction of subjects which chose an unidentiﬁed
recipient is the same in rows 1 and 2 (Proportions test, 81 versus 69%, N = 16, p = 0.37).
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subjects donated more to a group as compared to a single recipient, this choice pattern
is inconsistent with Hypothesis 4.
A closer look at the individual choice patterns, displayed in Table 3.2, reveals that
subjects were more likely to select donating to the group, independent of their previous
donation decisions. In particular, all subjects which previously donated the same
average amount to the three single recipients and the group, chose to donate to a
group in decision 5. A large majority of the remaining subjects also chose to donate to
the group. Using a proportions test, I cannot reject the hypothesis that subjects which
previously made higher average donations to the three identiﬁed recipients than to the
group (see row 1), chose both modes with equal probability (33 versus 66%, N = 9,
p = 0.30). Nevertheless, this pattern could be explained by a general preference for the
group as compared to the single recipient (see row 2). Perhaps surprisingly, subjects
which previously donated more to the group than to the three single recipients (on
average) are also signiﬁcantly more often choose to donate to the group (87 versus
13%, N = 30, p < 0.001). Hence, as for the other treatment, I do not ﬁnd evidence
that subjects avoid the ask.
Result 4. I ﬁnd that subjects are less likely to choose to donate to a single identiﬁed
recipient than to a group of three identiﬁed recipients, independent of whether they
previously donated more, less or the same average amount to the three single recipients
and the group. Hence, there is no evidence that subjects avoid the ask (inconsistent
with Hypothesis 4).
3.5 Conclusion
This paper studies behavioral explanations for the identiﬁable victim eﬀect, i.e. the
observation that people tend to be more generous to single identiﬁed recipients as
compared to groups of statistical recipients. In particular, I analyze two common
explanations for this phenomenon: identiﬁability and a preference for concentrated
distributions. According to the ﬁrst hypothesis, donors give more if they can identify
the recipient of their donation. The second hypotheses states that donors prefer con-
centrated donations, disbursed to a single recipient, instead of equal distributions of
their donation among a potentially large group of recipients.
I compare the two explanations in a uniﬁed choice experiment. Each subject is assigned
to a group of three school children from Uganda to which she can make a donation.
Prior to the ﬁrst donation decision, all three children are presented by a photo. Thereby,
I can control the amount of information that donors have over the potential recipients.
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In the ﬁrst treatment, subjects can only donate to one of the children. Across choice
situations, I vary whether subjects know which child receives their donation (such that
the recipient is identiﬁed) or whether they only know that one of the three children
will receive the donation (such that the recipient is unidentiﬁed). In contrast to the
hypothesis that identiﬁability should increase donations, I do not ﬁnd that subjects
give more to identiﬁed as compared to unidentiﬁed recipients in this setting.
In a second treatment, subjects either make a donation to a single identiﬁed child
or to all three identiﬁed children. In the latter case, the amount donated is equally
shared among the three (identiﬁed) recipients, thus allowing me to analyze how the
distribution of the donation aﬀects giving. I ﬁnd that subjects donate more to the
group than to a single recipient. Hence, this result is inconsistent with a preference for
concentrated donations, as observed in previous studies.
In addition, I analyze whether subjects tend to avoid single and identiﬁed recipients
when given the choice between diﬀerent modes of donating. To answer this question,
subjects are matched to a new group of children (whose photos are displayed on the
decision screen prior to the decision) and asked to choose between two modes. Sub-
jects in the ﬁrst treatment can either donate to an identiﬁed child or make a donation
without knowing which child receives the donation. In the second treatment, subjects
can either donate to a single child or make a donation to the group, with the donation
being equally divided among the three children in the group. I ﬁnd that only a mi-
nority of subjects chose to donate to a single and identiﬁed child in both treatments.
Nevertheless, I do not ﬁnd that subjects avoid the ask, i.e. strategically choose modes
in which they previously donated less.
Given the diﬀerence of my own to previous ﬁndings, I ﬁnd it important to point out
and discuss possible explanations. Concerning the role of identiﬁability, my design
clearly departs from previous papers which compare donations to vividly identiﬁed and
otherwise anonymous recipients. Such diﬀerences could reﬂect that donors give more
the more vivid information they have and / or that they give more to identiﬁed than to
unidentiﬁed recipients. The design presented in this paper clearly eliminates the ﬁrst
explanation. Hence, all diﬀerences in donations to identiﬁed and unidentiﬁed recipients
observed in this paper can only be attributed to identiﬁability. Given that I do not
observe any eﬀect of identiﬁability on donations, my results provide an interpretation
for previous studies. Namely, the diﬀerences observed can be solely and unambiguously
attributed to the donor's response to vivid information and not to the fact that donors
can identify the recipient.
It is not entirely obvious why this study ﬁnds a tendency to donate more to groups
instead of single children, given that several papers have found the exact opposite eﬀect
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(Kogut and Ritov, 2005a,b). One diﬀerence to these studies is that I use a much smaller
group size (3 instead of 8 children). Clearly, this makes donating to the group more
attractive in this as compared to the previous studies. Furthermore, subjects received
a much higher endowment (15 instead of 3 EUR). In combination, these diﬀerences
imply that subjects could potentially make the same donation to a single child and the
group of three children (e.g. by donating 2 EUR to a single and 6 EUR to a group of
children), thereby eliminating diﬀerences in the perceived impact (which few subjects,
however, do). Despite these diﬀerences, the results obtained here suggest that there
is no general tendency to donate more to single recipients than to groups, which is
independent of the choice situation. Hence, it might be possible to create arbitrary
biases by varying the group size as well as well as the endowment. Interestingly, the
ﬁnding that groups receive higher donations than single recipients is also in line with
results from dictator games in which all participants remain anonymous. For example,
Engel (2011) ﬁnds that dictators keep smaller amounts as the number of recipients
increases. Hence, this raises the question how identiﬁability interacts with group size,
in order to explain such diﬀerences.
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Appendix 3.A
3.A.1 Additional Results
Figure 3.6: Donation to Single Identified recipient versus Multiple iden-
tified recipients (Within-subjects) - excluding first choice
(a) Maximum (N = 12) (b) Minimum (N = 12)
(c) Average (N = 12)
Figure 3.7: Donations to single identified recipients versus multiple iden-
tified recipients (Between-subjects) - excluding first choice
96
CHAPTER 3. DONATING TO IDENTIFIED INDIVIDUALS
3.A.2 Instructions
Instructions  
Identifiable Treatment 
 
Your participant code  
You have drawn a card at the beginning of this experiment. On this card, you will find a four-digit 
participant code.  
You are the only person who knows this code. The experimenter does not know which participant has 
drawn which code such that your choices in this experiment are completely anonymous.  
Please keep this card until the end of the experiment.  
Please enter your code to start the experiment. 
 
Questionnaire 
We would like to ask you to answer a couple of questions. Your answers will be used for scientific 
purposes only and do not influence the course of this experiment.  
Please read all instructions carefully and take as much time for answering the questions, as you need. 
It is very important for the scientific analysis that you answer all questions as precise as possible.  
 
Your payment 
You will be paid 15 EUR for completing the questionnaire.   
Every participant can proceed through this experiment in their own speed. However, you will receive 
your payment once every participant has finished the experiment.  
 
You have answered all questions. 
You have answered all questions and earned 15 EUR.  
 
Donation 
You have the chance to donate a share or your entire earnings of 15 EUR.  
After thorough research, we have chosen the organization Abaana e.V. as the recipient of your 
donation. Abaana e.V. supports approximately 800 children in Nyamirima Village Uganda. Uganda is 
one of the poorest countries in the world and to visit one of the few public schools, the children from 
Nyamirima Village have to walk several hours. Classes with up to 120 children are common in public 
schools such that there is little opportunity to attend the needs of individual children. In addition, 
families often cannot afford the costs for school uniforms and books such that few children in 
Nyamirima village have the opportunity to go to school.  
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The donations collected in this experiment will be used to enable children to attend the local school 
(financed through donations) and allow them to take part in the school lunches (with two meals per 
day).  
All of Abaana’s employees are volunteers, such that every EURO donated will be spent on the children 
in Nyamirima Village.  
More information about Abaana is contained in the brochure next to your computer screen.  
 
Several decisions 
You will make several donation decisions. Only one of these decisions will be selected for payment. In 
every decision, you can donate between 0 and 15 Euro to one or several children in Nyamirima Village.  
If you chose to make a donation in the decision selected for payment, the donation will be deducted 
from your earnings and transferred to Abaana e.V. and the rest will be paid out in cash at the end of 
the experiment.  
The AWI Lab Team guarantees that your donation will be transferred to Abaana e.V. If you want to 
verify that your donation has been transferred, please write an email to info@abaana.com and indicate 
your participant code in the mail.  
 
Payment  
Your payment is anonymous. Neither the experimenter nor any other participants will be informed 
how much you donated. To guarantee anonymity the payment is organized according to the following 
rules:  
At the end of the experiment, the experimenter only sees which amount has to be paid to which 
participant code. The corresponding payments are placed in envelopes, marked with the respective 
participant code and sealed. The experimenter places all envelopes on the table in the entry area and 
leaves the room.  
At this point, the computer randomly selects one of the participants. This participant calls the other 
participants one after another (according to their cubicle number) to the front desk and asks them to 
show the card with the participant code drawn at the beginning of the experiment. He or she then 
supervises that the other participants collect only the envelope marked with the exact same code.   
 
Decision fields and buttons 
In every decision, the fields and buttons will be displayed after 15 seconds have passed. Take as 
much time for your decision as you need.  
You can only donate integer amounts (0,1,2,…,15).  
 
Summary 
Here is a summary of all details for the following decisions:  
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1. You will take several decisions. At the end of the experiment, one of the decisions will be 
randomly selected for each participant (the chosen decision might, thus, be different for 
different participants) and you will be paid according to your choices in this situation.  
2. In every decision, you can donate an amount between 0 and 15 EUR. If you chose to make a 
donation in the decision selected for payment, your donation will be deducted from your 
earnings and transferred to Abaana e.V.  
3. Your payment is anonymous. Neither the experimenter nor any other participant will learn 
how much you chose to donate.  
4. You can enter and confirm your choices only after 15 seconds have passed. You can only 
donate integer amounts.  
Please click on the “Start” button if you have read all instructions. You will not have the opportunity 
to read the instructions again as soon as you click this button.  
 
 
Every participant has been matched to a group of three children from Nyamirima village. On the 
screen, you can see the photos of the three children in the group you have been matched to. 
In the following decisions, you will have the opportunity to donate to one of the children in this group.  
For this experiment, we chose a large group of children from Nyamirima Village. It is, thus, possible 
but rather unlikely that another participant in this session has the possibility to make a donation to the 
same child as you.  
 
First decision  
Below you see the picture of one of the three children. This child has been randomly selected and 
will receive your entire donation.  
<Photo> 
Your donation: _____________ 
(Please enter an amount between 0 and 15 EUR) 
 
Second decision 
Below you see the photos of all three children. The computer will select one of these three children. 
The child selected by the computer will receive your entire donation. You will, however, not be 
informed during or after the experiment which of the three children has been selected.  
<Photo> 
Your donation: 
(Please enter an amount between 0 and 15 EUR) 
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Chapter 4
Legislative Bargaining with Joint
Production: An Experimental Study1
Abstract
We conduct 3-person bargaining experiments in which the surplus being divided is
produced by completing a prior task. Using a Baron-Ferejohn framework, we investi-
gate how diﬀerences in contributions to production aﬀect bargaining under diﬀerent
decision rules. Under unanimity rule, all proposals and agreements constitute convex
combinations of the equal and proportional splits. Contrary to our predictions, this
pattern largely persists under majority rule. In sharp contrast to prior experiments in
which an exogenous surplus is divided, few subjects attempt to build minimum winning
coalitions when the surplus is jointly produced.
Keywords: bargaining, subjective claims, Baron and Ferejohn bargaining game, dis-
tributional preferences, proportionality, fairness, experiments
JEL Classiﬁcation: C72, C78, C91, D33, D63
1 This chapter has been jointly written with Christoph Vanberg.
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4.1 Introduction
Whenever groups of individuals collaborate in productive activities, decisions must be
made about how to distribute gains resulting from joint production. Unless the division
is contractually speciﬁed ex ante, it must instead be negotiated ex post. For example,
governments need to distribute the tax budget across diﬀerent departments and private
companies need to decide how to allocate revenues across diﬀerent divisions. Such
negotiations are likely to be especially complicated when diﬀerent group members have
made diﬀerent `contributions' to the prior productive activity, inducing disagreement
about the degree of `proportionality' that should prevail.2 How are such disagreements
handled under diﬀerent decision rules? This is what we want to investigate in this
paper.
A number of authors have experimentally shown that joint production can lead to
the establishment of `subjective claims' to a resulting surplus, and investigated how
such claims aﬀect bargaining behavior. In these experiments, groups of two or more
subjects `produce' a joint surplus by completing a real eﬀort task such as answering
trivia questions. Subsequently, subjects bargain over how to distribute that surplus. In
a bilateral context, Gächter and Riedl (2005) and Karagözo§lu and Riedl (2014) ﬁnd
that subjects expect distributions to reﬂect relative contributions (e.g. the number of
correct answers given), and also judge such proportionality as fair. Further, they show
that bargaining outcomes reﬂect these considerations. Gantner et al. (2016) extend
the analysis to a three-player context, comparing the impact of contributions under
three diﬀerent bargaining procedures, all of which require unanimous consent to reach
agreement. They also ﬁnd that fairness judgments reﬂect individual contributions, but
to a lesser extent than suggested by a strict norm of proportionality.
To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper to experimentally investigate majority rule
bargaining with joint production. All prior experiments on bargaining with joint pro-
duction have looked at either bilateral situations or at multilateral situations with
unanimity rule. There are many interesting situations, however, where distributive
decisions are made using majority rule. Examples include labor-management negotia-
tions, coalition formation, bargaining over distributive politics, and budget negotiations
in national or international organizations.
As an example, consider budget allocation decisions within the European Union. Here,
representatives from diﬀerent member states bargain over how to allocate resources,
2 Such disagreements are likely to be especially pronounced in contexts where relative contributions
are diﬃcult to assess, or where they are perceived to result from `luck' as opposed to `eﬀort' (Hoﬀman
and Spitzer, 1985; Konow, 2003; Fischbacher et al., 2009; Almås et al., 2010; Becker, 2013).
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both across diﬀerent budget categories (e.g. agriculture, regional development, etc.)
and within categories, to projects located in speciﬁc member states. Although many
expenditures serve to create shared beneﬁts for all member states (e.g. defense, admin-
istration), there is some truth to the common perception that the process ultimately
boils down to the splitting of a cake between the separate member states. Likewise, a
widely held view is that some member states are entitled to a larger slice of that cake
than others, because they have made larger contributions in the form of membership
fees.3
There are good reasons to believe that bargaining behavior and outcomes under ma-
jority rule are diﬀerent from those observed under unanimity rule. Under unanimity
rule, each player holds veto power which can be used to defend one's claim. This is
fundamentally diﬀerent under majority rule, where players can form minimum winning
coalitions and exclude certain group members from the allocation. Prior experiments
on majority rule bargaining over an exogenous surplus have consistently shown that
most games end with such agreements. Hence, an important question is whether we
continue to observe such outcomes when all players hold claims to the surplus. If so,
an interesting question is which player is more likely to be included in a coalition - the
one who has a larger or a smaller claim?
In this paper, we experimentally investigate how claims based on contributions to
production aﬀect bargaining behavior under both unanimity and majority rule. In our
experiment, groups of 3 subjects bargain over a surplus which they have previously
produced by separately engaging in an individual real eﬀort task. The bargaining
procedure is a ﬁnite horizon version of the Baron and Ferejohn (1989) game (henceforth
BF game). Our main treatment variable (exogenously manipulated) is the number of
votes required to pass a proposal (majority vs. unanimity rule). In addition, we
observe a number of diﬀerent (endogenously determined) situations in terms of the
relative contributions the group members have made, depending on their individual
performance in the real eﬀort task. We investigate and compare how the resulting
claims aﬀect proposals, voting behavior, passage rates, and ﬁnal outcomes under each
rule.
Our main ﬁndings are the following. Under both rules, proposals and voting behavior
are signiﬁcantly aﬀected by claims. In treatments with unanimity rule, virtually all
3 For example, in the recent `Brexit' referendum, Britain's rising net contributions, calculated as
the fees contributed to the EU minus received transfers, was one of the most contentious issues. Not
only EU critics but also the popular media discussed this issue as an argument against UK's con-
tinued membership. Net contributions were also a central topic during Scotland's ﬁrst independence
referendum in 2014 which would have enabled Scotland to become and independent member of the
EU. Prior to the referendum, the government examined Scotland's potential role within the EU and
critically pointed out that Scotland was likely to become a net contributor.
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proposals and outcomes constitute convex combinations of the three-way equal split
and the split that is exactly proportional to relative contributions. This result is
consistent with prior evidence discussed in the next section. More surprisingly, we
observe a very similar pattern under majority rule. In particular, the vast majority
of proposals allocate positive shares to all participants. This result stands in stark
contrast to comparable experiments on BF bargaining in which subjects divide `manna
from heaven' and most subjects propose minimum winning coalitions.
Under both decision rules, we ﬁnd that players who have made relatively smaller con-
tributions tend to make more equal (i.e. less proportional) proposals. This pattern is
more pronounced under majority rule. In combination with the fact that players with
lower claims are more likely to support more equal proposals, this leads to more equal
outcomes under majority rule when a majority (i.e. two players) have made relatively
small contributions. Finally, we ﬁnd that majority rule leads to a higher passage rate
than unanimity rule, especially when group members have made diﬀerent contributions
to the surplus.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 discusses related literature.
Section 4.3 presents our experimental design. Section 4.4 summarizes our hypotheses.
Results are presented in section 4.5. Section 4.6 concludes. Further analyses and
experimental instructions are provided in Appendix 4.
4.2 Related Literature
Our paper contributes to a recent literature analyzing how claims, resulting from joint
production, aﬀect behavior and outcomes in experimental bargaining games. For a
review on bargaining games with joint production see Karagözo§lu (2012). Most closely
related are three recent studies which examine the role of claims in bilateral (Gächter
and Riedl, 2005; Karagözo§lu and Riedl, 2014) and multilateral bargaining (Gantner
et al., 2016). In these experiments, subjects earn endowments by answering a series
of quiz questions. These endowments are then combined to form a common surplus.
Subsequently, either two (Gächter and Riedl, 2005; Karagözo§lu and Riedl, 2014) or
three (Gantner et al., 2016) subjects bargain over the distribution of the surplus using
unanimity rule. A common ﬁnding in all three papers is that subjects who have made
higher contributions are oﬀered more compared to subjects with lower contributions.
Further evidence suggests that individuals derive `subjective claims' which reﬂect their
relative contributions to the jointly produced surplus. According to Schlicht (1998),
claims (or `entitlements') are rights, as perceived by the individual (...) that go along
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with a motivational disposition to defend them (Schlicht, 1998, p.24). Moreover, he
deﬁnes obligations as the counterpart of claims, i.e. people will feel obliged to comply
with what they perceive as another person's right. Hence, claims appear to capture
what a person expects to receive as well as her subjective fairness view.
In sum, several prior studies have found evidence that claims have a signiﬁcant impact
on bargaining under unanimity rule, i.e. when all group members must consent to the
ﬁnal agreement. In contrast, there is to our knowledge no experimental evidence on
the eﬀects of claims under majority rule. The key diﬀerence is that a majority coalition
(in our case 2 players) can, in principle, ignore the claims of a minority player, as his
consent to the allocation is not required. If no player can enforce his own claim by
vetoing a potential agreement, do claims become meaningless?
Of obvious relevance to this point are several studies looking at two-person dictator
games with a jointly produced surplus. Cappelen et al. (2007) conduct an experiment in
which subjects contribute endowments earned in a prior investment stage. Importantly,
endowments are a combination of the sum a subject decided to invest in one of two
projects and a randomly determined high or low interest rate paid for each dollar
invested. Both subjects in a pair decide how to allocate the joint surplus and one
(randomly chosen) decision is implemented. Subjects are repeatedly matched and
thus take decisions in diﬀerent distributional situations which allows the authors to
classify subjects into types. They ﬁnd that a majority of subjects can be classiﬁed as
`liberal egalitarian' or `libertarian' types and thus take the investment made by the
other subject into account when choosing an allocation. Almås et al. (2010) conduct
dictator games with children in grades 5 to 13 where the surplus is the result of a
real eﬀort task. They ﬁnd that as children get older, their oﬀers more strongly reﬂect
the contributions of their partners. In a recent meta study on dictator game behavior,
Engel (2011) ﬁnds that dictators tend to give less if they have earned the endowment or
take less from the receiver if she has earned the endowment. Overall, these experiments
provide evidence that dictators tend to `respect' a recipient's claim, at least to some
extent, even though the recipient has no veto power. Applied to our own context, this
suggests that subjects may be reluctant to form minimum winning coalitions under
majority rule, and instead allocate positive shares to all players.
The previous ﬁndings from unanimity bargaining and the dictator game appear to be
compatible with the idea that behavior is motivated by fairness concerns which take
claims into account. Thus, the literature examining `fairness' of outcomes in situa-
tions with joint production is also informative for this paper. For example, Selten
(1988) discusses the role of the so-called `equity principle' for understanding behavior
in allocation tasks and bargaining games. He deﬁnes a `proportional equity rule' as
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follows: The proportional equity rule can be thought of as a modiﬁcation of the equal
division principle. Whereas the equal division principle prescribes the same reward for
every person, the proportional equity rule prescribes the same reward for every unit
of achievement. Among others, he discusses reward allocation experiments conducted
by Mikula (1972) and Mikula and Uray (1973). In these experiments, subjects ﬁrst
engage in a task and subsequently one subject is asked to allocate a sum of money.
As summarized by Selten (1988), subjects tend to divide equally if performance in the
task was equal. If performance was however unequal, there was a tendency towards
more proportional distributions. Konow (2003) reviews a very large collection of em-
pirical studies (mostly experiments and vignette surveys) to assess the degree to which
diﬀerent conceptions of `justice' are descriptive of how people commonly make impar-
tial fairness judgments. He proposes a multi-criterion theory of justice' (...) in which
three justice principles are interpreted, weighted, and applied in a manner that de-
pends on context. (Konow, 2003, p. 1235) These principles are equity, eﬃciency, and
need. In discussing evidence on the `equity principle', he cites extensive experimental
and survey evidence showing that subjects consider it fair to distribute resources in a
way that is proportional to all variables under a person's control, such as work eﬀort.
In the multilateral bargaining game discussed above, Gantner et al. (2016) ﬁnd that
impartial fairness assessments, elicited from independent and unaﬀected participants,
are a convex combination of proportionality and equality, giving rise to pluralism of
fairness norms which might guide individual behavior in these situations.
An important ﬁnding is that such fairness perceptions can be self-servingly biased. For
example, Gantner et al. (2016) ﬁnd that low contributors are more likely than high
contributors to judge an egalitarian division of the surplus as fair. Further evidence
comes from an experiment by Konow (2000), in which all subjects perform the same
real eﬀort task (prepare a given amount of letters) but earn diﬀerent piece rates. The
funds of both subjects are then pooled and either the subject with the higher piece
rate or an uninvolved third person decides how to allocate the funds among the two
subjects. The results of the experiment indicate that partial subjects are more likely
to deviate from the accountability principle than impartial subjects, indicating a self-
serving bias. In summary, these ﬁndings suggest that (at least a majority of) people
judge proportionality as fair, and that the degree of proportionality they favor might be
self-servingly biased. We conjecture that such judgments are likely to aﬀect bargaining
behavior under majority rule.
Finally, we add to a vast experimental literature on the Baron and Ferejohn bargaining
game (McKelvey, 1991; Fréchette et al., 2003, 2005a,b,c; Diermeier and Morton, 2005;
Agranov and Tergiman, 2014; Miller and Vanberg, 2013, 2015). The central ﬁndings
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of that literature can be brieﬂy summarized as follows. First, most proposers form
minimum winning coalitions (MWCs) under majority rule, especially after gaining
some experience with the game. Second, the most commonly observed proposals and
agreements implement equal splits (either overall or within a MWC). Third, unanimity
rule leads to more delay as compared to majority rule.4 To our knowledge, we are the
ﬁrst to report on a Baron-Ferejohn experiment involving the division of a previously
produced surplus. Baranski (2016) studies a majoritarian BF game in which the surplus
to be allocated is the result of voluntary contributions. His main interest is how
allowing subjects to bargain over the distribution aﬀects incentives to contribute. Our
context diﬀers from this in several respects. First, performance in the real eﬀort task
is not a strategic choice given that players are not informed about the decision rule
when they earn their contributions. Second, diﬀerences in performance result at least
in part from luck, such that there is likely more disagreement about the distribution of
the surplus. These design choices reﬂect the fact that we are interested in the inﬂuence
of claims (as exogenous parameters) on bargaining behavior.
4.3 Experimental Design
The experiment consists of of two stages, a `production' stage followed by a `bargaining'
stage. In the production stage, subjects individually earn `points' by answering a series
of trivia questions organized into 12 `blocks'. Each block consisted of 2 multiple choice
questions on diﬀerent topics (i.e. geography, history, arts, science). On each block,
subjects could earn either zero, one, or three points, depending on whether neither, one,
or both questions were answered correctly. Each block contained one `easy' question
that we expected most subjects to answer correctly, and a second question that varied
in diﬃculty. After completing the production stage, each subject thus had `produced'
a list of 12 separate scores, each either 0,1, or 3 points.
After all subjects had completed the production stage, they proceeded to the bargaining
stage. This consisted of 12 separate rounds. In each round, subjects were matched
into groups of three. Each group was then assigned a surplus equal to 5 EUR times
the sum of three randomly and independently chosen scores, one from each of the lists
that they had previously produced. Thus, the scores contributed by the members of
a group would usually come from diﬀerent `quiz blocks'. The sampling of scores was
4 Recent ﬁndings by Agranov and Tergiman (2014, 2017) suggest that free communication (chat-
ting) between the group members leads to more unequal agreements under majority rule and to more
equal allocations under unanimity rule. In addition, communication virtually eliminates delay under
both rules.
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done with replacement, so that it was possible for a given subject to have the same
quiz block selected multiple times over the course of the experiment. Each subject was
informed about the quiz block selected for her and about the number of points she had
earned. In addition, they were informed about the number of points contributed by
the other players, as well as each group member's percentage share of all contributed
points. Subjects were not informed about the quiz block selected for the other two
group members.
These design features were chosen with three goals in mind. First, the presence of an
easy question in every quiz block was meant to ensure that all subjects would have
a positive claim, at least in most games. Second, the more diﬃcult questions should
lead to heterogeneity in claims, as some but not all subjects will score 3 points on
the quiz block chosen for them. Third, diﬀerences in diﬃculty between blocks implies
that individual contributions constitute a noisy signal of relative performance. That
is, subjects could not be sure whether diﬀerences in the number of points contributed
were due to good performance (answering diﬃcult questions) or luck (having an easy
quiz block chosen).5
The bargaining game itself followed a ﬁnite horizon Baron-Ferejohn framework. That
is, bargaining proceeded over a ﬁnite number of discrete rounds. Within each round,
the sequence of events was as follows. First, all subjects were asked to propose a
division of the surplus. Next, all subjects voted either `yes' or `no' on each of the three
proposals made in their group. Once the votes had been cast, one of the three proposals
was randomly selected and the votes were counted.6 Depending on the treatment, the
proposal passed if either a majority (two) or all three subjects voted `yes'. In that case,
the game ended. Otherwise, the surplus shrank by 20% and bargaining proceeded to a
new round. If the surplus fell below 2 EUR (i.e. after 8 rounds of bargaining), the game
was terminated and all group members earned 0 EUR.7 At the end of the experiment,
one of the 12 bargaining games was randomly chosen and subjects were paid according
to the corresponding outcome.
The experiment was conducted at the AWI Lab at the University of Heidelberg, Ger-
many, in June 2016 and January 2017. In total, 198 students, from various disciplines,
5 Note that the element of `luck' is indeed present because a given subject's quiz scores for diﬀerent
games are drawn with replacement. Therefore some subjects will be luckier than others even if they
perform equally well, and even if we aggregate across all games played.
6 In the standard formulation of the BF game, the proposer is selected at the beginning of the round
and only one proposal is made. Our procedure allows us to observe three times as many proposals
and votes. Although this does not alter the SSPE predictions, it may impact real behavior if subjects
react to the additional information provided. However, any such eﬀects are of course present in all
our treatment conditions.
7 This feature of our design implies that ours is a ﬁnite horizon BF game.
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Table 4.1: Symmetric equilibrium proposals
Proposer share Responder share
Majority rule 73% 27% (to one)
Unanimity rule 46% 27% (to both)
participated (108 in the June and 90 in the January sessions). We conducted twelve
sessions, six for each treatment (majority and unanimity rule). Each session involved
18 subjects, divided into three matching groups of six participants.8 Due to no-shows,
we conducted three sessions with 12 subjects. Hence, in total we have 33 matching
groups (17 for majority and 16 for unanimity rule). Upon entering the laboratory,
subjects were randomly assigned to isolated computer terminals. Paper instructions
(reproduced in the Appendix) were handed out and questions were answered in pri-
vate. The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Sessions took
approximately 70 minutes, and average earnings amounted to 13 EUR (highest: 23.5
EUR, lowest: 4 EUR) including a 4 EUR show-up fee.
4.4 Benchmark predictions and hypotheses
While the BF bargaining game admits multiple subgame perfect equilibria, the prior
literature has typically focused on symmetric and stationary equilibria, which are (es-
sentially) unique. For the ﬁnite horizon version, the relevant equilibrium concept is
Symmetric Markov Perfect Equilibrium (SMPE). See Norman (2002) for a detailed
analysis. As established there, the unique SMPE has three interesting properties which
can be tested empirically. The ﬁrst is that proposers attempt to form minimum win-
ning coalitions in which only the number of individuals required to vote yes receive
positive oﬀers. Second, these `coalition partners' are oﬀered exactly their continuation
value, i.e. the amount that they expect to receive if the current proposal were to fail.
This implies an unequal distribution of the surplus, favoring the proposer. Third, the
ﬁrst proposal passes without delay. All three of these predictions are independent of
the decision rule being employed. The predicted outcomes for our version of the game
(n = 3 players and discount factor δ = 0.8) are presented in Table 4.1.
Naturally, these SMPE predictions are unaﬀected by the prior production phase con-
8 Admittedly, these are small matching groups. However, we believe that repeated game eﬀects
within the matching groups are unlikely. First, subjects were not told about the size of the matching
group. In the instructions, they were only informed that they would be re-matched at the beginning of
each round. Second, the identifying labels on the decision screens changed randomly between games.
The advantage of implementing small matching groups is that we obtain 3 independent observations
for each session.
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ducted in our experiment. By deﬁnition, they are based on the assumption that all
players employ the same strategy, eﬀectively ignoring any diﬀerences in the relative
contributions they have made to the surplus. Under unanimity rule, the SMPE cor-
responds to the only subgame perfect equilibrium. The fact that players can selec-
tively build coalitions under majority rule, leads to multiple and asymmetric equilib-
ria. Hence, in these cases players could use the relative contributions to coordinate
on asymmetric and / or non-stationary equilibria of the game (see Norman, 2002).
For this reason, it is especially interesting to study how claims aﬀect behavior under
majority rule.
In addition to the SMPE predictions, we formulate a number of additional hypotheses
which are based on the idea that players are motivated by material self-interest as well
as notions of fairness, which take claims into account (Konow, 2000, 2003). Players
are assumed to be heterogeneous in how much weight they place on either of these
two motives. As outlined in Section 4.2, prior evidence on unanimity rule bargaining
appears to support this idea, and demonstrates that such preferences have a systematic
impact on behavior and outcomes. We separately formulate our additional hypotheses
for situations with symmetric claims (i.e. all group members have made the same
contribution) and situations with heterogeneous claims (i.e. the group members have
made diﬀerent contributions).
Symmetric Claims Situations with symmetric claims are those where all three
group members have contributed either 1 point (5 EUR) or 3 points (15 EUR) to
the surplus. Various theories of fairness, such as summarized by Konow (2003) suggest
that the unique `fair' outcome in this situation is an equal split. This should motivate
`fair-minded' players to propose the equal split, and to vote for it (and against other
proposals). Anticipating this behavior, even purely self-interested players should do
the same under unanimity rule, knowing that anything else is likely to only increase
delay.9 Thus, under unanimity rule, we hypothesize that subjects will propose and
agree on the equal split.
Hypothesis 1. In symmetric situations with unanimity rule, most proposers suggest
three-way equal splits. Group members more often vote `yes' on such proposals than on
unequal splits. Therefore, equal splits pass with higher probability.
The predictions implied for majority rule are less straightforward. Since proposers can
build minimum winning coalitions, `selﬁsh' (or less `fair-minded') players may attempt
9 That is, if at least one of the players in a given group is `fair-minded' in the way outlined, no
unequal division can pass under unanimity rule.
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to do so, hoping that the included player will vote `yes', either because he is also selﬁsh,
or because the larger share that he can be given (e.g. 50% instead of 33%) is enough
to outweigh his fairness concerns. Thus, depending on (beliefs about) the distribution
of types in a population, `selﬁsh' proposers will build minimum winning coalitions,
and perhaps make relatively generous oﬀers to their partners within such coalitions.
This could result in a mix of three-way and two-way equal splits being proposed.
When voting, fair-minded players should be more likely to support `grand' proposals
that are equal splits, and all players should be more likely, ceteris paribus, to support
proposals that allocate larger shares to them. In sum, it appears diﬃcult to predict
which allocations will be proposed under majority rule. Relative to unanimity rule,
however, we can expect minimum winning coalitions to be more common. We therefore
formulate the following hypothesis to be compared against the results obtained.
Hypothesis 2. In symmetric situation with majority rule, proposers attempt to build
minimum winning coalitions. These coalitions are more likely to pass the larger the
share oﬀered to the coalition partner.
Asymmetric claims Our second set of hypotheses is formulated for situations in
which the group members have made diﬀerent contributions, leading to heterogeneous
claims. Given that high contributors expect to receive higher shares, and indeed people
regard this as fair (Gächter and Riedl, 2005; Gantner et al., 2016), it is diﬃcult for
proposers to ignore claims under unanimity rule, as doing so is likely to result in failure
of their proposal. Thus, players with larger contributions should receive higher oﬀers.
This prediction is in line with the existing evidence on the eﬀect of heterogeneous
claims under unanimity rule (Gächter and Riedl, 2005; Karagözo§lu and Riedl, 2014;
Gantner et al., 2016).
Hypothesis 3. In asymmetric situations with unanimity rule, shares oﬀered are in-
creasing in relative points contributed.
In the presence of a self-serving bias, proposals should be more proportional the larger a
player's contribution, as material self-interest and fairness concerns are aligned in these
cases. Similarly, when voting, players with higher contributions should more often vote
`yes' the more proportional a proposal than individuals with lower contributions.
Hypothesis 4. In asymmetric situations with unanimity rule, individuals with larger
contributions more often suggest, and are more likely to vote `yes' on the proportional
split than members with smaller contributions.
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When claims are asymmetric, individuals are likely to diﬀer in how much proportion-
ality they perceive as `fair', thus causing heterogeneity in fairness views. This, in
turn, may lead to more delay in negotiations in asymmetric as compared to symmetric
situations. In line with this prediction, Karagözo§lu and Riedl (2014) ﬁnd that the
bargaining duration signiﬁcantly increases in treatments where subjects derive het-
erogeneous claims based on performance feedback relative to treatments in which no
performance feedback is provided.
Hypothesis 5. Under unanimity rule, delay occurs more frequently when players have
asymmetric claims than when claims are symmetric.
One reason why claims are likely to inﬂuence bargaining outcomes under unanimity
rule is that all players have veto power which can be used to enforce claims as well as
fairness perceptions. As was already discussed, this situation is fundamentally altered
when majority rule is used. A player seeking to maximize his payoﬀ may propose a
minimum winning coalition excluding one responder. When responder claims diﬀer,
it is even conceivable that the proposer would systematically discriminate against the
player with the larger claim, as she might be perceived as more `expensive'. This
hypothesis may fail if players' fairness conceptions cause them to be reluctant to exclude
others from the winning coalition. As mentioned above, evidence from dictator games
with prior production indicate that many subjects are indeed reluctant to exclude
others in situations where they could do so. Note, however, that the frequency of
minimum winning coalitions in (standard) Baron-Ferejohn experiments is signiﬁcantly
larger than the frequency of zero oﬀers in standard dictator games. That is, subjects
in multilateral bargaining games appear to be more willing to allocate nothing to one
player. Therefore we tentatively conjecture that this willingness to exclude a player
from payment will persist in our setting, even when the surplus is jointly produced.
These considerations lead us to formulate the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 6. In asymmetric situations with majority rule, proposers attempt to
build minimum winning coalition.
Should this hypothesis prove to be true, an interesting follow-up question is which re-
sponder is more likely to be included in a minimum winning coalition. When responder
`claims' diﬀer, two competing considerations may play a role. On the one hand, the
responder with the larger claim may appear more deserving, and thus fairness concerns
may dictate that she be included in the coalition. On the other hand, it appears likely
that the responder with the smaller claim will be `cheaper' - i.e. more likey to vote
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`yes' for a given share being oﬀered. Thus, proposers may strategically exclude the
player with the larger claim. Which of these considerations prevails more often is an
empirical question. We will organize our analysis around the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 7. When the responders' contributions diﬀer, proposers who build min-
imum winning coalitions are more likely to include responders with smaller contribu-
tions.
As under unanimity rule, heterogeneous claims are likely to cause more disagreement
in subjective fairness ideals which will lead to more delay in negotiations as compared
to situations with homogeneous claims.
Hypothesis 8. Under majority rule, delay occurs more frequently when players have
asymmetric claims.
Majority versus Unanimity rule All hypotheses formulated thus far concern the
eﬀects of claims within each of our treatments (majority and unanimity rule). Finally,
we formulate two hypotheses regarding diﬀerences between the two treatments. First,
claims should aﬀect proposals (and ﬁnal outcomes) more strongly under unanimity
than under majority rule. Under unanimity rule, the existence of veto power implies
that claims and fairness perceptions can be enforced. Under majority rule, in contrast,
subjects can trade oﬀ fairness against higher shares for themselves which might cause
less fair-minded players to propose minimum winning coalitions and even relatively
fair-mindeded individuals might propose less proportional and more equal divisions of
the surplus. Thus, under majority rule proposals and ﬁnal outcomes should shift away
from the proportional split.
Hypothesis 9. Proposals and ﬁnal outcomes under majority rule are less proportional
than under unanimity rule whenever the proposer has made a smaller contribution.
The ﬁnal hypothesis concerns the length of the bargaining process under both decision
rules. Given that under majority rule less members need to consent, majority rule
should lead to faster agreement than unanimity rule. This eﬀect should be particularly
pronounced in situations with heterogeneous claims as group members are more likely
to hold conﬂicting fairness views. The ﬁnal hypothesis is also in line with previous
research conducted on the BF bargaining game. For example, Miller and Vanberg
(2013, 2015) and Miller et al. (2018) ﬁnd that delay occurs more frequently under
unanimity rule.
113
CHAPTER 4. BARGAINING WITH JOINT PRODUCTION
Hypothesis 10. Delay occurs more frequently under unanimity than under majority
rule, especially in situations involving heterogeneous claims.
4.5 Results
As indicated above, we purposefully designed the quiz blocks such that most subjects
should earn at least one point, and some would earn three points. We did this be-
cause we want to focus on situations where all group members have made positive
contributions, but the size of these contributions may diﬀer. Table 4.2 summarizes the
frequency with which we observed various constellations of points within the bargain-
ing groups that were formed in both treatments. By focusing on situations where all
contributions are positive, we lose approximately 25% of the data. We analyze these
excluded cases in Appendix 4. Also, we have relatively few observations where all
subjects contributed either one point or three points. Since the relative contributions
are the same in these situations, we will pool these data in the subsequent analysis.
Table 4.2: Constellations of points contributed
Number of games
Contributions Surplus Unanimity rule Majority rule
(1,1,1) 15 EUR 20 30
(3,3,3) 45 EUR 47 39
(1,1,3) 25 EUR 87 117
(1,3,3) 35 EUR 140 116
not all positive various 90 106
Total 408 384
As is typically done in the literature on Baron-Ferejohn bargaining, most of our em-
pirical analysis will focus on the ﬁrst round of bargaining. Given our method of having
all subjects make a proposal, we observe three proposals per game. In situations where
relative contributions diﬀer, we will distinguish cases according to whether the pro-
poser has made a relatively large or small contribution.10 With this in mind, Table
4.3 presents the number of proposals we observed in each of ﬁve possible situations.
Here and later, the ﬁrst coordinate of the contribution vector (in bold) denotes the
relative contribution of the proposer. When responder contributions diﬀer, they are
ordered such that the smaller contributor is listed ﬁrst (i.e. the second coordinate).
When responder contributions are the same, they are ordered alphabetically according
10 Recall that, by design, individual contributions can take on only two values, 1 and 3.
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to the letter i.d. (`A', `B', or `C') that players were randomly assigned at the start of
the game.
Table 4.3: Situations observed (first round)
Percentage Number of proposals
Contributions† Majority rule Unanimity rule
(33,33,33) 207 201
(20,20,60) 234 174
(60,20,20) 117 87
(14,43,43) 116 140
(43,14,43) 232 280
Total 906 882
† The ﬁrst coordinate is the proposer's percentage contribu-
tion.
4.5.1 Symmetric claims
We begin by discussing the situations where all subjects have contributed the same
number of points (either 1 or 3). Figure 4.1 displays the distribution of proposals
within a simplex. In this and the following ﬁgures, the simplex is deﬁned such that
the shares allocated to responders 1 and 2 are measured along the horizontal and
vertical axes, respectively. As mentioned above, responders are ordered alphabetically
according to the letter i.d. they were assigned on the decision screen. The south-
west corner would correspond to a proposal where the proposer demands the entire
pie, and the right and top corners represent points where everything is allocated to
responder 1 and responder 2, respectively. For orientation, a number of focal points
are highlighted. Equal splits (both two- and three way) are marked in blue. The
proportional split (reﬂecting claims) is marked in red. (In the symmetric case, the
proportional split is identical to the three-way equal split.) The size of the bubbles
reﬂect the relative frequency of the corresponding proposals, and the pie charts within
the bubbles display the fraction of proposals that pass (in green) and fail (in red).
Finally, each (sub)ﬁgure contains information about the three most frequently observed
proposals. For example, the most frequently observed proposal under unanimity rule
is an equal split.11 It accounts for 88% of all oﬀers, and it passes 95% of the time.
11 Although the ﬁgure displays these as (34, 33, 33), these may include some proposals that were
actually (33, 33, 33). The simplex is constructed such that the ﬁrst coordinate is 100 minus the other
two, i.e. we are assuming that all proposals sum to 100.
115
CHAPTER 4. BARGAINING WITH JOINT PRODUCTION
Figure 4.1: Proposals and passage rates, equal claims
(a) Unanimity rule (N=201)
88% x=(34, 33, 33) pass=95%
5% x=(33, 33, 34) pass=90%
2% x=(33, 34, 33) pass=100%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
(b) Majority rule (N=207)
76% x=(34, 33, 33) pass=99%
9% x=(50, 50, 0) pass=89%
2% x=(50, 0, 50) pass=100%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
Figure 4.2: Proposals and passage rates, no claims†
(a) Unanimity rule (N=312)
57% x=(34, 33, 33) pass=94%
18% x=(36, 32, 32) pass=52%
5% x=(40, 30, 30) pass=6%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
(b) Majority rule (N=351)
12% x=(34, 33, 33) pass=98%
12% x=(60, 40, 0) pass=98%
12% x=(60, 0, 40) pass=88%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
† These data are taken from a previous experiment (Miller and Vanberg 2013)
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As can be easily recognized by inspecting Figure 4.1, behavior in the symmetric situ-
ation is quite similar under both rules. In particular, the vast majority of proposals
are either equal splits or very close to equal splits, and these proposals almost always
pass. Overall, 94% and 95% of proposals pass under unanimity and majority rule,
respectively (see Table 4.4 below). Under majority rule, we observe only few minimum
winning coalitions being proposed and all of them suggest the two-way equal split.
While this behavior was to be expected under unanimity rule (see Hypothesis 1), it
is somewhat surprising under majority rule. As mentioned, previous experiments on
the BF game without claims have found that most proposers build minimum winning
coalitions (MWCs), excluding one responder from payment. As an example, consider
Figure 4.2, which presents the distribution of proposals in a prior BF experiment
without claims (Miller and Vanberg, 2013). Our results suggest that the willingness to
completely exclude one player from payment is substantially reduced when the surplus
being distributed has been jointly produced. Comparing our own and results reported
in Miller and Vanberg (2013), we ﬁnd that the fraction of MWCs is signiﬁcantly lower
in our sample (Chi-squared test, 11% vs. 66%, p < 0.01, N1 = 207 and N2 = 354).
Thus, we can reject Hypothesis 2.12
One reason why individuals might propose a three-way equal split more often than a
MWC is that MWCs may be less likely to pass. Although we have only few relevant
observations, we ﬁnd that the passage rate in MWCs is smaller than in grand coalitions
(85% versus 96%). To test for signiﬁcance, we compare the fraction of passed proposals
in grand and minimum winning coalitions for each matching group. We do not ﬁnd
that the diﬀerence in passage rates is statistically signiﬁcant (Wilcoxon matched-pairs
signed-ranks test, p = 0.53, N = 13).13 To the extent that subjects could have
anticipated or learned this over time, the fact that few MWCs are proposed suggests
that individuals indeed regard it as fair to respect other subjects' claims.
To analyze how the location of a proposal aﬀects voting behavior, we run a Random-
eﬀects probit regression using the voting decision as dependent variable.14 The inde-
pendent variables are the Euclidean distance to the equal (proportional) split and the
period. Under both decision rules, we ﬁnd that the probability to vote `yes' decreases
signiﬁcantly as the distance to the equal split increases (Average marginal eﬀect; Una-
nimity rule β = −0.02, p < 0.01; Majority rule β = −0.01, p < 0.01). Hence, deviations
12 It should be noted that the frequency of MWCs increases over time. If we focus only on the
ﬁnal 4 periods, it is 17%. This is still substantially smaller than what is observed in periods 9-12 of
Miller and Vanberg (2013) (79%, p < 0.01, N1 = 48 and N2 = 96)
13 We observe MWCs being proposed in 13 of 17 matching groups in the majority rule treatment.
14 Each individual votes on the proposals of both other group members in every game. We use
panel methods assuming that voting decisions are uncorrelated with individual characteristics.
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from the equal split result in higher disapproval.15
Result 1. In symmetric situations, the vast majority of proposers suggest a three-
way equal split under both decision rules. Under majority rule, only a small number of
proposers attempt to build a minimum winning coalition. Those that do always propose
a two-way equal split. Under both decision rules, proposals are more often rejected, the
larger the distance to the equal split. (Consistent with Hypothesis 1, inconsistent with
Hypothesis 2.)
4.5.2 Asymmetric claims, unanimity rule
Next we look at situations in which the group members have contributed diﬀerent
amounts to the surplus. We begin by considering behavior under unanimity rule.
Figure 4.3 displays the distribution of proposals and corresponding passage rates in
the c = (20, 20, 60) situation. The left panel depicts cases in which the proposer has
contributed 20%, the right panel those in which his contribution is 60%.
Three patterns are immediately visible. First, virtually all proposals are located on a
line connecting the proportional (marked in red) to the three-way equal split (blue).
Second, the distribution of proposals shifts away from the equal split and towards
the proportional split when the proposer's own contribution is relatively larger (right
panel). In these cases, the proposer suggests the proportional split almost twice as often
(57% vs. 30%). Finally, the proportional split passes less often when the proposer has
made a comparatively large contribution (68% vs. 85%) but this diﬀerence is only
marginally signiﬁcant (Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test, N = 30, p = 0.1).
The corresponding distributions for the c = (14, 43, 43) situation are depicted in Figure
4.4. Again, the left and right panels depict the cases where the proposer's contribution
is relatively small (i.e. 14%) or large (43%). In the second asymmetric situation, we
observe the exact same pattern as in the previously discussed c = (60, 20, 20) situation.
Given that virtually all proposals in both asymmetric situations are somewhere in
between the equal and proportional splits, it follows immediately that oﬀers are aﬀected
by claims. Table 4.4 summarizes the average oﬀers made in all situations and in both
treatments. Focusing on the middle column for now, we can see that the ordinal
ranking of oﬀers received matches that of the claims in all situations. This pattern is
consistent with Hypothesis 3.
Result 2. In asymmetric situations with unanimity rule, shares oﬀered are increasing
15 Given that all MWC proposals suggest a two-way equal split, we cannot test the second part of
Hypothesis 2.
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Figure 4.3: Proposals and passage rates, c = (20, 20, 60), unanimity rule
(a) (20, 20, 60) (N=174)
30% x=(25, 25, 50) pass=83%
30% x=(20, 20, 60) pass=85%
14% x=(34, 33, 33) pass=84%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
(b) (60, 20, 20) (N=87)
57% x=(60, 20, 20) pass=68%
20% x=(50, 25, 25) pass=94%
10% x=(34, 33, 33) pass=78%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
Figure 4.4: Proposals and passage rates, c = (14, 43, 43), unanimity rule
(a) (14, 43, 43) (N=140)
52% x=(20, 40, 40) pass=93%
18% x=(14, 43, 43) pass=80%
14% x=(34, 33, 33) pass=65%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
(b) (43, 14, 43) (N=280)
44% x=(40, 20, 40) pass=91%
34% x=(43, 14, 43) pass=74%
9% x=(34, 33, 33) pass=92%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
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Table 4.4: Average proposed shares†
Percentage Unanimity Rule Majority Rule
Contributions Average Oﬀers Average Oﬀers
(c0, c1, c2) (y0, y1, y2) (y0, y1, y2)
(33, 33, 33) (33, 33, 33) (36, 34, 30)
(20, 20, 60) (26, 25, 48) (31, 29, 40)
(60, 20, 20) (53, 24, 23) (55, 25, 20)
(14, 43, 43) (22, 39, 39) (28, 39, 33)
(43, 14, 43) (40, 19, 40) (43, 16, 41)
† When responder contributions are the same, they are the
same, they are ordered according to the letter i.d. assigned
to them in the experiment.
in relative points contributed. (Consistent with Hypothesis 3.)
In order to assess the statistical signiﬁcance of these patterns, we take advantage of the
fact that almost all proposals are located along the line connecting the proportional to
the three-way equal split. This allows us to reduce the data to a single dimension, as
follows. For each proposal yi, we identify its scalar projection onto the line described
by the equation
yi = (1− ai) · equal split+ ai · proportional split
The corresponding value of ai characterizes the point on the line which is closest to
the proposal, i.e. whose connecting vector is orthogonal to the line. Thus, ai = 0
corresponds to the equal, and ai = 1 to the proportional split. After we identify the
ai for each proposal, we can look at the distribution of the ai as well as its eﬀect on
voting and passage rates.
Figure 4.5 displays the distribution of ai values in the c = (20, 20, 60) situation. As
above, the left and right panels show the situation where the proposer's own contribu-
tion is 20% and 60%, respectively. Within each bar, the lighter region represents the
fraction of proposals that passed. Comparing the right to the left panel, we see that
the distribution appears to be shifted to the right, with nearly twice as much weight
on the proportional split (located at ai = 1) when the proposer's own contribution is
large. Using paired matching group averages as our unit of observation, we ﬁnd that
this diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant (Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test,
p < 0.01, N = 16).
The corresponding distribution of ai values for the c = (14, 43, 43) situation are dis-
played in Figure 4.6. Again, we see that the distribution shifts to the right, i.e. towards
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Figure 4.5: Distribution of ai values, c = (20, 20, 60), unanimity rule
(a) (20, 20, 60) (N=174)
2%
16%
1%
11%
1% 1%
30%
2%
1%
5%
31%
81%
65%
83%
75%
85%
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
<0 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1 >1
fitted location (0 = equal, 1 = proportional)
Fail Pass
(b) (60, 20, 20) (N=87)
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Figure 4.6: Distribution of ai values, c = (14, 43, 43), unanimity rule
(a) (14, 43, 43) (N=140)
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(b) (43, 14, 43) (N=280)
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the proportional split, when the proposer has made a relatively large contribution (right
panel). To test for signiﬁcance, we compare the average values of ai in all matching
groups and ﬁnd a signiﬁcant diﬀerence (Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test,
p < 0.01, N = 16). Hence, in both asymmetric situations we ﬁnd that proposals are
more proportional if the proposer himself has made a relatively large contribution.
This supports the ﬁrst part of Hypothesis 4.
To assess the eﬀect of proposal location on voting behavior, we run Random-eﬀects
probit regressions. Results for unanimity rule are summarized in the top part of Table
4.5. In each regression, the dependent variable is the voting decision, coded as vi = 1
if a subject votes `yes' and vi = 0 otherwise. The independent variables are ai and
the period. For the (20, 20, 60) situation, we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient on ai is positive
and signiﬁcant for responder 2 but insigniﬁcant for responder 1. That is, the subject
with the larger claim is signiﬁcantly more likely to vote yes if the proposal is closer
to the proportional split. We observe a similar pattern in the (43, 14, 43) situation.
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Namely, the coeﬃcient on ai is positive and signiﬁcant for responder 2 but negative
and signiﬁcant for responder 1. Hence, in this situation the individual with the larger
claim is more likely to vote yes if the proposal is closer to the proportional split while
the opposite is true for the individual with the smaller claim. We also ﬁnd that the
coeﬃcient of ai is positive in the (14, 43, 43) situation where both responders have made
a relatively large contribution. In contrast, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant opposite eﬀect of ai
on voting in the (60, 20, 20) situation, where both responders have made a relatively
small contribution. In summary, our results indicate that responders with relatively
large contributions vote `yes' more often the more proportional a proposal. On the
other hand, we ﬁnd only partial evidence that individuals with lower contributions less
often vote `yes', as suspected in the second part of Hypothesis 4.
Result 3. In asymmetric situations and under unanimity rule, individuals who have
made relatively large contributions make proposals that are closer to the proportional
split than do individuals who have made relatively small contributions. Responders with
large contributions are more likely to vote `yes' on proposals closer to the proportional
split. (Partially consistent with Hypothesis 4.)
Table 4.5: Effect of proposal location on responder votes
(20, 20, 60) (60, 20, 20) (14, 43, 43) (43, 14, 43)
Unanimity Responder 1 -.03 -.09 .21 *** -.48 ***
rule Responder 2 .24 *** .07 *
# of obs (174) (174) (280) (280)
# of ids (74;60) (74) (85) (67;85)
Majority Responder 1 -.14*** -.48*** .34*** -.70 ***
rule Responder 2 .434 *** .19 ***
# of obs (234) (234) (232) (232)
# of ids (90;67) (90) (86) (57;86)
Notes: The table reports average marginal eﬀects of proposal location. (ai = 0 and ai = 1
correspond to equal and proportional splits.) The coeﬃcient can roughly be interpreted as
the eﬀect of proposing the proportional rather than the equal split. (However, it is not
evaluated at the equal split.)
Turning to rates of passage, it is apparent that proposals fail more often in the asym-
metric situation (Figures 4.3 and 4.4) than in the symmetric situation (Figure 4.1, left
panel). Table 4.6 presents information on the overall passage rates in each of the sit-
uations observed. Pooling all asymmetric situations, the overall rate of passage under
unanimity rule is 79%, as compared to 94% in the symmetric situation. By comparing
average passage rates within each matching group, we ﬁnd that this diﬀerence is signif-
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Table 4.6: Passage rate by situation (all first round proposals)
(33,33,33) (20,20,60) (60,20,20) (14,43,43) (43,14,43) Total
Unanimity 94% 78% 71% 82% 81% 83%
189/201 136/174 62/87 115/140 228/280 730/882
Majority 95% 93% 84% 76% 95% 90%
196/207 217/234 98/117 88/116 220/232 819/906
Rank Sum p† 0.95 0.01 0.67 0.89 <0.01 < 0.01
† Rank sum tests are based on fraction passed within each matching group (16 and 17
observations for unanimity and majority rule, respectively).
icant (Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, p = 0.01, N = 16). This supports our Hypothesis
5.
Result 4. Under unanimity rule, the passage rate is larger in situations where claims
are symmetric as compared to situations in which claims are asymmetric. (Consistent
with Hypothesis 5.)
4.5.3 Asymmetric claims, majority rule
Now we turn to the majority rule treatment, and continue to look at situations where
subjects have heterogeneous claims. Figures 4.7 and 4.8 display the distribution of
proposals and the corresponding passage rates in detail. A salient pattern in these
ﬁgures is that proposals are concentrated in three distinct areas. As in the unanimity
rule treatment, the vast majority is located along a line connecting the three-way equal
to the proportional split. In addition, a small number of proposals are located along
either the horizontal or vertical axis, corresponding to minimum winning coalitions
with responder 1 or responder 2, respectively.
Looking only at the grand coalitions in the c = (20, 20, 60) and the c = (14, 43, 43)
situations, we observe that the distribution of proposals shifts towards the proportional
split when the proposer's contribution is relatively larger (right panels). In these cases
the proposer suggests the proportional split three times as often in the c = (20, 20, 60)
(12% vs. 39%), and almost twice as often in the c = (14, 43, 43) situation (18%
vs. 34%). Although we observe few minimum winning coalitions ((20,20,60) 16%,
(60,20,20) 19%, (14,43,43) 9%, (43,14,43) 18%), the distribution of oﬀers within these
coalitions seems to reﬂect claims. That is, a two-way equal split is proposed if both
coalition partners have made the same contribution, whereas partners with higher
(lower) contributions are oﬀered more (less) than the two-way equal split. For example,
in the (20,20,60) the average oﬀers to responder 1 and 2 are 50 and 62%, respectively.
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Figure 4.7: Proposals and passage rates, c = (20, 20, 60), majority rule
(a) (20, 20, 60) (N=86)
25% x=(30, 30, 40) pass=93%
24% x=(25, 25, 50) pass=98%
12% x=(20, 20, 60) pass=93%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
(b) (60, 20, 20) (N=43)
39% x=(60, 20, 20) pass=74%
21% x=(50, 25, 25) pass=96%
9% x=(40, 30, 30) pass=91%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
Figure 4.8: Proposals and passage rates, c = (14, 43, 43), majority rule
(a) (14, 43, 43) (N=86)
30% x=(20, 40, 40) pass=91%
17% x=(34, 33, 33) pass=35%
14% x=(30, 35, 35) pass=81%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
(b) (43, 14, 43) (N=43)
31% x=(40, 20, 40) pass=99%
25% x=(43, 14, 43) pass=97%
13% x=(50, 0, 50) pass=100%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
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In the (43,14,43) situation average oﬀers within MWCs are 37% to responder 1 and
50% to responder 2.
To study the composition and frequency of MWCs in more detail, we split proposals
into three categories according to whether they are closest to one of the axes or the line
connecting the equal and the proportional splits (extending out beyond those points).16
Thus, by this deﬁnition, a proposal that allocates a very small share to one responder
would be classiﬁed as a `ﬁtted' minimum winning coalition. Note that this measure will
classify more proposals as MWCs than a more `strict' deﬁnition would. The percentage
of proposals that are thereby categorized as `ﬁtted' MWCs and `ﬁtted' grand coalitions
is summarized in Table 4.7. The left and right parts of the table provide information
on all periods and on the last 4 periods, respectively.
Table 4.7: Proposed coalition composition, majority rule
All periods Periods 9-12
MWC with Grand MWC with Grand
Situation resp. 1 resp. 2 coalition N resp. 1 resp. 2 coalition N
(33,33,33) 10% 3% 87% 207 15% 6% 79% 48
(20,20,60) 12% 5% 83% 234 18% 3% 79% 94
(60,20,20) 18% 5% 77% 117 26% 6% 68% 47
(14,43,43) 12% 1% 87% 116 24% 0% 76% 38
(43,14,43) 3% 15% 82% 232 5% 25% 70% 76
Total 10% 7% 83% 906 16% 10% 74% 303
Notes: `Situations' are deﬁned such that the ﬁrst coordinate is the proposer, the second
and third are responder percentage contributions.
In every situation, we ﬁnd that the vast majority of proposers (83%) build grand rather
than minimum winning coalitions (MWCs). Although the fraction of MWCs increases
somewhat over time, it remains low even in the last four experimental periods (26%).
This evidence is inconsistent with Hypothesis 6. Comparing the fraction of MWCs
across situations, we ﬁnd that they are more frequent in asymmetric (18%) than in
symmetric situations (13%). This diﬀerence persists, although smaller in size, in the
last 4 periods (21% vs. 27%) and is signiﬁcant (Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks
test, p = 0.06, N = 10). Turning to the composition of MWCs, we do not ﬁnd evidence
that proposers systemically exclude members with higher claims as conjectured in
16 For this purpose, we compute the scalar projection onto the line connecting the three-way equal
and the proportional split. Thereafter, we calculate the Euclidean distance (ϵ) of the vector connecting
a proposal to this line. In addition, we measure the distance to the horizontal and the vertical axes
which are x2 and x1 respectively. By comparing the length of the three vectors, we are able to identify
a proposal as `ﬁtted grand coalition' (i.e. ϵ < x1 and ϵ < x2) etc.
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Hypothesis 7. In the (20,20,60) situation, proposers are indeed more likely to include
responder 1 who has contributed a smaller share (Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks
test, p = 0.08, N = 8). However, in the (43,14,43) situation, proposers are more likely
to include responder 2 who has made a larger contribution (Wilcoxon matched-pairs
signed-ranks test, p < 0.01, N = 10). This is despite the fact that responder 2 is
oﬀered higher shares when included in a MWC than responder 1 (see above). Hence,
when responders have diﬀerent claims, it appears that the proposer is more likely to
include the responder who has contributed the same share as the proposer. Thus, we
do not ﬁnd that the responder with the higher claim is systematically excluded. This
evidence stands in contrast to our Hypothesis 7.17
Result 5. In asymmetric situations with majority rule, the vast majority of proposers
attempt to build grand coalitions. Those who do build minimum winning coalitions are
more likely to include the responder who has made the same contribution as themselves.
(Inconsistent with Hypotheses 6 and 7.)
Focusing only on the `ﬁtted' grand coalitions, Figures 4.9 and 4.10 provide histograms
of the ai values (calculated as above - see Subsection 4.5.2). Among the `ﬁtted' grand
coalitions, we observe the same pattern as in the unanimity rule treatment. Namely, in
both ﬁgures, the distribution of proposals seems to be shifted to the right, i.e. towards
the proportional split, when the proposer has made a relatively large contribution (right
panels). Using matching group averages of ai as unit of observation, we ﬁnd that the
average values of ai are indeed signiﬁcantly larger when the proposer has made a
relatively large contribution in both situations (Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks
test; (20,20,60), p < 0.01, N = 17; (14,43, 43), p < 0.01, N = 16).
Result 6. In asymmetric situations with majority rule, proposers with larger contri-
butions are more likely to suggest the proportional split.
Turning to voting behavior, we explore how the location of a proposal aﬀects the
decision to vote `yes'. We do so separately for grand and minimum winning coalitions,
starting with the latter. As would be expected, the most important determinant of
voting on MWC proposals is whether a subject is included in the proposed coalition.
If not, virtually all subjects (96%) vote `no'. In contrast, those included vote `yes' in
17 In addition, we ﬁnd that whenever responders have the same claims, proposers are more likely to
include responder 1. Remember that we ordered responders according to the letter i.d. they received
on the decision screen. That is, if the proposer's i.d. is `A', responder 1 corresponds to the individual
displayed as `B' on the decision screen. If the proposer's i.d. was instead `B' responder 1 corresponds
to the individual displayed as `A' on the decision screen. Hence, in both of these cases responder 1
is the person displayed below the proposer on the decision screen which might have aﬀected the
likelihood of receiving a positive oﬀer.
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92% of all cases. To test how the location of a proposal aﬀects the decision to vote `yes'
within a MWC, we run a Random-eﬀects probit regression18, with the voting decision
as dependent and the period as well as the share being oﬀered as the independent
variables. Our tests reveal that coalition members are more likely to vote `yes' the
higher the share they are oﬀered (Average marginal eﬀect, β = 0.01, p = 0.04).
In a second step, we explore voting behavior within the `ﬁtted' grand coalitions that
we observe in the majority rule treatment. For this purpose, we again run a set of
Random-eﬀects probit models, using the voting decision as dependent and the period
as well as ai as independent variables. The bottom half of Table 4.5 reports the
average marginal eﬀects of ai on the decision to vote yes. In the (20, 20, 60) and the
(43, 14, 43) situations, the coeﬃcient on ai is negative (and signiﬁcant) for responder 1
and positive (and signiﬁcant) for responder 2. Consistent with this pattern, we ﬁnd that
the coeﬃcient on ai is negative (and signiﬁcant) in the (60, 20, 20) and positive (and
signiﬁcant) in the (14, 43, 43) situation. Hence, our ﬁndings indicate that individuals
with relatively large claims are more likely to vote yes if a proposal is closer to the
proportional split while the opposite holds for individuals with smaller claims.
Result 7. In asymmetric situations with majority rule, responders with larger contri-
butions more often vote `yes' the more proportional a proposal suggested in a grand
coalition. Responders included in a MWC more often vote `yes' the larger the share
they are being oﬀered.
In a last step we explore passage rates. As displayed in Table 4.6, we observe that 89%
of the proposals pass in the asymmetric situations. This is signiﬁcantly smaller than the
passage rate in symmetric situations which amounts to 95% (Wilcoxon matched-pairs
signed-ranks test, p = 0.01, N = 17) which supports our Hypothesis 8.19
Result 8. Under majority rule, the passage rate is larger in situations where claims
are symmetric as compared to situations in which claims are asymmetric. (Consistent
with Hypothesis 8.)
18 Each subject votes on the proposals of the other two group members. We use the voting decisions
of each individual as panel variable assuming that voting decisions are independent of individual
characteristics.
19 We also do not ﬁnd that the passage rate is larger in grand than in minimum winning coalitions
(Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test, p = 0.18, N = 12) although this result is based on few
observations. If subjects were able to anticipate or learn this over time, the fact that we observe few
MWCs suggests that individuals prefer to form grand coalitions. We are unable to test this conjecture
given that we did not elicit beliefs over passage rates.
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4.5.4 Majority versus Unanimity rule
So far, we have separately discussed outcomes under both rules. In contrast to our
hypotheses, we ﬁnd a remarkable number of similar patterns. First, average shares
oﬀered increase in relative points contributed under both decision rules (see Table 4.4).
Hence, oﬀers reﬂect claims even under majority rule. Second, we ﬁnd that oﬀers under
both rules are concentrated on a line connecting the three-way equal and proportional
splits, moving closer to the proportional split if the proposer has made a relatively
larger contribution. Third, individuals with relatively large contributions are more
likely to vote `yes' the closer a proposal to the proportional split. In this section, we
analyze how the decision rule itself aﬀects oﬀers as well as passage rates and explore
diﬀerences in these common patterns.
We start by comparing the distribution of grand coalition oﬀers (i.e. distribution of ai)
between treatments. The corresponding distributions for the (20, 20, 60) situation are
displayed in the left panels of Figures 4.5 and 4.9. It appears that the distribution is
shifted to the right (i.e. towards the proportional split) under unanimity as compared
to majority rule. In particular, we observe almost twice as many proportional proposals
under unanimity rule (31% vs. 14%). This is also the case in the (14, 43, 43) situation,
depicted in the left panels of Figures 4.6 and 4.10. Here, the fraction of proportional
proposals is 19% under unanimity and only 5% under majority rule. By comparing
the average values of ai across matching groups, we ﬁnd that proposals are indeed
signiﬁcantly closer to the proportional split under unanimity rule in both situations
(Wilcoxon rank-sum test; (20, 20, 60), p = 0.02; (14, 43, 43), p = 0.01; N = 33). In
contrast, we do not ﬁnd that the decision rule has a signiﬁcant eﬀect in the (43, 14, 43)
(Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p = 0.26, N = 32) and the (60, 20, 20) situations, i.e. when
the proposer has made a relatively large contribution (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p = 0.8,
N = 33). These ﬁndings lend partial support for our Hypothesis 9.
Result 9. Proposals under majority rule are less proportional (and more equal) as
compared to unanimity rule in situations where the proposer's contribution is relatively
small. In contrast, the degree of proportionality does not diﬀer signiﬁcantly when the
proposer has made a relatively large contribution. (Partially consistent with Hypothesis
9.)
As stated in Hypothesis 10, we are also interested in how the decision rule aﬀects the
incidence of delay. Given that delay is costly in our setting, this allows us to comment
on the eﬃciency of agreements reached under both decision rules. Table 4.6 above
summarizes the passage rates under both decision rules for each situation observed in
our experiment. Averaged over all situations (including the symmetric ones), we ﬁnd
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Figure 4.9: Distribution of ai values in `fitted' grand coalitions, c =
(20, 20, 60), majority rule
(a) (20, 20, 60) (N=195)
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(b) (60, 20, 20) (N=90)
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Figure 4.10: Distribution of ai values in `fitted' grand coalitions, c =
(14, 43, 43), majority rule
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that the passage rate is signiﬁcantly higher under majority than under unanimity rule
(83% vs. 90%, Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p < 0.01, N = 33). This diﬀerence in passage
rates is slightly higher in the asymmetric situations (78% vs. 89%, Wilcoxon rank-sum
test, p < 0.01, N = 33). However, when comparing the passage rates in each situation
separately, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the (60, 20, 20) situation, nor in the
(14, 43, 43) situation. Hence, we only ﬁnd partial support for our Hypothesis 10.
Result 10. On average, the passage rate is signiﬁcantly higher under majority as
compared to unanimity rule, especially when considering asymmetric situations only.
However, when comparing the passage rates under unanimity and majority rule for
each situation separately, we do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the (60, 20, 20) and
the (14, 43, 43) situations. (Partially consistent with Hypothesis 10.)
4.5.5 Final Outcomes
So far, our analysis has focused on the ﬁrst proposals within each game. In this
section, we will instead analyze ﬁnal outcomes. As a ﬁrst step, we want to assess how
the decision rule aﬀects the length of the bargaining process, i.e. how many rounds of
bargaining were necessary before a given group reached agreement. Figure 4.11 plots
the distribution of bargaining rounds in the majority and the unanimity rule treatment.
Although many groups reach an immediate agreement under both rules (89% under
majority and 82% under unanimity rule), we observe signiﬁcantly more groups which
continue to bargain over several rounds in the unanimity rule treatment (Wilcoxon
rank-sum test, p < 0.01, N = 33). Hence, this is additional support for the hypothesis
that unanimity rule leads to more delay as compared to majority rule.
To study ﬁnal outcomes, we restrict our analysis to the ﬁrst randomly selected proposal
which passes.20 In situations where the group members have made diﬀerent contribu-
tions, we will not distinguish between the points contributed by the proposer and the
two responders, but instead simply study the share of the surplus received by each
group member.
Given the large share of proposals which pass immediately, we would expect that the
ﬁnal outcomes resemble initial proposals, analyzed in detail in the last sections. Figures
4.12 to 4.14 depict the distribution of ﬁnal outcomes in all three situations. (In each
Figure, players are ordered according to the size of their contribution, from low to high.)
The left panels depict the distribution of ﬁnal outcomes under unanimity rule, the right
20 The number of observations that we observe for each constellation of points can be inferred from
Table 4.2. Only one of the groups in the (1, 1, 3) situation did not reach an agreement in the unanimity
treatment. As in the previous sections, we will focus on relative contributions and, thus, pool the
cases in which all group members have either contributed one or three points.
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Figure 4.11: Rounds before reaching agreement
panels those under majority rule. Indeed, we observe the exact same patterns as in
the previous sections: First, ﬁnal bargaining outcomes are quite similar under both
decision rules. Most notably, we continue to observe few minimum winning coalitions
being formed under majority rule. Second, almost all grand coalitions are located on
a line connecting the equal and the proportional splits. However, comparing the left
and right panels of Figures 4.13 and 4.14, we see that outcomes move away from the
proportional split under majority rule. For example, in the (14, 43, 43) situation, the
fraction of proportional outcomes falls from 49% to 34% when moving from unanimity
to majority rule. Using scalar projections (see above), we ﬁnd that outcomes are
indeed signiﬁcantly less proportional under majority rule in the (20,20,60) situation
(Ranksum test, p = 0.09, N = 33) but not in the (14,43,43) situation (Ranksum test,
p = 0.14). Hence, outcomes are less proportional under majority rule when a majority
of individuals have made relatively small contributions (i.e. in the (20,20,60) situation)
but not if a majority of individuals have made relatively large contributions (i.e. in
the (14,43,43) situation).
Result 11. The ﬁnal outcomes in grand coalitions are less proportional under majority
as compared to unanimity rule if at least two group members have contributed less than
33% to the surplus. Otherwise, we do not ﬁnd any diﬀerence between the ﬁnal outcomes
in the majority and unanimity rule treatments.
As noted above, we observe few MWCs among the ﬁnal outcomes. Using the same
classiﬁcation of proposals as above, 17% of the ﬁnal outcomes can be classiﬁed as
ﬁtted minimum winning coalitions, while 82% are grand coalitions. Table 4.8 depicts
the relative frequency with which we observe MWCs for each pair of group members
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Figure 4.12: Final outcomes in c = (33, 33, 33)
(a) Unanimity rule (N=67)
85% x=(34, 33, 33) pass=100%
7% x=(33, 33, 34) pass=100%
6% x=(33, 34, 33) pass=100%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
(b) Majority rule (N=69)
70% x=(34, 33, 33)pass=100%
9% x=(50, 50, 0) pass=100%
6% x=(33, 34, 33)pass=100%
6% x=(33, 33, 34)pass=100%
6% x=(50, 0, 50) pass=100%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
Figure 4.13: Final outcomes in c = (20, 20, 60)
(a) Unanimity rule (N=87)
31% x=(20, 20, 60) pass=100%
30% x=(25, 25, 50) pass=100%
14% x=(34, 33, 33) pass=100%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
(b) Majority rule (N=117)
26% x=(25, 25, 50) pass=100%
20% x=(30, 30, 40) pass=100%
18% x=(20, 20, 60) pass=100%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
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Figure 4.14: Final outcomes in c = (14, 43, 43)
(a) Unanimity rule (N=140)
49% x=(20, 40, 40) pass=100%
29% x=(14, 43, 43) pass=100%
11% x=(34, 33, 33) pass=100%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
(b) Majority rule (N=116)
34% x=(20, 40, 40) pass=100%
17% x=(14, 43, 43) pass=100%
9% x=(0, 50, 50) pass=100%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
in all periods (left) and the last 4 periods (right). As in our previous analysis, we
do not ﬁnd evidence that group members with higher contributions are systematically
excluded from MWCs. For example, in the (20,20,60) situation 20% of ﬁnal outcomes
suggest a MWC. Of these, 11% include the group member who has contributed 60%
to the surplus.
Table 4.8: Coalition composition, final agreements (majority rule)
MWC Grand Fitted MWC Fitted Grand
Situation 1&2 1&3 2&3 coalition 1&2 1&3 2&3 coalition N
(33,33,33) 9% 6% 0% 86% 10% 6% 0% 84% 69
(20,20,60) 9% 3% 8% 81% 9% 3% 8% 80% 117
(14,43,43) 3% 4% 11% 82% 3% 4% 11% 81% 116
Total 6% 4% 7% 82% 7% 4% 7% 81% 302
4.6 Conclusion
We experimentally investigate how claims, derived from relative contributions to a
commonly produced surplus, aﬀect bargaining behavior and outcomes under two de-
cision rules, namely unanimity and majority rule. Under unanimity rule, each group
member possesses veto power which may be used to defend one's claim. Hence, while
unanimity rule might result in fair (in the sense of proportionality) outcomes, endow-
ing each party with veto power could cause severe delay. Majority rule, on the other
hand, enables a minimum winning coalition to ignore the claims of a minority member.
While this may reduce the degree of proportionality reﬂected in ﬁnal outcomes and,
133
CHAPTER 4. BARGAINING WITH JOINT PRODUCTION
consequently, be deemed unfair, requiring fewer group members to consent might allow
groups to reach an agreement more quickly.
We study how claims aﬀect fairness and eﬃciency in a laboratory experiment in which
groups of three subjects ﬁrst jointly produce a surplus and then bargain over the dis-
tribution of the surplus. Bargaining takes place in a ﬁnite horizon Baron and Ferejohn
framework. Across treatments, we vary whether two or all three group members have
to agree on a proposed division of the surplus. In line with previous evidence, we
ﬁnd that claims aﬀect proposals and ﬁnal outcomes under unanimity rule. Speciﬁcally,
oﬀers received increase in relative points contributed. A closer inspection reveals that
virtually all proposals are located between the equal and the proportional split. In
addition, we ﬁnd that proposals are closer to the proportional split if the proposer
has made a relatively large contribution, and hence beneﬁts from receiving the pro-
portional instead of the three-way equal share. Studying voting behavior, we ﬁnd that
individuals with higher claims are also more likely to vote yes the closer the proposal
to the proportional split.
Turning to majority rule, we detect many similar patterns. In contrast to previous
experiments without claims, we ﬁnd that a majority of proposers suggests a grand
instead of a minimum winning coalition and that average oﬀers reﬂect the ranking of
contributions. This is despite the fact that minimum winning coalitions are as likely
to pass as grand coalitions. Although we observe few minimum winning coalitions,
proposers are more likely to include group members who have made the same contri-
butions. This behavior might result from the fact that there is a clear norm to share
the beneﬁts equally with partners who have contributed the same amount, while it is
more diﬃcult to assess how much needs to be oﬀered to individuals with higher or lower
contributions. Within grand coalitions, proposals are closer to the proportional split
if the proposer has made a relatively large contribution. Thus, under both decision
rules we ﬁnd that proposers attempt to implement the proportional split more often if
they have made a relatively large contribution. Conversely, they attempt to distribute
the surplus more equally whenever they have made a relatively small contribution. In
these latter cases, we ﬁnd that proposals as well as ﬁnal outcomes outcomes are closer
to the equal split under majority as compared to unanimity rule. In terms of eﬃciency,
we ﬁnd that majority rule leads to a higher passage rate, especially in situations in
which individuals have made diﬀerent contributions.
While we do ﬁnd that the decision rule aﬀects proposer behavior, ﬁnal outcomes as
well as the incidence of delay, these diﬀerences are not as large as one might have
expected based on previous Baron and Ferejohn experiments without claims. In these
papers, diﬀerences in oﬀers under unanimity and majority rule are mostly driven by the
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fact that proposers form minimum winning coalitions under majority rule. Our results
suggest that the willingness to do so is substantially reduced when all individuals have
contributed to the surplus via a real eﬀort task. This result is likely to reﬂect fairness
perceptions, i.e. proposers deliberately choose to respect claims because they regard
this as fair.
Our paper shows that the diﬀerences between the two decision rules are instead more
subtle in the presence of claims. In particular, we do observe that individuals strate-
gically propose and approve less proportional distributions whenever this is to their
own advantage and whenever the decision rule leaves them more discretion to ignore
the claims of other group members (as under majority rule). This results in less pro-
portional outcomes, whenever a majority of group members has contributed relatively
little. Given that individuals seem to balance their oﬀers between two prevalent fair-
ness norms, proportionality and equality, this behavior may be indicative of a self
serving bias in fairness norms. That is, in a given situation, individuals opportunisti-
cally choose the fairness norm which suits their own interests most (Messick and Sentis,
1983; Cappelen et al., 2007). Although the consequences for high contributors are not
as drastic as, for example, being excluded from a coalition, this behavior certainly
shows that individuals are willing to ignore the claims to the beneﬁt of more equality
within the group.
These (latter) ﬁndings may also be relevant for real world instances of bargaining with
claims, such as budget allocation within the EU. Several recent reforms of the EU
decision rules appear to be motivated by settling the conﬂict between redistribution
from richer to poorer member states and preserving proportionality at the same time.
While redistribution from poorer to richer member states is an explicit goal of the EU,
richer member states provide most of the budget and also represent a majority of the
population. Hence, preserving proportionality might be an important goal in order to
secure support from the voters in these countries and to preserve the EU's legitimacy.
Several recent voting reforms have indeed shifted voting rights from newer and poorer
member states to older and richer member states. Research in political science suggests
that this voting reform has led to more proportional outcomes which come at the cost
of less equal outcomes. For example, with the 2004 enlargement the EU moved from
the traditionally employed unanimity rule to a system with qualiﬁed majority rule
and country voting weights, allocated roughly approximate to population. It has been
shown that members with higher voting weights were in fact able to secure higher shares
of structural and agricultural funds (Aksoy, 2010). The latest reform implemented a
system of double majority, according to which a proposal passes if it is approved by 55%
of the member states who represent at least 65% of the population. Eﬀectively, this
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reform has been found to redistribute voting weights from newer towards older EU15
members, especially to Germany (Leech and Aziz, 2013). Although our experiment is
not directly applicable to the complex institutional setting of the EU, we believe that
it captures some relevant facts on how decision rules aﬀect the distribution of beneﬁts
and may, thus, be informative for the public discourse about optimal decision rules.
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Appendix 4.A
4.A.1 Analysis of excluded cases
In this section, we provide an analysis of all cases in which at least one of the respon-
ders has contributed 0 points to the surplus. We excluded these cases because they
are relatively rare and do not occur in every matching group, leaving us with few inde-
pendent observations to test for diﬀerences between and within treatments. Table 4.9
summarizes the frequency with which we observed the various constellations of points.
Given that the relative contributions are the same in the ﬁrst and the second as well
as in the third and forth situation, we will pool these data in the subsequent analysis.
In situations, where relative contributions diﬀer, we will distinguish whether the pro-
poser has made a small, an intermediate or a large contribution. Given that all subjects
in each group make a proposal, we observe three proposals for each game. Table 4.10
presents the number of proposals we observe in each of the 7 possible situations. The
ﬁrst coordinate of the contribution vector denotes the relative points of the proposer.
When responder contributions diﬀer, they are ordered such that the responder with
the smaller contribution is listed ﬁrst. When the responder contributions are the same,
they are ordered alphabetically, according to the letter i.d. that players were assigned
at the beginning of the game.
Table 4.9: Constellation of points contributed (excluded cases)
Number of games
Contributions Surplus Majority rule Unanimity rule
(0,0,1) 5 EUR 12 3
(0,0,3) 15 EUR 8 5
(0,1,1) 10 EUR 24 10
(0,3,3) 30 EUR 15 29
(0,1,3) 20 EUR 43 42
Total 102 89
We begin by discussing outcomes under unanimity rule. Figures 4.15 to 4.17 display
the distribution of proposals under unanimity rule. In all ﬁgures, the left panels display
the cases in which the proposer has contributed nothing, while the right panels display
cases in which the proposer has made a positive contribution.
In the c = (100, 0, 0) and the c = (0, 50, 50) situation we observe that a large majority
of proposals is located on a line connecting the equal and the proportional splits.
Proposals which are not located on this line are almost always rejected. In the c =
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Table 4.10: Situations observed (Excluded cases)
Percentage Number of proposals
Contributions Majority rule Unanimity rule
(0,0,100) 40 16
(100,0,0) 20 8
(0,50,50) 39 39
(50,0,50) 78 78
(0,25,75) 43 42
(25,0,75) 43 42
(75,0,25) 43 42
Total 306 267
Figure 4.15: Proposals and passage rates, c = (0, 0, 100), Unanimity rule
(a) (0, 0, 100) (N=16)
25% x=(20, 20, 60) pass=100%
19% x=(30, 30, 40) pass=0%
12% x=(34, 33, 33) pass=50%
12% x=(0, 0, 100) pass=0%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
(b) (100, 0, 0) (N=8)
50% x=(100, 0, 0) pass=0%
25% x=(80, 10, 10) pass=50%
12% x=(98, 1, 1) pass=0%
12% x=(60, 20, 20)pass=100%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
Figure 4.16: Proposals and passage rates, c = (0, 50, 50), Unanimity rule
(a) (0, 50, 50) (N=39)
44% x=(10, 45, 45) pass=88%
18% x=(20, 40, 40) pass=86%
8% x=(34, 33, 33) pass=67%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
(b) (50, 0, 50) (N=78)
46% x=(45, 10, 45) pass=81%
17% x=(50, 0, 50) pass=23%
6% x=(34, 33, 33) pass=80%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
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Figure 4.17: Proposals and passage rates, c = (0, 25, 75), Unanimity rule
(a) (0, 25, 75) (N=42)
26% x=(10, 20, 70) pass=64%
14% x=(20, 30, 50) pass=83%
7% x=(34, 33, 33) pass=100%
7% x=(25, 25, 50) pass=67%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
(b) (25, 0, 75) (N=42)
21% x=(20, 10, 70) pass=78%
14% x=(30, 10, 60) pass=83%
7% x=(34, 33, 33) pass=67%
7% x=(40, 10, 50) pass=0%
7% x=(25, 5, 70) pass=33%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
(c) (75, 0, 25) (N=42)
17% x=(50, 20, 30) pass=71%
14% x=(70, 10, 20) pass=67%
14% x=(60, 10, 30) pass=100%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
(0, 25, 75) situation, proposals are concentrated around the line connecting the equal
and the proportional splits. The fact that proposals are farther away from the line
might be explained by the fact that all subjects have contributed diﬀerent amounts,
making it more complicated to target points on the line. As in our main analysis, we
ﬁnd that the distribution of proposals appears to be closer to the proportional split
whenever the proposer has contributed a positive share (right panels) as compared
to having contributed nothing. We do, however, observe a very small passage rates
among proportional splits. Most notably, the proportional split is always rejected in
the (0, 0, 100) situation. Given that almost all proposals are located on (or close to)
the line connecting the equal to the proportional split, we reduce the data to a single
dimension by identifying the scalar projection onto the line for each proposal (see
section 4.2). Hence, each proposal is characterized by a value ai. As in the previous
Results section, ai = 0 corresponds to the equal and ai = 1 to the proportional split.
We use the average values of ai within each matching group to test whether proposals
are closer to the proportional split whenever the proposer has made a relatively large
contribution. Only in the c = (0, 50, 50) situation we ﬁnd that proposals are indeed
closer to the proportional split when the proposer's contribution is 50% compared to
cases in which the proposer has contributed nothing (Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-
ranks test, p = 0.02, N = 12). In all other cases, we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant
diﬀerences ((0, 0, 100) versus (100,0,0): p = 0.12, N = 6; (0, 25, 75) versus (75, 0, 25):
p = 0.66, N = 13).21
Now, we turn to discussing proposals under majority rule. The relevant distributions
of the proposals are displayed in Figures 4.18 to 4.20. It is apparent that proposals
are concentrated in three areas: As in the unanimity rule treatment, the vast majority
of proposals is located on a line connecting the equal and the proportional split. In
21 Given that we do not observe any constellation of points in all 16 matching groups, the number
of observations that we use for our tests ranges from 6 to 13.
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Figure 4.18: Proposals and passage rates, c = (0, 0, 100), Majority rule
(a) (0, 0, 100) (N=40)
15% x=(50, 50, 0) pass=100%
15% x=(20, 20, 60) pass=83%
12% x=(33, 33, 34) pass=80%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
(b) (100, 0, 0) (N=20)
20% x=(100, 0, 0) pass=0%
15% x=(50, 25, 25) pass=67%
10% x=(80, 10, 10) pass=50%
10% x=(60, 20, 20)pass=100%
10% x=(34, 33, 33)pass=100%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
Figure 4.19: Proposals and passage rates, c = (0, 50, 50), Majority rule
(a) (0, 50, 50) (N=39)
28% x=(20, 40, 40)pass=91%
13% x=(10, 45, 45)pass=100%
8% x=(45, 55, 0)pass=100%
8% x=(34, 33, 33)pass=33%
8% x=(30, 35, 35)pass=67%
8% x=(0, 50, 50)pass=100%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
(b) (50, 0, 50) (N=78)
60% x=(50, 0, 50) pass=100%
15% x=(45, 10, 45) pass=100%
5% x=(40, 20, 40) pass=100%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
Figure 4.20: Proposals and passage rates, c = (0, 25, 75), Majority rule
(a) (0, 25, 75) (N=43)
33% x=(10, 20, 70)pass=100%
9% x=(50, 50, 0) pass=100%
7% x=(40, 60, 0) pass=100%
7% x=(34, 33, 33)pass=100%
7% x=(10, 30, 60) pass=67%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
(b) (25, 0, 75) (N=43)
19% x=(25, 0, 75)pass=100%
9% x=(30, 0, 70)pass=100%
7% x=(50, 50, 0)pass=100%
7% x=(34, 33, 33)pass=67%
7% x=(50, 0, 50)pass=100%
7% x=(30, 10, 60)pass=100%
7% x=(40, 0, 60)pass=67%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
(c) (75, 0, 25) (N=43)
16% x=(75, 0, 25) pass=100%
12% x=(60, 10, 30) pass=80%
9% x=(70, 0, 30) pass=75%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
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addition, many proposals are located along either the horizontal or the vertical line,
corresponding to minimum winning coalitions with responder 1 or responder 2, respec-
tively. We begin our discussion of results by looking at the size of coalitions under
majority rule. Table 4.11 summarizes the share of proposals which can be classiﬁed
as minimum winning coalitions, allocating 0 to at least one other group members, and
grand coalitions. To diﬀerentiate between attempted minimum winning coalitions and
proportional splits, we report the fraction of proportional proposals separately. The
left and right parts of the table provide information on all periods and on the last
4 periods, respectively. Most notably, we ﬁnd that proposers are more likely to build
grand coalitions instead of minimum winning coalitions in all situations (24% vs. 52%).
This diﬀerence is, however, much smaller in the last 4 rounds (37% vs. 39%), i.e. after
subjects have gained some experience.
Interestingly, we observe that 23% of the proposers suggest the proportional split.
This fraction is especially high in situations where the proposer has made a positive
contribution. The high fraction of proportional proposals is indeed interesting given
that we observe few minimum winning coalitions being proposed in this and our main
analysis presented in section 4.5. Thus, our ﬁndings suggest that proposers may be
more willing to oﬀer nothing to some group members if such proposals can be justiﬁed
by proportionality.
In order to study the composition of minimum winning coalitions, we computed the
inclusion frequencies for each responder. In contrast to our results in section 4.5.3, we
do not ﬁnd that proposer are more likely to include the individual who has made the
same contribution in the ﬁrst 4 situations. For example, in the (50, 0, 50) situation,
proposers are more likely to include responder 1 instead of responder 2 who has con-
tributed the same share of points as the proposer. In the last three situations, where
all group members have made diﬀerent contributions, we ﬁnd that proposers are more
likely to include responder 2 (who has contributed a positive amount in all cases) if
the proposer has made a positive contribution himself. Instead, if the proposer has
contributed nothing, responder 2 is never included.
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Table 4.11: Coalition Composition (Excluded cases)
all periods periods 9-12
MWC with Grand Propor- MWC with Grand Propor-
Situation resp. 1 resp. 2 coalition tional N resp. 1 resp. 2 coalition tional N
(0,0,100)† 18% 15% 65% 0% 40 31% 19% 44% 0 16
(100,0,0) 15% 5% 60% 20% 20 13% 13% 50 % 25% 8
(0,50,50)† 18% 5% 67% 8% 39 44% 11% 44% 0 % 9
(50,0,50) 9% 4% 27% 60% 78 28% 0 % 6% 67% 18
(0,25,75) 19% 0% 81% 0% 43 29% 0% 71 % 0 % 17
(25,0,75)† 14% 26% 40% 19% 43 24% 24% 24% 30% 17
(75,0,25) 12% 19% 53% 16% 43 24% 6% 47% 24% 17
Total 14% 10% 52% 23% 306 27% 10% 39% 23% 102
† In each of these three situations, we observe one proposals in which the proposer suggests 100% for himself.
Given that this is neither a minimum winning coalition with responder 1 or responder 2 nor a grand coalition,
we can classify less than 100% of the proposals in these three situations.
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In order to study the distribution of proposals in more detail, we turn to Figures 4.18 to
4.20. Looking only at the grand coalitions, it appears that the distribution of proposals
is closer to the proportional split if the proposer has made a positive contribution (right
panels). As noted above, in these cases the proposer also suggests the proportional
split more often. However, this attempt to distribute the surplus more proportionally,
leads to a high rejection rate whenever two individuals have contributed less than
the equal split ((75,0,25) and (100,0,0)). In order to test whether the distribution is
signiﬁcantly closer to the proportional split whenever the proposer has made a positive
contribution (right panels), we ﬁrst compute the number of `ﬁtted grand coalitions'
(see section 4.5.3) and then compare the average values of ai within matching groups.
Only in the c = (0, 50, 50) situation, we ﬁnd that the average values of ai are indeed
larger when the proposer has made a positive as compared to no contribution (Wilcoxon
matched-pairs signed-ranks test, p = 0.03, N = 12). Hence, in these cases proposals are
indeed signiﬁcantly closer to the proportional split if the proposer has made a positive
contribution. In the other two situations, we do not ﬁnd any diﬀerence (Wilcoxon
matched-pairs signed-ranks test; (0,0,100) vs. (100,0,0), p = 0.12, N = 6; (0,0,100) vs.
(75,0,25), p = 0.66, N = 13). Our tests are, however, based on a very small sample
because we did not observe each situation in all 17 matching groups.
Turning to the passage rate, Table 4.12 summarizes the passage rate in each of the
situations. First and most notably, the passage rate is smaller compared to the sit-
uations in which all group members have made a positive contribution (83% under
unanimity, 90% under majority rule, see discussion in section 4.5.5). Second, the pas-
sage rate is signiﬁcantly smaller under unanimity as compared to majority rule in all
situations. Hence, compared to the situations discussed in section 4.5.5, we ﬁnd a more
pronounced diﬀerence between the passage rates under majority and unanimity rule.
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Table 4.12: Passage rate by situations (excluded cases)
(0,0,100) (100,0,0) (0,50,50) (50,0,50) (0,25,75) (25,0,75) (75,0,25) Total
Unanimity 44% 25% 64% 58% 64% 55% 62% 59%
rule 7/16 2/8 25/39 45/78 27/42 23/42 26/42 155/267
Majority 80% 50% 85% 95% 98% 91% 88% 88%
rule 32/40 10/20 33/39 74/78 42/43 39/43 38/43 268/306
Rank-sum p 0.01 0.89 <0.01 <0.01 0.03 <0.01 0.02 <0.01
N † 6/8 6/8 12/13 12/13 14/13 14/13 14/13 14/16
† The Wilcoxon rank-sum test test is based on the passage rate within each matching group. Given that we do not
observe all situations in every matching group, we report the number of observations in the Unanimity /
Majority treatment in this row
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4.A.2 Instructions
---------------------------------------------------------- Page 1 ---------------------------------------------------- 
Dear Participant,  
Thank you for attending this experiment. Before we describe today’s experiment in more detail, we 
would like to inform you about some general rules:  
General rules:  
• This experiment lasts for approximately 70 minutes. During this time, you should not leave 
your seat.  
• Please turn off your mobile phone and store it in your pocket or bag. There should not be 
anything on your table. (A beverage is of course allowed.) 
• Please be quiet during this experiment and do not talk to other participants.  
• If you have any questions, please raise your hand and wait for the experimenter to attend 
you at your seat.  
• For your participation, you will receive a four Euro show-up fee. However, you can earn 
more money in this experiment. How much money you can earn depends on your own as 
well as the choices of other participants.  
 
What happens at the end of this experiment?  
Once all participants have finished this experiment, the experimenter will call the participants to the 
front desk one after another. You will then receive your payment. 
---------------------------------------------------------- Page 2 ---------------------------------------------------- 
Description of the experiment  
This experiment has two parts. 
 
Part 1 consists of 12 quiz blocks. In each quiz block you have to answer two questions. For each 
question, 4 possible answers are given. Only one of these answers is correct.  
In each quiz block you can earn between 0 and 3 points by selecting the correct answers: You earn 1 
point if you are able to answer one question correctly. If you answer both questions correctly, you 
earn 3 points. However, if you answer none of the two questions correctly, you will earn 0 points. 
You will not be informed how many points you collected in any of the quiz blocks.  
Please note: All participants have to answer the exact same questions.  
 
Part 2 of this experiment also consists of 12 rounds. At the beginning of each round, groups of 3 
participants will be randomly formed. For each round, the computer randomly selects one of the 12 
quiz blocks from part 1 for each participant in the group. The points that the group member have 
collected in the randomly chosen quiz blocks will be added. For each point collected, the group 
receives five Euro. The group’s task is to bargain over the distribution of this surplus. 
You will receive more instructions for part 2 after you and all other participants have completed part 
1.  
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Your payment at the end of the experiment 
Once all groups have finished part 2, the computer randomly selects one of the 12 rounds in part 2 of 
this experiment. All participants receive the amount agreed upon in this randomly selected round.  
 
---------------------------------------------------------- Page 3 ---------------------------------------------------- 
 
Examples for part 1:  
Here is an example of what you will see in each of the 12 quiz blocks (in German): 
 
 Displayed on the top right of the screen are the quiz block number.  
 The first question is displayed in the left; the second question is displayed in the right box.  
 The 4 possible answers are displayed below each question and numbered from 1 to 4.  
 Please type the number of the correct answer into the field labeled “Your answer”. For 
example, if you think that answer number 1 is correct, type “1” into the field.  
 As soon as you have typed an answer into both fields, please click on the “OK” button. You 
will then move to the next quiz block.  
---------------------------------------------------------- Page 4 ---------------------------------------------------- 
 
Details for the 2nd part of this experiment  
Part 2 of this experiment consists of 12 rounds. At the beginning of each round, groups of three 
participants will be randomly formed. Thus, you will interact with different participants in each 
round. No participant will know with whom he or she has been grouped during the experiment.  
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At the beginning of every round, each participant in a group will be assigned an ID (“A”, “B” or “C”). 
These IDs remain fixed throughout the round.  
In every round, the computer randomly selects one of the 12 quiz blocks for each participant. Then, 
each participant will be informed which quiz block has been drawn for him / her personally and he 
/she will see how many points he / she has collected in the randomly selected quiz block. You will 
also be informed about the number of points collected by the other two group members. However, 
you will not be informed about the quiz block that was selected for the other two participants. 
All points collected in the randomly chosen quiz blocks are then added. The group receives 5 Euro 
for each point collected by its members. For example, if all three participants have collected 3 
points, the group receives 15 Euro.  
The group’s task is to bargain how to divide the surplus which the group has received among the 
members of the group.  
Decisions are made by majority rule, using the following procedure: 
First, every participant makes a proposal as to how much each group member should receive 
(expressed in percent of the surplus). Next, all group members vote “yes” or “no” on the proposal of 
each group member. Finally, one of the proposals is randomly chosen and votes are counted. If at 
least two group members voted “yes” on the randomly chosen proposal, it passes and the round 
ends. If less than two group members voted “yes”, the proposal is rejected and bargaining continues. 
In this case, the available surplus shrinks by 20 percent (e.g. from 15 to 12 Euro). Then, all 
participants make a proposal and vote on the proposals of all group members. If the randomly 
chosen proposal is rejected again, the surplus shrinks by 20 percent once more (e.g. from 12 to 8.60 
Euro), etc.  
The round ends as soon as at least two group members vote “yes” on the randomly chosen 
proposal. In addition, a round ends if the available surplus shrinks below 2 Euro. In this case, all 
group members receive 0 Euro.  
---------------------------------------------------------- Page 5 ---------------------------------------------------- 
 
Examples for part 2:  
Here is an example of what you will see on the proposal screen (in German):  
 
• Displayed on the top are the current period, your id and the available surplus (in Euro). 
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• The table displays how many points the group has collected in total. In addition, the table 
reports each group member’s contribution in points and his/her share of contributed points 
in percent. (The displayed shares are rounded.)    
• Below, you will find three boxes into which you must type your proposal. You must type the 
share of the pie (%) you wish to allocate to “A” (upper box), the share of the pie (%) you wish 
to allocate to “B” (middle box), and the share of the pie (%) you wish to allocate to “C” (lower 
box). You can allocate at most 100 percent.  
After all three participants in the group have submitted a proposal, you will move to the voting 
screen.   
 
---------------------------------------------------------- Page 6 ---------------------------------------------------- 
 
Here is an example of what you will see on the voting screen (in German). In this Example, we 
assume that all group members propose to give 100 percent off the surplus to participant “A”.  
 
• The top part of the screen contains the same information as the previous proposal screen.  
• Below, you will see each of the submitted proposals displayed both numerically (percent 
share and exact amount in Euro) and graphically (as pie chart). 
• To the right of each proposal, you will find the buttons used to vote on the proposals.  
• After selecting yes or no for each proposal, click submit to cast your votes. 
As soon as all group members have cast their votes, you will move to the Results screen.  
---------------------------------------------------------- Page 7 ---------------------------------------------------- 
Here is an example of what you will see on the Results screen (in German):  
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• The proposals are displayed on the left side of the screen.  
• On the right side, you can see whether the other participants voted “yes” or “no” on a 
proposal. At the very right, you will be informed whether the proposal has passed or whether 
it has been rejected.  
• The votes will only count for the randomly selected proposal, marked in red.  
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Chapter 5
Legislative bargaining with costly
communication 1
Abstract
We investigate the eﬀects of voting rules on delay in a multilateral bargaining ex-
periment with costly communication. Our design is based on a variant of the Baron-
Ferejohn framework. Communication takes place after a proposer is selected and before
a proposal is made. In contrast to prior experiments involving communication, it is
directly associated with costs in our setup. Speciﬁcally, every second of communica-
tion increases the probability that the game is terminated before a proposal can be
made. In case of `breakdown', each player receives an exogenously ﬁxed disagreement
value. These values sum up to less than the size of the available surplus, implying that
delay due to communication is costly. We vary the decision rule (majority versus una-
nimity) as well as the distribution of disagreement values (symmetric or asymmetric).
We ﬁnd that unanimity rule leads to longer communication and a higher frequency of
breakdown in asymmetric, but not in symmetric situations.
Keywords: bargaining, communication, Baron and Ferejohn bargaining game, distri-
butional preferences, proportionality, fairness, experiments
JEL Classiﬁcation: C72, C78, C91, D33, D63
1This chapter was jointly written with Christoph Vanberg.
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5.1 Introduction
One of the most basic problems in Public Choice Theory is the choice of a decision rule
to be used by a committee. Going back at least to Buchanan and Tullock (1962), several
authors have investigated the relative merits of alternative q-majority rules, with simple
majority rule and unanimity rule as polar cases. The central trade-oﬀ identiﬁed in this
line of research is that unanimity rule has the advantage that any decision taken must
constitute a compromise that is acceptable to all parties, i.e. a Pareto improvement
over the status quo. The most important disadvantage of unanimity rule is that it may
be associated with greater costs of decision making, most notably in the form of delay.
A number of authors have used observational data to investigate whether unanimity
rule is indeed associated with greater delay in decision making. For example, in the
context of the European Union, Schulz and König (2000) and König (2007) measure
the time lag between the initiation of a legislative proposal through the commission
and the council's decision on a ﬁnal proposal. They ﬁnd that issues which require
unanimous consent are associated with a larger time lag than those for which majority
rule is used. A causal interpretation of these ﬁndings can, however, be questioned given
that majority and unanimity rule are applied to substantively diﬀerent issues.
For this reason, it is interesting to look at experiments, in which the issue under
consideration can be held constant. Several studies have investigated the link between
decision rules and delay in multilateral bargaining (Miller and Vanberg, 2013; Agranov
and Tergiman, 2014; Miller and Vanberg, 2015; Agranov and Tergiman, 2017). These
studies implement variants of the Baron Ferejohn `divide-the-dollar' game. In this
game, individuals take turns in proposing allocations of a given surplus. Depending on
the decision rule, a proposal passes if either a majority or all group members vote `yes'.
If a proposal fails, the available surplus is discounted and a new round of bargaining
begins.
The discounting of payoﬀs in the Baron-Ferejon model reﬂects the assumption that a
signiﬁcant amount of time passes before a new proposal can be made. Thus, the main
measure of delay in this model is the probability with which proposals fail. According
to standard equilibrium predictions (discussed in more detail below), this should not
occur under either decision rule. In contrast to these predictions, both Miller and
Vanberg (2013) and Miller and Vanberg (2015) ﬁnd that ﬁrst round proposals fail with
positive probability, and signiﬁcantly more often under under unanimity as compared
to majority rule. These experimental ﬁndings constitute causal evidence supporting
the hypothesized link between unanimity rule and delay in decision making.
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Further experimental evidence consistent with this idea is provided by Merkel and
Vanberg (2017) and Miller et al. (2018), who investigate variants of the BF game
which introduce asymmetries between players. Merkel and Vanberg (2017) conduct
experiments in which subjects bargain over a surplus that is jointly produced. In
situations where all subjects have contributed equally in production, they ﬁnd no
diﬀerence in passage rates under unanimity and majority rule. When contributions
diﬀer, passage rates under unanimity rule drop signiﬁcantly, while those under majority
rule remain at the same level. In Miller et al. (2018), failure of a proposal results, with
some probability, in a `breakdown' of negotiations. If and when breakdown occurs,
each player receives an exogenously given payoﬀ, which may diﬀer between players.
Consistent with the prior studies, they ﬁnd that unanimity rule is associated with lower
rates of passage. In addition, this diﬀerence is especially pronounced in the presence of
asymmetries in the form of heterogeneous disagreement values. These ﬁndings suggest
that unanimity rule is associated with greater delay, especially if there are fundamental
asymmetries between players.
Conﬂicting evidence is provided by Agranov and Tergiman (2014) and Agranov and
Tergiman (2017). These authors conduct Baron and Ferejohn experiments in which
subjects are allowed to verbally communicate prior to making proposals. They ﬁnd
that allowing for communication virtually eliminates delay in the form of proposals
failing, under both decision rules. Since verbal communication between bargaining
partners is a realistic feature of group decision making in most real-world applications,
this evidence raises the question whether unanimity and majority rule are actually
equally eﬃcient under realistic circumstances.
Indeed, observational data suggests that very few proposals that are formally voted
on in legislatures ever fail. For example, statistics collected by govtrack.us show that,
out of the 11,224 bills and resolutions that were introduced to the 115th Congress and
referred to a committee, only 712 were put to a vote, of which only 9 failed.2 Going
back to the 93rd Congress (1973), the percentage of formal votes resulting in failure
has consistently been below 1%.
These data demonstrate that the formal vote on a proposal is only the ﬁnal step in
an often lengthy process of largely informal bargaining between legislators. In reality,
therefore, delay manifests itself in the length of these negotiations rather than in failure
of formal proposals. Naturally, such delay will normally be associated with costs.3
2 see https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/statistics
3 As an example, consider the ongoing negotiations between EU member states regarding the
handling of refugees. While these negotiations take place, the `refugee crisis' continues, and the
possible beneﬁts of reform are delayed. Similarly, the longer the negotiation takes, the larger the risk
that individual member states will take alternative measures, i.e. the opportunity to reach a mutually
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Therefore, the observation that unanimity and majority rule lead to equal passage
rates on formal proposals does not imply that they are equally eﬃcient. The relevant
question is whether unanimity rule leads to longer `informal' negotiations leading up
to a formal vote. For these reasons, we conduct experiments in which communication
itself is associated with costs.
Our experimental design is based on the modiﬁed BF game introduced by Miller et al.
(2018). We chose this game because it introduces asymmetries in the form of hetero-
geneous breakdown values. This allows us to investigate whether the decision rule has
diﬀerent eﬀects in symmetric vs. asymmetric situations, as observed in prior experi-
ments without communication. As explained above, the main feature of this game as
originally formulated is that proposal failure leads, with some probability, to a break-
down of negotiations. In order to implement a version in which communication itself is
associated with costs, we make the probability of breakdown depend upon the length
of communication. Substantively, the idea is that lengthy `informal' negotiations are
associated with a risk that the opportunity to undertake a collective action will pass.
In our experiment, groups of three subjects bargain over the division of a ﬁxed surplus.
The bargaining process is divided into discrete `rounds', and one subject is randomly
assigned the role of `proposer' in a given round. Prior to formally introducing and vot-
ing on a proposal, subjects can exchange messages via chat windows. At any point in
time, the proposer can terminate this `informal' negotiation in order to make a formal
proposal. However, after the proposer has closed the chat, the game is terminated with
a probability that depends on the length of time spent communicating. Speciﬁcally,
every two seconds of communication increase the probability of breakdown by one per-
cent. In this case, the surplus is lost and players are paid predetermined disagreement
values.
Our main ﬁndings are the following. When all players have the same disagreement
value, the decision rule has no impact on the total time spent communicating, ag-
gregated over all `rounds' of each game. Virtually all groups quickly agree on equal
splits (either two- or three-way). A more detailed analysis reveals that the average
time spent communicating is slightly shorter under unanimity as compared to major-
ity rule. However, a larger number of proposals fail, such that there is no diﬀerence in
the realized frequency of breakdown in the symmetric situations.
When disagreement values diﬀer, unanimity rule is associated with signiﬁcantly longer
total communication time. Here, the more detailed analysis shows that the time spent
communication within a given round is longer, and in addition more proposals fail
agreeable compromise may pass.
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under unanimity rule. Both of these phenomena contribute to longer aggregate com-
munication times as well as a higher frequency of breakdown. Thus, unanimity rule
does appear to be associated with more ineﬃcient delay in the asymmetric situations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 describes the existing literature
in more detail. Section 5.3 provides an overview of our experimental design and the
procedures. Results are presented in Section 5.4. The last section concludes and
discusses our results. Instructions and additional empirical analysis are presented in
Appendix 5.
5.2 Related Literature
Several studies have analyzed the eﬀect of decision rules on the length of negotiations
in the Baron and Ferejohn (1989) bargaining game. In this stylized bargaining game,
a committee of size n bargains over the division of a ﬁxed surplus in a sequence of
rounds. At the beginning of each round, one member is randomly chosen to propose
an allocation and the committee members can vote `yes' or `no'. Depending on the
decision rule, a proposal passes if it is approved by a majority or all members of the
committee. In this case, the proposal is implemented and the game ends. Otherwise,
the available surplus is discounted by a factor of δ < 1 and a new round of bargaining
begins. In Miller et al. (2018), failure of a proposal leads to a breakdown of negotiations
with probability .2. In this case, players receive exogenously ﬁxed disagreement values.
The standard measure of costly delay in all of these experiments is the fraction of ﬁrst
round proposals that fail.
Table 5.1 summarizes the ﬁrst round passage rates observed in these experiments.
Miller and Vanberg (2013) conduct 3-player games with a discount factor of δ = .9.
Miller and Vanberg (2015) have groups of 3 and 7, with a discount factor of δ = .5.
Both studies ﬁnd similar passage rates, with signiﬁcantly more proposals failing under
unanimity rule. As explained above, Merkel and Vanberg (2017) have groups of 3
players who have previously produced the surplus. Their discount factor is δ = .8.
They ﬁnd signiﬁcantly more delay under unanimity rule in situations where players
have contributed diﬀerent amounts to the surplus, but not when players contributed the
same amounts. In the experiment with breakdown values, Miller et al. (2018) ﬁnd lower
passage rates under unanimity rule, especially if players have diﬀerent (exogenous)
disagreement values. In sum, these ﬁndings support the notion that unanimity rule is
associated with greater delay, especially if there are fundamental asymmetries between
players.
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Table 5.1: First round passage rates
Unanimity Majority
No Communication
Miller and Vanberg (2013)
groups of 3, δ = .9 70% 87%
Miller and Vanberg (2015)
groups of 3, δ = .5 74% 88%
groups of 7, δ = .5 67% 75%
Merkel and Vanberg (2017)
same contributions 94% 95%
diﬀerent contributions 79% 94%
Miller et al. (2018)
homogeneous disagreement values 46% 77%
heterogeneous disagreement values 35% 78%
With Communication
Agranov and Tergiman (2014, 2017)
without communication 57% 81%
with communication 93% 89%
In two recent experiments, Agranov and Tergiman (2014) and Agranov and Tergi-
man (2017) conduct Baron and Ferejohn bargaining games with surplus discounting.
Across treatments, they exogeneously manipulate whether players are able to discuss
prior to making formal proposals. They ﬁnd that introducing communication virtually
eliminates diﬀerences in passage rates. As indicated above, a possible interpretation
of these ﬁndings is that allowing for communication causes participants to engage in
informal bargaining prior to making proposals. Since informal bargaining is costless in
these experiments, players can continue chatting until they verbally agree on a proposal
which they are reasonably conﬁdent will pass. This allows groups to avoid eﬃciency
losses resulting from proposals being rejected. With this in mind, it is perhaps not
too surprising that the decision rules are not associated with diﬀerences in eﬃciency
when communication is free. It is, however, important to remark that the two papers
by Agranov and Tergiman (2014) and Agranov and Tergiman (2017) were interested
in how communication aﬀects proposals, and in particular proposer power.
Given the prior evidence reviewed above, an important unanswered question is how the
decision rule aﬀects the length of informal negotiations pior to voting. This question has
been studied in jury experiments, where groups of subjects act as jurors on a ﬁctitious
case. Foss (1981) ﬁnds that groups discuss on average twice as long under unanimity
as compared to qualiﬁed majority rule. Note, however, that jury experiments represent
situations of common interest, in which all jurors would want to convict a defendant
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that is guilty, whereas Baron and Ferejohn bargaining experiments represent situations
with misaligned preferences.
5.3 Experimental Design
Our experimental design is based on a modiﬁed version of the Baron and Ferejohn
(BF) bargaining game introduced by Miller et al. (2018). This game works as follows:
As in the standard BF game, bargaining proceeds over a potentially inﬁnite number
of discrete `rounds'. At the beginning of each round, one player is randomly chosen to
propose a division of the surplus, which is immediately voted on by all group members.
Depending on the decision rule, a proposal passes if either all three or a majority of two
group members vote `yes'. In this case, the game ends and the points were distributed
according to the proposal. If a proposal fails, the game continues to another round with
an exogenously given probability δ. With probability (1− δ), the game is terminated.
In the latter case, each player is paid an exogenously speciﬁed `disagreement value'.
We chose this version of the game because it allows us to easily introduce asymmetries
between the players, in the form of diﬀerent disagreement values.
We introduce communication by allowing subjects to communicate using a chat win-
dow. As in the experiments of Agranov and Tergiman (2014, 2017), communication
takes place after a subject has been identiﬁed as proposer, and prior to making a formal
proposal. Subjects could exchange both `public' messages visible to all group members
and `private' messages visible only to speciﬁc players. Communication continued until
the proposer decided to terminate the chat and move to a proposal screen.
To introduce the notion that communication is costly, the time spent on the chat
screen determined the likelihood that the game would terminate immediately after the
chat. Speciﬁcally, every two seconds spent on the chat screen increased the breakdown
probability by one percent. Throughout the chatting phase, the current breakdown
probability was displayed to subjects as a counter above the chat window. Once the
proposer ended the chat, a random number between 1 and 100 was drawn for each
group. If the randomly drawn number was smaller than (or equal to) the breakdown
probability, the game was terminated immediately and players received their disagree-
ment values (see next paragraph). Otherwise, the proposer entered a proposal which
was then immediately voted on. In order to prevent proposers from forcing a certain
breakdown of the game, we imposed a 60 second maximum communication time.
In the event of breakdown, each group member received a pre-determined number of
points (his disagreement value). These points added up to 60 points in every period
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(making agreement eﬃcient) but their distribution was varied. Speciﬁcally, we imple-
mented three diﬀerent constellations of disagreement values, each of which was repeated
in four consecutive periods. The ﬁrst distribution was symmetric and assigned each
player 20 points. These situations are perhaps most comparable to standard BF games
without disagreement values. The other two situations were asymmetric. One situation
assigned 60 points to one group member (and 0 to both others), the second assigned
40, 20 and 0 points to the three group members. In the two asymmetric situations,
disagreement values were randomly assigned and remained ﬁxed at the individual level
for all four periods. To control for order eﬀects, the sequence of situations varied be-
tween sessions. At the end of the experiment, one of the 12 periods was randomly
selected and subjects were paid 0.35 EUR for each point they had received.
The experiment was conducted at the KD2 Lab in Karlsruhe, Germany in September
2017. In total, 210 students from various disciplines participated in the experiment. We
conducted ten sessions, ﬁve for each treatment (unanimity and majority rule). Each
session involved 21 subjects. We used a pre-determined matching scheme which ensured
that any pair of subjects would meet at most twice. Upon entering the lab, subjects
were randomly assigned to visually isolated computer terminals, paper instructions
(reproduced in the Appendix) were handed out and questions were answered in private.
Sessions took approximately 60 minutes, and average earnings amounted to 16.30 EUR
(highest 29.50 EUR, lowest 5 EUR), including a 5 EUR show-up fee.
5.4 Hypotheses
Miller et al. (2018) derive benchmark equilibrium predictions for the modiﬁed BF
game with breakdown values. As is typical in the literature on the BF game, they
focus on Stationary Subgame Perfect Equilibria (SSPE). Their equilibrium predictions
depend on the exogenously given continuation probability δ, which in our experiment
is endogenously determined. We therefore brieﬂy summarize qualitative predictions
which are consistent with all values of δ ∈ [0, 1).
In an SSPE, each player demands a minimum `price' in order to approve a proposal.
This price is increasing in disagreement values (strictly under unanimity rule and
weakly under majority rule). That is, players with larger disagreement values need
to be oﬀered at least as much for a `yes' vote as players with smaller disagreement
values (and strictly more under unanimity rule). Given these prices, proposers form
minimum winning coalitions (MWC), purchasing only the cheapest votes required for a
proposal to pass. Hence, under unanimity rule players with larger disagreement values
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receive larger shares and achieve higher expected payoﬀs in equilibrium. When ma-
jority rule is used, more `expensive' players can be excluded from winning coalitions.
This implies that players with larger disagreement values are less often included and
ex-ante expected payoﬀs are either non-monotone or even decreasing in disagreement
values.4 Given that all members of a MWC are oﬀered enough to vote `yes', the ﬁrst
proposal passes, independently of the decision rule being used.
Miller et al. (2018) ﬁnd support for some, but not all of these qualitative predictions.
Their most important ﬁndings for the purpose of our own analysis can be roughly
summarized as follows. Under unanimity rule, the vast majority of proposals and
agreements constitute convex combinations of the three-way equal split and the pre-
dicted equilibrium division. Since the two end-points of this spectrum are farther apart
in asymmetric situations, those situations are associated with a greater variability in
proposals and ﬁnal outcomes. This variability, in turn, leads to diﬀerences in delay:
in the symmetric situation, most groups quickly agree on a three-way equal split. In
the asymmetric situations, in contrast, initial proposals are signiﬁcantly more likely to
fail. Under majority rule, Miller et al. (2018) ﬁnd that most subjects attempt to build
minimum winning coalitions, especially after gaining some experience. In asymmetric
situations, the responder with the larger disagreement values is less often included.
The overall variability of outcomes does not diﬀer between situations, and there are
no diﬀerences in delay. Finally (and as a consequence of these patterns), there is sig-
niﬁcantly more delay - in the sense of ﬁrst round proposals failing - under unanimity
rule than under majority rule, especially in asymmetric situations.
Based on these prior results, we formulate the following hypotheses regarding ﬁnal
agreements and delay in our experimental context. Under unanimity rule, we expect
greater variability in ﬁnal outcomes in asymmetric situations. Speciﬁcally, we expect
most groups to agree on a three-way equal split in the (20,20,20) situation. In the
asymmetric situations, we expect players with larger disagreement values to secure
larger shares, with some variability in terms of distance from the equal split. Under
majority rule, we hypothesize that ﬁnal agreements will constitute minimum winning
coalitions, and that responders with larger disagreement values are less often included.
Hypothesis 1. Under unanimity rule, ﬁnal agreements will exhibit greater variability
in the asymmetric situations (0,20,40) and (0,0,60) than in the symmetric situation
(20,20,20).
4 If a player with a larger disagreement value has the same `price' as one with a smaller disagreement
value, this implies that he is less often included, and as a consequence achieves a lower expected payoﬀ.
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Hypothesis 2. Under majority rule, ﬁnal agreements constitute minimum winning
coalitions. When responder disagreement values diﬀer, the one with the smaller dis-
agreement value is more often included.
Finally, we turn to our main hypotheses, concerning the extent of ineﬃcient delay. Our
context diﬀers from Miller et al. (2018) in that ineﬃcient delay manifests itself in the
length of communication rather than the failure of proposals. Although a variety of
measures seem reasonable (some of which are discussed below), our main hypotheses
will be stated in terms of the total length of communication prior to the passage of a
proposal (i.e. possibly over multiple rounds of bargaining).5
First, consider the symmetric situation (20,20,20). Given the conjectured lack of vari-
ability in ﬁnal outcomes under unanimity rule, we expect that proposers will anticipate
that only a three-way equal split is likely to pass, even without communicating with
the responders. Thus we conjecture that unanimity rule will not be associated with
greater delay in the symmetric situation.6
Hypothesis 3. When players have symmetric disagreement values, the total length
of communication and the frequency of breakdown do not diﬀer between majority and
unanimity rule.
For the two asymmetric situations, we hypothesize that the anticipated variability
in ﬁnal outcomes will translate into greater delay under unanimity rule. That is,
the variability in outcomes makes it more likely that players will disagree about the
allocation to be implemented. Given that each player has veto power, proposers have an
incentive to communicate and settle any such disagreement prior to making a proposal,
while responders can withhold agreement in order to force concessions. The situation
is fundamentally diﬀerent under majority rule, as proposers can exclude responders
who insist on a particular outcome. The threat of being excluded creates incentives
to compromise. Second, diﬀerences in disagreement values may help proposers to
break indiﬀerence with respect to coalition formation. For example, anticipating that
players with larger disagreement values will be weakly more expensive, proposers have
an incentive to communicate with the cheaper responder only and oﬀer him a place
in the coalition. Thus, given the incentive to compromise and the focality of splits
with cheaper responders, we would less communication under majority rule in both
asymmetric situations.
5 In cases where breakdown occurs, total communication time prior to agreement is unobserved.
These observations are censored. We will return to this issue when presenting our results.
6 Indeed, a plausible alternative conjecture would be that proposers communicate longer under
majority rule in the symmetric situation, as there is no obvious `focal' outcome in that condition.
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Table 5.2: Number of observations
All Periods Periods 5-12
Majority Unanimity Sessions Majority Unanimity Sessions
per per
Treatment Treatment
(20,20,20) 140 140 5 84 84 3
(0,20,40) 140 140 5 112 112 4
(0,0,60) 140 140 5 84 84 3
Hypothesis 4. When players have asymmetric disagreement values, the total length
of communication and the frequency of breakdown are greater under unanimity than
under majority rule.
5.5 Results
In total, we observe behavior from 140 games for each constellation of disagreement
values and in each treatment. The order in which the three constellations were im-
plemented was varied between sessions. Several of our results are based on data from
periods 5 to 12, and most of our tests of signiﬁcance will use session level averages as
units of observation. With this in mind, Table 5.2 summarizes, for each constellation
of disagreement values, the number of games observed and the number of sessions in
which those games were played, both overall and in later periods.7
5.5.1 Final agreements
Our main objective is to investigate how the decision rule aﬀects the extent of delay
and the frequency of breakdown. However, our main hypotheses regarding delay (Hy-
potheses 3 and 4) are based on the conjecture that ﬁnal agreements are likely to vary
more in asymmetric situations, implying a greater potential for disagreement and delay.
We therefore begin our analysis by presenting information on the type of agreements
reached, and testing Hypotheses 1 and 2.
Figure 5.1 depicts, within a series of simplexes, the distribution of ﬁnal agreements in
the unanimity rule treatment. Each simplex represents one of the three constellations of
7 Across sessions, we varied the order in which the three constellations of disagreement values were
presented (see Table 5.5 in Appendix 5). Due to a large number of no-shows, we were only able to
run 5 of the 6 possible orders. For each of the 5 orders used in this experiment, we conducted one
session in the unanimity and the majority rule treatments.
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Figure 5.1: Outcomes under Unanimity Rule (periods 5-12)
(a) (20, 20, 20), N = 84
94% x=(34, 33, 33)
4% x=(40, 30, 30)
2% x=(36, 32, 32)
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
(b) (0, 20, 40), N = 112
27% x=(30, 30, 40)
10% x=(33, 33, 34)
9% x=(25, 30, 45)
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
(c) (0, 0, 60), N = 84
34% x=(20, 20, 60)
15% x=(30, 30, 40)
12% x=(33, 33, 34)
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
disagreement values, (20,20,20), (0,20,40), and (0,0,60). The simplexes are constructed
such that players are ordered from the smallest to the largest disagreement value, and
the shares allocated to the second and third players are measured on the horizontal and
vertical axis, respectively. (The share allocated to the ﬁrst player is the remainder.)
When two players have the same disagreement value, they are ordered according to
the share received, with larger shares ﬁrst. The size of the bubbles reﬂect how often a
speciﬁc outcome was observed. For orientation, equal splits (either three- or two-way)
are marked in blue. Each (sub-)ﬁgure also displays information about the three most
common outcomes. We depict outcomes observed in periods 5 to 12, i.e. after subjects
have gained some experience with the game.
As can be recognized by inspecting Figure 5.1, the variation in outcomes is substantially
smaller in the symmetric (left ﬁgure) as compared to the asymmetric (middle and
right ﬁgure) situations. In the symmetric situation, 94% of outcomes are three-way
equal splits. This supports our conjecture that the equal split constitutes a clear
focal outcome under unanimity rule. In contrast, the variability of outcomes in the
two asymmetric situations suggests that there is no clear or focal outcome. Hence,
these situations are likely to be associated with greater disagreement concerning which
allocation to implement. Our main hypothesis is that this disagreement will lead to
delay in bargaining, i.e. to more and / or longer rounds of communication prior to
agreement.
Result 1. Under unanimity rule, ﬁnal agreements exhibit greater variability in the
asymmetric situations (0,20,40) and (0,0,60) than in the symmetric situation (20,20,20)
(consistent with Hypothesis 1).
Another pattern visible in the middle and right panels of Figure 5.1 is that 100% of
allocations in the (0,20,40) and 96% in the (0,0,60) situation, are located in the region
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Figure 5.2: Outcomes under Majority Rule (periods 5-12)
(a) (20, 20, 20), N = 84
37% x=(34, 33, 33)
33% x=(50, 50, 0)
8% x=(60, 40, 0)
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
(b) (0, 20, 40), N = 112
17% x=(50, 50, 0)
12% x=(0, 50, 50)
11% x=(33, 34, 33)
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
(c) (0, 0, 60), N = 84
27% x=(34, 33, 33)
14% x=(50, 50, 0)
13% x=(33, 33, 34)
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
where shares are increasing in disagreement values.8 Pooling data from periods 5 to
12, we ﬁnd that in the (0,20,40) situation, players receive on average 28, 31 and 40
percent of the surplus (Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test, pairwise comparison,
N = 8, 28 versus 31 p = 0.05, 31 vs. 40 p = 0.05). In the (0,0,60) situation, players
with r = 0 and r = 60 receive 24 and 50 percent on average (Wilcoxon matched-pairs
signed-ranks test, N = 6, p = 0.1). This evidence is consistent with the qualitative
equilibrium predictions discussed above.
Figure 5.2 depicts ﬁnal outcomes observed in the majority rule treatments. Two pat-
terns are immediately visible: First, there is substantial variation in outcomes, espe-
cially in the two asymmetric situations (middle and right ﬁgures). Second, in contrast
to the SSPE predictions, a majority of outcomes in the asymmetric situations are grand
coalitions in which all three players receive positive shares (38% in the (20,20,20), 53%
in the (0,20,40) and 58% in the (0,0,60) situation). This contradicts the ﬁrst part
of Hypothesis 2, i.e. the prediction that most outcomes would constitute minimum
winning coalitions.
To study whether players with larger disagreement values are excluded more often, we
provide information on the type of coalitions we observe among ﬁnal outcomes. Table
5.3 displays the fraction of MWCs depending on the proposer's own (in bold) and
the responders' disagreement values. When responder contributions diﬀer, proposers
are more likely to include the responder with the smaller disagreement value. For
example, in the (0,0,60) situation, 28% of proposals suggest an MWC with responder
1, while only 9% suggest a MWC with responder 2. An exception is the (40,0,20)
situation, where coalitions are more likely to include responder 2 instead of responder
8 This is the region above the 45 degree line and above a line connecting the top left corner to the
midpoint of the horizontal axis. A somewhat surprising result is that 10% and 12% of games in the
(0,20,40) and (0,0,60) situations end with agreement on the three-way equal split, implying that one
player accepts less than her disagreement value.
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Table 5.3: Majority rule outcomes (periods 5-12)
Grand coalitions MWC
Non equal equal With resp. 1 With resp. 2
(20,20,20) 23% 15% 33% 28%
(0,20,40) 36% 15% 30% 19%
(20,0,40) 25% 38% 28% 9%
(40,0,20) 35% 10% 23% 32%
(0,0,60) 35% 33% 23% 9%
(60,0,0) 32% 15% 24% 29%
ALL 30% 19% 28% 22%
1. In order to assess the statistical signiﬁcance of these patterns, we compare the
average inclusion frequencies of responder 1 and 2 within each session. The results of a
Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test suggest that none of the observed diﬀerences
are statistically signiﬁcant.9 Note however, that this result is based on few observations.
Result 2. Under majority rule, most outcomes in the symmetric situation suggest
minimum winning coalitions, while most outcomes in the asymmetric situations sug-
gests grand coalitions. Those proposers who suggest minimum winning coalitions are
on average more likely to include the responder with the smaller disagreement value
although this pattern is not signiﬁcant (inconsistent with Hypothesis 2).
5.5.2 Length of communication
Having established some basic patterns concerning ﬁnal agreements, we now turn to our
main research question: (How) does the decision rule aﬀect the length of negotiations
and the probability of breakdown? Before proceeding, we should highlight the fact
that the data collected is quite rich, which is why we will focus on a few relatively
simple measures of delay.
Four features of our data need to be stressed: First, we observe some groups which
reach immediate agreement (and communicate at most once). Other groups bargain
and communicate over multiple rounds before eventually reaching an agreement. Still
others bargain for shorter or longer periods of time before experiencing breakdown. Sec-
ond, some groups communicate relatively much in one round (e.g. 30 seconds) while
other groups communicate as long over the course of multiple rounds. Third, when-
ever bargaining involves multiple rounds, the proposer role is randomly re-assigned
in each round. In the asymmetric situations, this implies that players with diﬀerent
9 Wilcoxon matched- pairs signed-ranks test using observations from periods 5 to 12 (N = 6):
(0,20,40) p = 0.35, (20,0,40) p = 0.13 (40,0,20) p = 0.27, (0,0,60) p = 0.17
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Figure 5.3: Communication length in the (20,20,20) situation
disagreement values control the length of communication. And lastly, in cases where
bargaining ends with breakdown, we do not observe at which time an agreement would
have occurred if the game had continued, i.e. breakdown censors our data.
Due to all of these reasons, our data is relatively complex and multiple factors need
to be addressed in order to answer our main research question. In what follows, we
begin by focusing on the total communication time, aggregated over all rounds prior to
either agreement or breakdown. In a second step, we discuss how this measure might
be reﬁned in light of the complications mentioned.
Figure 5.3 displays the distribution of total communication length in the symmetric
situation, separately for unanimity (lower panel) and majority rule (upper panel). As
can be easily recognized, the two distributions are very similar. Approximately half of
the groups communicate for less than 4 seconds, and few groups communicate for more
than 32 seconds under both decision rules. As a result, we observe few instances of
breakdown under both, majority and unanimity rule. In order to test for signiﬁcance,
we compute the average length of communication within each session and compare
them across the two decision rule treatments. Using a Ranksum test, we do not ﬁnd
any signiﬁcant diﬀerences in game length (N = 10, p = 0.92). We obtain the same
results, if we compare the average length of communication in periods 5-12, in which
subjects have already gained some experience with the game (Ranksum test, N = 6,
p = 0.51). These results are consistent with our Hypothesis 3.
Result 3. In the symmetric situation, unanimity rule does not lead to longer commu-
nication than majority rule.
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Figures 5.4 and 5.5 display the distribution of communication length in the two asym-
metric situations. As before, the upper panel corresponds to majority and the lower
panel to unanimity rule. In both ﬁgures, the distribution of communication length
is shifted to the right under unanimity as compared to majority rule. Most notably,
we see fewer groups which communicate at most 4 seconds and more groups which
discuss at least 116 seconds under unanimity as compared to majority rule.10 We
assess the signiﬁcance of these diﬀerences by comparing the average communication
length within each session across the two treatments. The results of our Ranksum test
reveal that unanimity rule indeed leads to signiﬁcantly longer communication in the
(0,0,60) (N = 10, p < 0.01) and the (0,20,40) situation (N = 10, p < 0.01). Although
smaller, this eﬀect persists if we drop the ﬁrst 4 periods of bargaining (Ranksum test,
(0,20,40): N = 6, p = 0.05; (0,0,60): N = 8, p = 0.02). These results are consistent
with Hypothesis 4.
Result 4. In both asymmetric situations, unanimity rule leads to longer communica-
tion than majority rule.
As highlighted above, an analysis that focuses on total communication length abstracts
from the fact that groups can bargain and communicate over multiple rounds. In what
follows, we investigate whether the pattern of communication over multiple rounds
diﬀers between the decision rules. For this purpose, Figure 5.6 depicts the average
length of communication in a given round (measured on the left axis) observed in each
situation. In addition, every ﬁgure also depicts the cumulative passage rate (measured
on the right axis) up to a given bargaining round, i.e. the percentage of groups which
reached an agreement by a given round. In all three situations, the cumulative passage
rate under majority rule is always larger than under unanimity rule. This diﬀerence is
especially large in the two asymmetric situations. Thus, as commonly observed in the
literature on BF bargaining, groups need more rounds of bargaining before reaching an
agreement when unanimity rule is used. In addition, the ﬁgures reveal that the average
communication length per round is longer under unanimity as compared to majority
rule in the two asymmetric but not in the symmetric situation. Thus, in the two
asymmetric situations, groups bargain over more rounds and discuss, on average, more
10 Given that several groups bargained over as much as 60 seconds, we investigated whether groups
indeed communicated or whether the proposer simply let the clock run down to 60 seconds (not sending
or replying to any messages sent) in an attempt to maximize the breakdown probability. Such hold out
strategies may be especially important when the proposer expects to receive a share smaller than his
disagreement value in the process of negotiating. We ﬁnd that proposers exhibit such hold out behavior
in only 3% of all rounds observed in our experiment. The results of a probit regression (reported in
Table 5.6 in Appendix 5) reveal that hold out occurs more often under unanimity as compared to
majority rule. This result is surprising, given that proposers are endowed with veto power under
unanimity rule. Hence, one might expect hold-out to occur more frequently under majority rule.
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Figure 5.4: Communication length in the (0,20,40) situation
Figure 5.5: Communication length in the (0,0,60) situation
167
CHAPTER 5. BARGAINING WITH COSTLY COMMUNICATION
Figure 5.6: Length and Aggregate Passage rates
(a) (20,20,20) situation (b) (0,20,40) situation
(c) (0,0,60) situation
under unanimity as compared to majority rule. Both factors explain our above ﬁnding
that unanimity rule leads to longer overall negotiations in these situations. In the
symmetric situations, in contrast, majority rule is associated with fewer rounds which,
however, involve longer discussions as compared to majority rule, thus eliminating any
diﬀerences in terms of overall negotiation time.
We brieﬂy analyzed the chat protocols in order to verify that subjects indeed used
communication to bargain informally. A large number of conversations can indeed
be classiﬁed as informal negotiations in which the proposer suggests an allocation
(i.e. 70-15-14?, 33 for everybody, 50-50 for us) and responders answer either
`yes' or make a counter proposal. Several messages also contain the word fairness,
usually in combination with a proposal to split the surplus equally. Few messages
appear to be unrelated to the actual game (Can anybody tell a joke?, What's your
problem?). In addition, responders frequently remind the proposer to close the chat
window (Be smart and terminate the chat!). Hence, our brief analysis indicates that
communication is used to bargain informally prior to making a formal proposal.
168
CHAPTER 5. BARGAINING WITH COSTLY COMMUNICATION
Table 5.4: Observed and implied probability of breakdown (in percent)
Observed breakdown Implied breakdown
Majority Unanimity Majority Unanimity
(20,20,20) 6.4 3.4 5.4 5.1
(0,20,40) 4.5 10 4.4 17
(0,0,60) 9.2 16 8 17.4
All situations 5.7 10 6.0 13.2
5.5.3 Breakdown
Next, we investigate how the length of communication translates into breakdown. In
our setting, the probability of breakdown within a given round is linearly increasing
in the length of communication. Thus, based on the results discussed in the previous
section, we would expect that unanimity rule is associated with more breakdown and
less eﬃcient outcomes in the two asymmetric situations.
To start, we simply present the observed frequency of breakdown (Columns 2 and 3 in
Table 5.4). As can be seen, breakdown occurred more frequently under unanimity rule
in asymmetric, but not in symmetric situations. Using Ranksum tests, we do not ﬁnd
a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in breakdown probabilities in the symmetric situations (N = 6,
p = 0.33; dropping ﬁrst 4 periods N = 6 p = 0.82). However, in the asymmetric
situations, we ﬁnd that there is signiﬁcantly more breakdown under unanimity as
compared to majority rule (Ranksum using all periods p = 0.03; dropping ﬁrst 4
periods N = 6 p = 0.11).
Result 5. For symmetric situations, we ﬁnd no diﬀerence in the frequency of break-
down. For asymmetric situations, we ﬁnd signiﬁcantly more breakdown under unanim-
ity rule (consistent with hypotheses 3 and 4.)
A drawback of looking only at the observed frequency of breakdown is that this depends
in part on chance, i.e. on the random numbers drawn at the end of each round. There-
fore another way to analyze the data is to compute the implied breakdown probability
given a group's communication proﬁle, i.e. the number of rounds and the length of
communication per round until an agreement is reached. For this purpose we calculate
the implied breakdown probability for a game lasting T periods as
pB(t1, ..., tT ) = 1−
T∏
j=1
(1− tj/200)
where tj is the length of communication in round j, and T is the time of agreement
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or breakdown.11 Columns 4 and 5 in Table 5.4 display the average implied breakdown
probability in our experiment for each decision rule and situation. At ﬁrst glance, it is
apparent that the eﬀects based on implied and actual breakdown are the same: First
and most notably, unanimity rule is associated with a higher probability of breakdown
in the two asymmetric situations. Using a Ranksum test comparing implied breakdown
probabilities, we ﬁnd that this eﬀect is strongly signiﬁcant ((0,20,40): N = 10, p < 0.01;
(0,0,60): N = 10, p < 0.01) and persists if we constrain our analysis to outcomes
in periods 5 to 12 ((0,20,40): N = 8, p = 0.02; (0,0,60): N = 6, p = 0.06). In
the symmetric situation where people communicate little and reach fast agreements
under both rules, we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the implied breakdown
probability (Ranksum test all periods N = 10, p = 0.98, periods 5-12 N = 6, p = 0.51).
As indicated above, our estimates of the implied breakdown probability are censored
in all cases where breakdown occurs, since in the absence of breakdown additional
rounds of communication would have occurred. Thus, the true breakdown probability
should be larger than our measure of the implied breakdown probability, especially
for unanimity rule. In Appendix 5, we use standard techniques of survival analysis to
address this issue, conﬁrming our results.
Result 6. In asymmetric situations, the implied probability of breakdown is signiﬁ-
cantly higher under unanimity as compared to majority rule. In contrast, the implied
breakdown probability in the symmetric situations does not diﬀer signiﬁcantly between
unanimity and majority rule.
5.6 Conclusion
This paper contributes to a growing experimental literature on the eﬀects of voting
rules in group decision making. In the context of multilateral bargaining, prior authors
have found that unanimity rule is associated with signiﬁcantly lower rates of passage as
compared to majority rule. These ﬁndings support the notion that the use of unanimity
rule may be associated with eﬃciency losses due to delay.
Conﬂicting evidence was provided by Agranov and Tergiman (2014, 2017). When
subjects were given the ability to communicate at no cost prior to making proposals,
passage rates increase dramatically and outcomes approached full eﬃciency under both
decision rules. However, these eﬃciency gains are driven by the fact that communica-
tion itself was costless in those experiments. Thus, although Agranov and Tergiman's
experiments reveal valuable information about the types of agreements reached under
11 When breakdown occurs, pB constitutes a censored measure of the breakdown probability.
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communication, they are not necessarily suited to compare the eﬃciency of alternative
decision rules. (And indeed, that is not the authors' intent.) We therefore revisit the
question of eﬃciency by conducting multilateral bargaining experiments with costly
communication.
Our experimental design is based on a modiﬁed version of the Baron-Ferejohn game.
The costs of communication are introduced in the form of a probability of breakdown
which is increasing in the amount of time spent communicating. In case of breakdown,
players are paid disagreement values. These values were varied such that we observe
behavior in symmetric and asymmetric situations. Our main ﬁnding is that unanimity
rule is associated with signiﬁcantly longer communication and more frequent break-
down in asymmetric situations.
We interpret these ﬁndings as demonstrating that majority rule may be preferred if
delay in decision making is associated with costs. This may include situations in which
committee members value the status quo diﬀerently or have diﬀerent outside options,
thus raising the question as to how much heterogeneity should be reﬂected in ﬁnal
outcomes. Our results may, thus, be applicable to real world contexts such as decision
making in the EU, where despite recent reforms unanimity rule continues to be applied
in situations of high conﬂict (such as the inclusion of new member states as well as
changes in the EU treaty). The choice which decision rule to use in these instances may
be subject to an eﬃciency-fairness tradeoﬀ: While each member might favor unanimity
over majority rule in order to protect her interests, majority rule may be preferred to
unanimity rule in terms of the eﬃciency of outcomes. Hence, arguments in favor of the
continued use of unanimity rule need to emphasize fairness over eﬃciency concerns.
Whether this adequately represents citizen preferences is unclear. For example, related
experimental research suggests that individuals are more concerned about eﬃciency
than about reducing inequality in outcomes (Charness and Rabin, 2002; Engelmann
and Strobel, 2004). Hence, an investigation into the relative importance of fairness and
eﬃciency of outcomes may provide important insights allowing us to choose decision
rules which maximize the utility of the citizens.
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Appendix 5.A
5.A.1 Additional Results
Table 5.5: Disagreement value constellations used in the experiment
Order Games Games Games
condition 1-4 5-8 9-12
1 (20,20,20) (0,20,40) (0,0,60)
2 (20,20,20) (0,0,60) (40,0,20)
3 (40,0,20) (20,20,20) (0,0,60)
4 (60,0,0) (20,20,20) (0,20,40)
5 (60,0,0) (0,20,40) (20,20,20)
Table 5.6: Probit Regression on Hold-Out
Probability to Hold-Out
(1)
Unanimity 0.64***
(0.17)
Player 3 proposes 0.34
(0.21)
Round -0.04
(0.04)
N 1,578
Prob> F 0.00
5.A.2 Survival Analysis
One of the complicating features of our data is that some games end with breakdown,
so that we do not observe the time at which agreement would have occurred. By
simply looking at the total length of communication without distinguishing games
that end in agreement or breakdown, the previous analysis treats cases of breakdown
as if agreement had occurred at that point in time. This leads us to underestimate the
time until agreement. One method of addressing this problem is to employ survival
analysis in order to estimate the time to agreement.
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Figure 5.7: Kaplan-Meier estimated survival function: r = (20, 20, 20)
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Length of communication
One way to estimate the distribution of time to agreement is to construct a Kaplan-
Meier survival function.12 Figure 5.7 displays the estimated survival functions for
unanimity and majority rule in the symmetric situations, along with 95% conﬁdence
intervals. As is apparent from these ﬁgures, the two survival functions are very similar.
Both a log-rank and a Wilcoxon test comparing these survival functions conﬁrm that
they are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent (p = 0.41 and p = 0.15, respectively).
Figures 5.8 and 5.9 displays the estimated survival functions for the asymmetric situa-
tions. Especially for the r = (0, 20, 40) situation, we see that unanimity rule is associ-
ated with longer estimated times to agreement. Under majority rule, roughly 75% of
games are estimated to last less than 13 seconds, whereas under unanimity rule, 75%
of games last less than 56 seconds (see Table 5.7). Both log-rank and Wilcoxon tests
conﬁrm that the survival functions diﬀer signiﬁcantly in the asymmetric situations
(p < 0.001, both tests and both comparisons).
Table 5.7 displays summary statistics based on these estimated survival functions.
According to these estimates, the average time to agreement under unanimity rule
is 57 seconds in the (0,20,40) situation and 76 seconds in the (0,0,60) situation, as
12 Basically, this method calculates, for each point in time, the proportion of games that end with
agreement conditional on not yet having ended in breakdown. See Cleves et al. (2008) for an accessible
introduction to survival analysis.
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Figure 5.8: Kaplan-Meier estimated survival function: r = (0, 20, 40)
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compared to 10 and 20 seconds, respectively, under majority rule.
A second method to compare the time to agreement is to estimate a Cox proportional
hazard model. This approach assumes that the likelihood with which agreement will
occur at a given moment in a treatment is equal to a baseline hazard multiplied by a
constant, called the hazard ratio, which is a function of control variables including a
treatment dummy. A hazard ratio larger than one would imply that the treatment is
associated with a larger probability of agreement (and therefore less delay) as compared
to the baseline, and vice versa for a hazard ratio below one. Table 5.8 displays the
result of this estimation using the majority rule treatment as the baseline condition. All
Table 5.7: Estimated communication time until agreement (in seconds)
games mean p25 p50 p75
All games Majority 420 13.88 1 3 18
Unanimity 420 49.70 2 11 40
Symmetric Majority 140 12.33 1 3 18
Unanimity 140 11.94 1 2 13
(0,20,40) Majority 140 9.55 1 3 13
Unanimity 140 57.11 3 22 56
(0,0,60) Majority 140 19.62 1 4 28
Unanimity 140 75.95 3 18 80
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Figure 5.9: Kaplan-Meier estimated survival function: r = (0, 0, 60)
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estimations are based on the pooled data from both asymmetric situations. Columns 2
and 3 add controls for the period of the experiment and (in addition) a dummy for the
r = (0, 0, 60) situation, respectively. All regressions involve standard errors clustered
at the session level. Three patterns are visible. First, unanimity rule is associated with
a hazard ratio slightly below 0.5, implying that the probability of reaching agreement
at any given time is approximately half as large under unanimity rule as compared
to majority rule. Second, the period variable is associated with a hazard ratio of
approximately 1.05, implying that the probability of agreement rises by roughly 5%
from one period to the next, i.e. as subjects gain experience. Finally, the r = (0, 0, 60)
dummy exhibits a hazard ratio of approximately .8, implying that agreement is 20%
less likely in that situation, leading to more delay than in the r = (0, 20, 40) situation.
Each of these eﬀects is signiﬁcant at the 1% level or more.
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Table 5.8: Cox proportional hazard models (asymmetric games)
(1) (2) (3)
Unanimity 0.487∗∗∗ 0.471∗∗∗ 0.461∗∗∗
(0.0525) (0.0312) (0.0305)
Period 1.057∗∗∗ 1.055∗∗∗
(0.0126) (0.0107)
r = (0, 0, 60) 0.801∗∗
(0.0658)
Observations 560 560 560
Exponentiated coeﬃcients; Standard errors in parentheses
std. err. adjusted for 10 session clusters
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001
5.A.3 Instructions
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Description of the experiment 
Rounds and Groups 
This experiment consists of 12 rounds. At the beginning of each round, you will be randomly matched in 
groups of three participants. This means you will be interacting with two, randomly selected 
participants in this room. All participants remain anonymous throughout the experiment. At the beginning 
of each round, every group member receives an ID (“A”, “B” or “C”) which he or she keeps until the end of 
the current round. You will be interacting with different participants in every round. This means, you 
will interact in the same group only once.  
Description of a round 
In each round, the group has the possibility to divide a surplus of 100 points among its members. (One 
point has a value of 35 EUR cents.) An agreement is reached if a majority of individuals (i.e. 2 out of three 
group members) consent on a division of the surplus. This happens according to the following rules:   
Proposal and Voting: One of the three participants in a group is randomly selected to make a 
proposal. (Every participant has the same probability of being selected.) This participant can 
make a proposal how much of the 100 points he wants to allocate to members “A”, “B” and “C”. 
Once the proposal is submitted, all group members (including the proposer himself) vote either 
“Yes” or “No”. If a majority of the group members (at least two of the three group members) vote 
“yes”, the proposal passes and the round ends. If this round is selected for payment, each group 
member is paid according to the proposal. If a majority of the group members rejects the 
proposal, it counts as rejected. In this case, one of the three participants in the group is randomly 
selected to make a proposal (it may be the same group member). This process is repeated until 
a proposal passes or until bargaining is terminated (see below).       
Communication via Chat: Once a proposer is selected and before he or she submits a proposal, 
the group can communicate via a chat window. The chat window is open for at most 60 seconds. 
However, the proposer can decide to close the chat window at any time.   
Possibility of termination: Once the proposer has closed the chat window, there is a chance that 
the round is terminated. In this case, he or she cannot propose how to allocate the 100 points. 
Instead, each group member will receive a predetermined amount of default points. Each member 
is informed about the default points that she as well as both other participants in the group 
receive in case of termination at the beginning of each round.   
Probability of termination: The probability that the round is terminated depends on how long a 
group decided to communicate via the chat. For every 2 seconds of chatting, the probability of 
termination rises by 1 percent. For example, if the group chats 40 seconds, the probability that the 
round is terminated amounts to 40 : 2 = 20 percent. If the group chats the maximum allowed time 
of 60 seconds, the probability of termination amounts to 30 percent.  
Your payment at the end of this experiment 
At the end of this experiment, the computer will randomly draw one of the 12 rounds. For each point that 
you received in the randomly chosen round, you will be paid 35 EUR cents. In addition, you receive a 5 
EUR show up fee for participating in this experiment.  
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Summary of a round: 
This picture summarizes the sequence of each round.   
 
 
178


Bibliography
Achtziger, A., Alós-Ferrer, C., and Wagner, A. K. (2015). Money, depletion, and proso-
ciality in the dictator game. Journal of Neuroscience, Psychology, and Economics,
8(1):1.
Agranov, M. and Tergiman, C. (2014). Communication in multilateral bargaining.
Journal of Public Economics, 118:7585.
Agranov, M. and Tergiman, C. (2017). Communication in bargaining games with
unanimity. Experimental Economics, pages 119.
Aksoy, D. (2010). Who gets what, when, and how revisited: Voting and proposal
powers in the allocation of the eu budget. European Union Politics, 11(2):171194.
Almås, I., Cappelen, A. W., Sørensen, E. Ø., and Tungodden, B. (2010). Fairness and
the development of inequality acceptance. Science, 328(5982):11761178.
Alós-Ferrer, C. (2016). A dual-process diﬀusion model. Journal of Behavioral Decision
Making, doi: 10.1002/bdm.1960.
Alós-Ferrer, C. and Strack, F. (2014). From dual processes to multiple selves: Impli-
cations for economic behavior. Journal of Economic Psychology, 41:111.
Andreoni, J. (1990). Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of
Warm-Glow Giving. The Economic Journal, 100(401):464.
Andreoni, J. and Miller, J. (2002). Giving according to garp: An experimental test of
the consistency of preferences for altruism. Econometrica, 70(2):737753.
Andreoni, J. and Rao, J. M. (2011). The power of asking: How communication aﬀects
selﬁshness, empathy, and altruism. Journal of public economics, 95(7-8):513520.
Andreoni, J., Rao, J. M., and Trachtman, H. (2017). Avoiding the ask: A ﬁeld exper-
iment on altruism, empathy, and charitable giving. Journal of Political Economy,
125(3):625653.
181
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Angrist, J. D., Pischke, J.-S., and Pischke, J.-S. (2013). Mostly harmless econometrics:
an empiricists companion. Cram101 Publishing.
Ariely, D., Loewenstein, G., and Prelec, D. (2003). coherent arbitrariness: Stable
demand curves without stable preferences. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
118(1):73106.
Arrow, K. J. (1951). Social choice and individual values. Cowles Foundation.
Austen-Smith, D. and Banks, J. S. (1996). Information aggregation, rationality, and
the condorcet jury theorem. American political science review, 90(1):3445.
Baranski, A. (2016). Voluntary contributions and collective redistribution. American
Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 8(4):149173.
Baron, D. P. and Ferejohn, J. A. (1989). Bargaining in legislatures. American Political
Science Review, 83(04):11811206.
Baron, J. (1997). Confusion of relative and absolute risk in valuation. Journal of Risk
and Uncertainty, 14(3):301309.
Batson, C. D. (1987). Prosocial motivation: Is it ever truly altruistic? In Advances in
experimental social psychology, volume 20, pages 65122. Elsevier.
Batson, C. D., Ahmad, N., Lishner, D. A., and Tsang, J. (2016). Empathy and altruism.
Oxford handbook of hypo-egoic phenomena: Theory and research on the quiet ego,
pages 161174.
Battaglini, M., Morton, R. B., and Palfrey, T. R. (2010). The swing voter's curse in
the laboratory. The Review of Economic Studies, 77(1):6189.
Bear, A. and Rand, D. G. (2016). Intuition, deliberation, and the evolution of cooper-
ation. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 113(4):936941.
Becker, A. (2013). Accountability and the fairness bias: the eﬀects of eﬀort vs. luck.
Social Choice and Welfare, 41(3):685699.
Bergson, A. (1938). A reformulation of certain aspects of welfare economics. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 52(2):310334.
Bock, O., Baetge, I., and Nicklisch, A. (2014). hroot: Hamburg registration and
organization online tool. European Economic Review, 71:117120.
182
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bogacz, R., Brown, E., Moehlis, J., Holmes, P., and Cohen, J. D. (2006). The physics
of optimal decision making: a formal analysis of models of performance in two-
alternative forced-choice tasks. Psychological review, 113(4):700.
Bolton, G. E. and Ockenfels, A. (2000). Erc: A theory of equity, reciprocity, and
competition. American economic review, 90(1):166193.
Bouwmeester, S., Verkoeijen, P. P., Aczel, B., Barbosa, F., Bègue, L., Brañas-Garza,
P., Chmura, T. G., Cornelissen, G., Døssing, F. S., Espín, A. M., et al. (2017).
Registered replication report: Rand, greene, and nowak (2012). Perspectives on
Psychological Science, 12(3):527542.
Broberg, T., Ellingsen, T., and Johannesson, M. (2007). Is generosity involuntary?
Economics Letters, 94(1):3237.
Brosig, J., Weimann, J., and Ockenfels, A. (2003). The eﬀect of communication media
on cooperation. German Economic Review, 4(2):217241.
Buchanan, J. M. and Tullock, G. (1962). The calculus of consent, volume 3. University
of Michigan Press Ann Arbor.
Buckert, M., Oechssler, J., and Schwieren, C. (2017). Imitation under stress. Journal
of Economic Behavior and Organization, 139:252  266.
Camerer, C. F., Loewenstein, G., and Rabin, M. (2011). Advances in behavioral eco-
nomics. Princeton university press.
Caplin, A. and Martin, D. (2015). The dual-process drift diﬀusion model: Evidence
from response times. Economic Inquiry, 54(2):1274  1282.
Cappelen, A. W., Hole, A. D., Sørensen, E. Ø., and Tungodden, B. (2007). The
pluralism of fairness ideals: An experimental approach. The American Economic
Review, 97(3):818827.
Cappelen, A. W., Nielsen, U. H., Tungodden, B., Tyran, J.-R., and Wengström, E.
(2016). Fairness is intuitive. Experimental Economics, 19:727740.
Capraro, V. and Cococcioni, G. (2016). Rethinking spontaneous giving: Extreme time
pressure and ego-depletion favor self-regarding reactions. Scientiﬁc Reports, 6.
Capraro, V., Corgnet, B., Espín, A. M., and Hernán-González, R. (2017). Deliberation
favours social eﬃciency by making people disregard their relative shares: evidence
from usa and india. Royal Society Open Science, 4(2).
183
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Cassar, A. and Friedman, D. (2004). Economics lab: an intensive course in experi-
mental economics. Routledge.
Chamberlin, E. H. (1948). An experimental imperfect market. Journal of Political
Economy, 56(2):95108.
Charness, G. and Rabin, M. (2002). Understanding social preferences with simple
tests. Quarterly Journal of Economics, pages 817869.
Chen, F. and Fischbacher, U. (2015). Cognitive processes of distributional preferences:
A response time study. Research Paper Series Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut.
Cleves, M., Gould, W., Gould, W. W., Gutierrez, R., and Marchenko, Y. (2008). An
introduction to survival analysis using Stata. Stata press.
Clithero, J. A. (2016). Response times in economics: Looking through the lens of
sequential sampling models. Available at SSRN, doi: 10.2139/ssrn.2795871.
Condorcet, M. d. (1785). Essay on the application of analysis to the probability of
majority decisions. Paris: Imprimerie Royale.
Croson, R. and Gächter, S. (2010). The science of experimental economics. Journal of
Economic Behavior & Organization, 73(1):122131.
Cryder, C. E. and Loewenstein, G. (2012). Responsibility: The tie that binds. Journal
of Experimental Social Psychology, 48(1):441445.
Cryder, C. E., Loewenstein, G., and Scheines, R. (2013). The donor is in the details.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 120(1):1523.
Cubitt, R. P., Drouvelis, M., Gächter, S., and Kabalin, R. (2011). Moral judgments in
social dilemmas: How bad is free riding? Journal of Public Economics, 95(3):253
264.
Dana, J., Cain, D. M., and Dawes, R. M. (2006). What you dont know wont hurt
me: Costly (but quiet) exit in dictator games. Organizational Behavior and human
decision Processes, 100(2):193201.
Dana, J., Weber, R. A., and Kuang, J. X. (2007). Exploiting moral wiggle room:
experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness. Economic Theory,
33(1):6780.
Davis, D. D. and Holt, C. A. (1993). Experimental economics. Princeton university
press.
184
BIBLIOGRAPHY
DellaVigna, S., List, J. A., and Malmendier, U. (2012). Testing for altruism and social
pressure in charitable giving. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127(1):156.
Dickert, S., Slovic, P., et al. (2009). Attentional mechanisms in the generation of
sympathy. Judgment and Decision Making, 4(4):297306.
Diermeier, D. and Morton, R. (2005). Experiments in majoritarian bargaining. pages
201226.
Dreber, A., Fudenberg, D., Levine, D. K., and Rand, D. G. (2014). Self-control,
social preferences and the eﬀect of delayed payments. Available at SSRN, doi:
10.2139/ssrn.1752366.
Drouvelis, M. and Grosskopf, B. (2016). The eﬀects of induced emotions on pro-social
behaviour. Journal of Public Economics, 134:18.
Duﬀy, S. and Smith, J. (2014). Cognitive load in the multi-player prisoner's dilemma
game: Are there brains in games? Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Eco-
nomics, 51:4756.
Engel, C. (2011). Dictator games: A meta study. Experimental Economics, 14(4):583
610.
Engelmann, D. and Strobel, M. (2004). Inequality aversion, eﬃciency, and maximin
preferences in simple distribution experiments. The American Economic Review,
96(5):857869.
Faravelli, M. (2007). How context matters: A survey based experiment on distributive
justice. Journal of Public Economics, 91(7):13991422.
Feddersen, T. J. and Pesendorfer, W. (1996). The swing voter's curse. The American
economic review, 86(3):408424.
Fehr, E. and Camerer, C. F. (2007). Social neuroeconomics: the neural circuitry of
social preferences. Trends in cognitive sciences, 11(10):419427.
Fehr, E. and Fischbacher, U. (2003). The nature of human altruism. Nature,
425(6960):785791.
Fehr, E. and Gächter, S. (2000a). Cooperation and punishment in public goods exper-
iments. American Economic Review, 90(4):980994.
Fehr, E. and Gächter, S. (2000b). Fairness and retaliation: The economics of reci-
procity. The journal of economic perspectives, 14(3):159181.
185
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Fehr, E. and Schmidt, K. M. (1999). A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, pages 817868.
Fehr, E. and Schmidt, K. M. (2006). The economics of fairness, reciprocity and altru-
ism experimental evidence and new theories. Handbook of the economics of giving,
altruism and reciprocity, 1:615691.
Fiedler, S., Glöckner, A., Nicklisch, A., and Dickert, S. (2013). Social value orientation
and information search in social dilemmas: An eye-tracking analysis. Organizational
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 120(2):272284.
Fischbacher, U. (2007). z-tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments.
Experimental economics, 10(2):171178.
Fischbacher, U., Kairies, N., and Stefani, U. (2009). Performance, productivity and
fairness: An experiment on the distribution of joint production. Working Paper.
Foss, R. D. (1981). Structural eﬀects in simulated jury decision making. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 40(6):1055.
Fréchette, G., Kagel, J. H., and Morelli, M. (2005a). Behavioral identiﬁcation in coali-
tional bargaining: An experimental analysis of demand bargaining and alternating
oﬀers. Econometrica, 73(6):18931937.
Fréchette, G., Kagel, J. H., and Morelli, M. (2005b). Nominal bargaining power, selec-
tion protocol, and discounting in legislative bargaining. Journal of Public Economics,
89(8):14971517.
Fréchette, G. R., Kagel, J. H., and Lehrer, S. F. (2003). Bargaining in legislatures:
An experimental investigation of open versus closed amendment rules. American
Political Science Review, 97(02):221232.
Fréchette, G. R., Kagel, J. H., and Morelli, M. (2005c). Gamson's law versus non-
cooperative bargaining theory. Games and Economic Behavior, 51(2):365390.
Frederick, S. (2005). Cognitive reﬂection and decision making. The Journal of Eco-
nomic Perspectives, 19(4):2542.
Friedman, J. W. (1963). Individual behavior in oligopolistic markets-an experimental-
study. Yale Economic Essays, 3(2):358417.
Fudenberg, D., Rand, D. G., and Dreber, A. (2012). Slow to anger and fast to forgive:
Cooperation in an uncertain world. American Economic Review, 102(2):72049.
186
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Gächter, S. and Riedl, A. (2005). Moral property rights in bargaining with infeasible
claims. Management Science, 51(2):249263.
Gantner, A., Horn, K., and Kerschbamer, R. (2016). Fair and eﬃcient division through
unanimity bargaining when claims are subjective. Journal of Economic Psychology.
Genevsky, A., Västfjäll, D., Slovic, P., and Knutson, B. (2013). Neural underpinnings
of the identiﬁable victim eﬀect: Aﬀect shifts preferences for giving. Journal of
Neuroscience, 33(43):1718817196.
Goeree, J. K. and Yariv, L. (2011). An experimental study of collective deliberation.
Econometrica, 79(3):893921.
Goeschl, T. and Lohse, J. (2016). Cooperation in public good games. calculated or
confused? AWI Discussion Paper Series No 626.
Harrison, G. W. and List, J. A. (2004). Field experiments. Journal of Economic
literature, 42(4):10091055.
Hawkins, G. E., Forstmann, B. U., Wagenmakers, E.-J., Ratcliﬀ, R., and Brown, S. D.
(2015). Revisiting the evidence for collapsing boundaries and urgency signals in
perceptual decision-making. Journal of Neuroscience, 35(6):24762484.
Hieber, P. and Scherer, M. (2012). A note on ﬁrst-passage times of continuously time-
changed brownian motion. Statistics & Probability Letters, 82(1):165172.
Hoﬀman, E. and Spitzer, M. L. (1985). Entitlements, rights, and fairness: An exper-
imental examination of subjects' concepts of distributive justice. The Journal of
Legal Studies, 14(2):259297.
Hopfensitz, A. and Reuben, E. (2009). The Importance of Emotions for the Eﬀective-
ness of Social Punishment. The Economic Journal, 119(540):15341559.
Jagau, S. and van Veelen, M. (2017). A general evolutionary framework for the role of
intuition and deliberation in cooperation. Nature Human Behavior, 1.
Jenni, K. and Loewenstein, G. (1997). Explaining the identiﬁable victim eﬀect. Journal
of Risk and Uncertainty, 14(3):235257.
Johnson, N. D. and Mislin, A. A. (2011). Trust games: A meta-analysis. Journal of
Economic Psychology, 32(5):865889.
Kagel, J. H. and Roth, A. E. (2016). The handbook of experimental economics, volume
2: the handbook of experimental economics. Princeton university press.
187
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Kahneman, D. (2003). A perspective on judgment and choice: Mapping bounded
rationality. American Psychologist, 58(9):697.
Karagözo§lu, E. (2012). Bargaining games with joint production. In The Oxford
Handbook of Economic Conﬂict Resolution.
Karagözo§lu, E. and Riedl, A. (2014). Performance information, production uncer-
tainty, and subjective entitlements in bargaining. Management Science, 61(11):2611
2626.
Kocher, M. G., Martinsson, P., Myrseth, K. O. R., and Wollbrant, C. E. (2016). Strong,
bold, and kind: Self-control and cooperation in social dilemmas. Experimental Eco-
nomics.
Kogut, T. and Ritov, I. (2005a). The identiﬁed victim eﬀect: An identiﬁed group, or
just a single individual? Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 18(3):157167.
Kogut, T. and Ritov, I. (2005b). The singularity eﬀect of identiﬁed victims in sepa-
rate and joint evaluations. Organizational behavior and human decision processes,
97(2):106116.
König, T. (2007). Divergence or convergence? from ever-growing to ever-slowing euro-
pean legislative decision making. European Journal of Political Research, 46(3):417
444.
Konow, J. (2000). Fair shares: Accountability and cognitive dissonance in allocation
decisions. The American Economic Review, 90(4):10721091.
Konow, J. (2003). Which is the fairest one of all? a positive analysis of justice theories.
Journal of economic literature, 41(4):11881239.
Krajbich, I., Bartling, B., Hare, T., and Fehr, E. (2015a). Rethinking fast and slow
based on a critique of reaction-time reverse inference. Nature Communications, 6.
Krajbich, I., Hare, T., Bartling, B., Morishima, Y., and Fehr, E. (2015b). A common
mechanism underlying food choice and social decisions. PLoS Comput Biol, 11(10).
Krajbich, I., Oud, B., and Fehr, E. (2014). Beneﬁts of neuroeconomic modeling: New
policy interventions and predictors of preference. The American Economic Review,
104(5):501506.
Ledyard, J. (1994). Public goods: A survey of experimental research. The Handbook
of Experimental Economics.
188
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Leech, D. and Aziz, H. (2013). The double majority voting rule of the eu reform
treaty as a democratic ideal for an enlarging union: an appraisal using voting power
analysis. Institutional Design and Voting Power in the European Union.
Levitt, S. D. and List, J. A. (2007). What do laboratory experiments measuring
social preferences reveal about the real world? Journal of Economic perspectives,
21(2):153174.
Lichtenstein, S. and Slovic, P. (1971). Reversals of preference between bids and choices
in gambling decisions. Journal of experimental psychology, 89(1):46.
Lindman, H. R. (1971). Inconsistent preferences among gambles. Journal of Experi-
mental Psychology, 89(2):390.
Loewenstein, G. (2000). Emotions in economic theory and economic behavior. The
American Economic Review, 90(2):426432.
Lohse, J. (2016). Smart or selﬁsh  when smart guys ﬁnish nice. Journal of Behavioral
and Experimental Economics, 64(10):2840.
Malouf, M. W. and Roth, A. E. (1981). Disagreement in bargaining: An experimental
study. Journal of Conﬂict Resolution, 25(2):329348.
Martinsson, P., Myrseth, K. O. R., and Wollbrant, C. (2014). Social dilemmas: When
self-control beneﬁts cooperation. Journal of Economic Psychology, 45:213236.
McKelvey, R. D. (1991). An experimental test of a stochastic game model of committee
bargaining. Laboratory Research in Political Economy, pages 139168.
Merkel, A. and Vanberg, C. (2017). Legislative bargaining with subjective claims.
Working Paper.
Messick, D. M. and Sentis, K. (1983). Fairness, preference, and fairness biases. Equity
theory: Psychological and sociological perspectives, 61:94.
Mikula, G. (1972). Gewinnaufteilungsverhalten in dyaden bei variiertem leistungsverh-
nis. Zeitschrift fr Sozialpsychologie, 3:126 133.
Mikula, G. and Uray, H. (1973). Die vernachligung individueller leistungen bei der
lohnaufteilung in sozialsituationen. Zeitschrift fr Sozialpsychologie, 4:136  144.
Miller, L., Montero, M., and Vanberg, C. (2018). Legislative bargaining with het-
erogeneous disagreement values: Theory and experiments. Games and Economic
Behavior, 107:6092.
189
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Miller, L. and Vanberg, C. (2013). Decision costs in legislative bargaining: an experi-
mental analysis. Public Choice, 155(3-4):373394.
Miller, L. and Vanberg, C. (2015). Group size and decision rules in legislative bargain-
ing. European Journal of Political Economy, 37:288302.
Milosavljevic, M., Malmaud, J., Huth, A., Koch, C., and Rangel, A. (2010). The drift
diﬀusion model can account for value-based choice response times under high and
low time pressure. Judgment and Decision Making, 5(6):437449.
Mischkowski, D. and Glöckner, A. (2016). Spontaneous cooperation for prosocials,
but not for proselfs: Social value orientation moderates spontaneous cooperation
behavior. Scientiﬁc Reports, 6.
Mobius, M. M. and Rosenblat, T. S. (2006). Why beauty matters. American Economic
Review, 96(1):222235.
Mrkva, K. (2017). Giving, fast and slow: Reﬂection increases costly (but not uncostly)
charitable giving. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making.
Mueller, D. C. (2003). Public Choice III. Cambridge University Press.
Myrseth, K. O. R. and Wollbrant, C. E. (2016). Models inconsistent with altruism
cannot explain the evolution of human cooperation. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences.
Myrseth, K. O. R. and Wollbrant, C. E. (2017). Cognitive foundations of cooperation
revisited: Commentary on rand et al. (2012, 2014). Journal of Behavioral and
Experimental Economics, 69:133  138.
Nishi, A., Christakis, N. A., and Rand, D. G. (2017). Cooperation, decision time, and
culture: Online experiments with american and indian participants. PloS one, 12(2).
Norman, P. (2002). Legislative bargaining and coalition formation. Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, 102(2):322353.
Palmer, J., Huk, A. C., and Shadlen, M. N. (2005). The eﬀect of stimulus strength on
the speed and accuracy of a perceptual decision. Journal of Vision, 5(5):11.
Polanía, R., Krajbich, I., Grueschow, M., and Ruﬀ, C. C. (2014). Neural oscillations
and synchronization diﬀerentially support evidence accumulation in perceptual and
value-based decision making. Neuron, 82(3):709720.
190
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Rabin, M. (1993). Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics. The Amer-
ican Economic Review, 83(5):12811302.
Rand, D. G., Brescoll, V. L., Everett, J. A., Capraro, V., and Barcelo, H. (2016).
Social heuristics and social roles: Intuition favors altruism for women but not for
men. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 145(4):389.
Rand, D. G., Greene, J. D., and Nowak, M. A. (2012). Spontaneous giving and calcu-
lated greed. Nature, 489(7416):427430.
Rand, D. G., Peysakhovich, A., Kraft-Todd, G. T., Newman, G. E., Wurzbacher, O.,
Nowak, M. A., and Greene, J. D. (2014). Social heuristics shape intuitive coopera-
tion. Nature Communications, 5.
Ratcliﬀ, R. (1988). Continuous versus discrete information processing: Modeling ac-
cumulation of partial information. American Psychological Association.
Ratcliﬀ, R. and Rouder, J. N. (1998). Modeling response times for two-choice decisions.
Psychological Science, 9(5):347356.
Recalde, M. P., Riedl, A., and Vesterlund, L. (2014). Error prone inference from
response time: The case of intuitive generosity. CESifo Working Paper Series No.
4987.
Redelmeier, D. A. and Tversky, A. (1990). 36discrepancy between medical decisions
for individual patients and for groups. Preference, Belief, and Similarity, page 887.
Reuben, E. and Riedl, A. (2013). Enforcement of contribution norms in public good
games with heterogeneous populations. Games and Economic Behavior, 77(1):122
137.
Robinson, J. A. and Torvik, R. (2009). The real swing voter's curse. American Eco-
nomic Review, 99(2):31015.
Rubinstein, A. (2007). Instinctive and cognitive reasoning: A study of response times.
The Economic Journal, 117(523):12431259.
Samuelson, L. (2005). Economic theory and experimental economics. Journal of Eco-
nomic Literature, 43(1):65107.
Samuelson, P. A. (1948). Foundations of economic analysis. Harvard University Press.
Sauermann, H. and Selten, R. (1960). An experiment in oligopoly. General Systems,
Yearbook of the Society for General Systems Research, 5:85114.
191
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Schelling, T. (1968). The life you save may be your own. In Problems in Public
Expenditure Analysis. S.B. Chase.
Schlicht, E. (1998). On custom in the economy. Oxford University Press on Demand.
Schmidt, K. M. (2009). The role of experiments for the development of economic
theories. Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, 10(Supplement):1430.
Schulz, H. and König, T. (2000). Institutional reform and decision-making eﬃciency
in the european union. American Journal of Political Science, pages 653666.
Selten, R. (1988). The equity principle in economic behavior. In Models of Strategic
Rationality, pages 269281. Springer.
Sen, A. (1977). Social choice theory: A re-examination. Econometrica, 45(1):5389.
Sen, A. (2017). Collective choice and social welfare: Expanded edition. Penguin UK.
Siegel, S. and Fouraker, L. E. (1960). Bargaining and group decision making: Experi-
ments in bilateral monopoly.
Slovic, P. (2010). If i look at the mass i will never act: Psychic numbingpsychic numbing
and genocidegenocide. In Emotions and risky technologies, pages 3759. Springer.
Slovic, P. and Lichtenstein, S. (1971). Comparison of bayesian and regression ap-
proaches to the study of information processing in judgment. Organizational behavior
and human performance, 6(6):649744.
Small, D. A. and Loewenstein, G. (2003). Helping a victim or helping the victim:
Altruism and identiﬁability. Journal of Risk and uncertainty, 26(1):516.
Small, D. A., Loewenstein, G., and Slovic, P. (2007). Sympathy and callousness: The
impact of deliberative thought on donations to identiﬁable and statistical victims.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 102(2):143153.
Smith, P. L. (2000). Stochastic dynamic models of response time and accuracy: A
foundational primer. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 44(3):408  463.
Smith, V. L. (1962). An experimental study of competitive market behavior. Journal
of political economy, 70(2):111137.
Smith, V. L. (1964). Eﬀect of market organization on competitive equilibrium. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 78(2):181201.
192
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Smith, V. L. (1976). Experimental economics: Induced value theory. The American
Economic Review, 66(2):274279.
Spiliopoulos, L. and Ortmann, A. (2017). The bcd of response time analysis in exper-
imental economics. Experimental Economics.
Stromland, E., Tjotta, S., and Torsvik, G. (2016). Cooperating, fast and slow: Testing
the social heuristics hypothesis. CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5875.
Thaler, R. (1980). Toward a positive theory of consumer choice. Journal of Economic
Behavior & Organization, 1(1):3960.
Thaler, R. (1981). Some empirical evidence on dynamic inconsistency. Economics
letters, 8(3):201207.
Tinghög, G., Andersson, D., Bonn, C., Böttiger, H., Josephson, C., Lundgren, G.,
Västfjäll, D., Kirchler, M., and Johannesson, M. (2013). Intuition and cooperation
reconsidered. Nature, 498(7452).
Tinghög, G., Andersson, D., Bonn, C., Johannesson, M., Kirchler, M., Koppel, L., and
Västfjäll, D. (2016). Intuition and moral decision-makingthe eﬀect of time pressure
and cognitive load on moral judgment and altruistic behavior. PloS One, 11(10).
Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and
biases. science, 185(4157):11241131.
Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1981). The framing of decisions and the psychology
of choice. science, 211(4481):453458.
Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1991). Loss aversion in riskless choice: A reference-
dependent model. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106(4):10391061.
Verkoeijen, P. P. and Bouwmeester, S. (2014). Does intuition cause cooperation? PloS
One, 9(5).
Voss, A., Rothermund, K., and Voss, J. (2004). Interpreting the parameters of the
diﬀusion model: An empirical validation. Memory & Cognition, 32(7):12061220.
Wright, P. (1974). The harassed decision maker: Time pressures, distractions, and the
use of evidence. Journal of Applied Psychology, 59(5):555  561.
Zelmer, J. (2003). Linear public goods experiments: A meta-analysis. Experimental
Economics, 6(3):299310.
193

